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Abstract 
Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Defining Europe -
The Implications of European Neighbourhood Policy 
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This dissertation, which is rooted in constructivist understandings of 
international relations, argues that the process of formulating the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) helps not only in regulating the European Union 's 
exchanges with its neighbours but also in defining the idea of "Europe" and helping to 
establish the European Union's "international identity". 
A new theoretical framework is suggested based on liberal intergovemmentalism 
and discursive constructivism. Through applying the techniques of discourse analysis 
to relevant policy documents and other texts , the dissertation provides a new way of 
understanding the ENP. The dissertation rej ects the simple materialistic argument that 
ENP is simply a response of realpoli tik. By dividing the policy process into three 
phases (first, the Proximity Policy; second, the Wider Europe and then the ENP), this 
dissertation argues that the ENP serves as a tool for each political actor to define the 
European-self and European-others according to their own national interests in their 
domestic and European politics and their perception of Europe as a whole. 
The dissertation shows how international relations theory can be effectively used 
to address important emerging issues in respect of the European Union: that is , the 
matter of borders and identity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Union shall set itself the following objectives: 
"to assert its identity on the 'nternational scene, in particular through the implantation 
of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in the time lead to a common defence. " 
Article B(2) of Treaty of European Union 
Together with the big-bang enlargement in 2004, the European Union has started 
its new policy initiative towards its old and new neighbours : the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Unlike its precedents like European Economic Area 
(EEA) or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), ENP has covered three 
conceptually different regions: the Eastern European countries (or the Western New 
Independent States, WNIS)l , the Southern Mediterranean countries2 and the Central 
Asian countries3. Taking the ordinary understanding of "neighbours" and 
"neighbourhood", the ENP has indeed covered more than expected.4 What's more, 
1 It includes Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, but the bilateral agreement between Belarus has been 
frozen since 1997 due to political reason. 
2 It aims to covers Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, 
Syria and Tunisia. However, there are no formal bilateral relations between EU and Libya, EU and 
Syria. 
3 In ENP, it covers Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
4 Except for Ukraine (580/0), Russia (570/0) and Belarus (500/0), no more than one-third of EU citizens 
regard the ENP countries as EU's neighbours. See Eurobarometer, "The European Union and it 
Neighbours", Special Eurobarometer 259 (Brussels : European Commission, 2006), pp . 12 - 18. 
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EU has committed itself the ideas of "common concerns" and "shared 
responsibilities" under ENP despite the geographical, political and cultural difference 
among the region, implying that the EU "neighbourhood" is a holistic and 
homogeneous concept. Different policies, for example those related to immigration, 
trade, humanitarian aids etc., are also integrated towards under the country's action 
plan. 
For such reason, the ENP has received an unprecedented interest from the 
academic community.5 To sum up, the rhetoric arguing for or against such a policy 
can be divided into three aspect: rationalists argue that the ENP is an urgent response 
from EU towards the European realpolitik (Akgul Acikmese, 2005; Aliboni , 2005 ; 
Batt et. aI , 2003; Copsey, 2007; European Round Table, 2004; Lynch, 2005), policy 
analysts focus on the similarity in the policy structure between the ENP and the 
enlargement negotiation (Cremona, 2004; Cremona and Hillion, 2006; Kelley, 2006; 
Tulmets, 2005) and constructivists go for the questions of European identity and EU 's 
international role - "to the demarcation of who and how Europe was to be and act in 
the world" (Ifversen and K0lvraa, 2007, p.l ; see also Baracani, 2004; 2005 ; Barbe 
5 For example, the earliest research on ENP was probably William Wallace research published in July 
2003, which was just more than half of the year after the policy idea emerged in December 2002. See 
William Wallace, "Looking after the Neighbourhood : Responsibilities for the EU-2S", Notre Europe 
Policy Paper If'4 . 
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and Johansson-Nogues, 2008 ~ Bosse, 2007 ~ Harris, 2004; Johansson-Nogues, 2007 ~ 
Ivatochvil, 2006 ~ Pace, 2005). Nevertheless, little research has placed its conceptual 
analysis on the change of political narratives emerged along the policy formulation 
process. Therefore, this dissertation, rather than producing more empirical facts , 
focuses on the two plain but important questions: what does the ENP produce and 
why does the ENP produce as such. 
As the title suggests, the formation of ENP sheds the light on how the ENP 
defines the ideas of Europe and European identity. Through extensive literature 
reviewing and process tracing, the dissertation aims to conceptualize ENP as a mean 
ofEU's boundary construction and the continuing self-other dialectics, with the 
underlying dynamics of actors in the construction. In short, the dissertation posits 
itself close to a discursive constructivist account of ENP, yet it moves further than the 
traditions by introducing actors ' political interests and institutional bargaining in the 
construction of narratives. 
This chapter starts with a brief revi ew of the policy background, followed by the 
conceptualization of key terms and the thematic framework. Hypotheses of the 
dissertation will be outlined and the methodological setting will be acknowledged. At 
the end, this chapter will give a preview of any potential contribution from the 
Defining Europe 4 
suggested framework and outline the structure of the dissertation. 
1.1 Policy Background 
Neither regional policy nor policy towards its particular neighbours is new for 
European Union. However, the ENP, as mentioned earlier, as attracted unprecedented 
academic concerns owing to the fact that such policy reform was situated under the 
context of the 2004 enlargement, arguably the largest integration and boundary 
expansion in the last two century. With the discussion of ten-in-one enlargement on 
one hand, the EU members have also prepared new initiatives for its new neighbours 
on the other. 
The discussion of a new initiative can be traced to January 2002, when British 
Foreign Minister Jack Straw demanded the Brussels to come up a "proximity policy" 
for the Eastern neighbours. This "proximity policy" was then formally proposed in 
April 2002 (GAERC meeting, 15 April 2002) and ajoint presentation by High 
Representative/Secretary-General (hereafter HRlSG) and Commissioner of External 
Relations to the GAERC was done. With a particular discussion on the relations with 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, GAERC concluded that "these countries should be the 
subject of a differentiated approach" and "the broader question of 'Wider Europe ' 
deserved consideration" (GAERC meeting, 30 September 2002). Finally, the GAERC 
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has adopted a conclusion on launching the New Neighbours Initiative" on 18 
November (GAERC meeting, 18 November 2002). This policy was mentioned as 
"proximity policy", when the Commission President introduced in a formal 
conference (Prodi, 2002). 
The debate and the formulation of the "proximity policy" continued in 2003 and 
by 11 th March of the year, the European Commission has produced a policy 
communication which titled "Wider Europe: Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours" (COM (2003) 104 Final). With 
the detailed discussion on policy ideas and policy instrument, the GAERC agrees 
unanimously on the "Wider Europe" policy on 16 June (GAERC meeting, 16 June 
2003). Since then, the policy was named under the proposed communication with a 
general reference as "Wider Europe".6 However, a year later, when the Commission 
presented its proposed action plans with country reports , the GAERC has explicitly 
challenged the Commission's stance and asked for a closer investigation and 
necessary guidance from the Permanent Representative Committee (GAERC meeting, 
23 February 2004, p.7). The policy formulation has come to a halt and the 
Commission, on 12 May, had redrafted the communication under the heading of 
6 For instance, in the discussion of another communication paper, the Council has used "Wider 
Europe" to replace any idea of "proximity". See 2533 rd GAREC meeting, 13 October 2003. 
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"European Neighbourhood Policy" (European Commission, 2004). This subsequent 
communication was quickly adopted and finalized as the policy initiative towards 
EU's neighbours. In 2005, the ENP was expanded to Caucasian region thus the 
European Neighbourhood Policy has now covered three different regions : the WNIS, 
the Mediterranean Partners and the Caucasian region .. 
1.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
While debate among policy is normal in theories and reality, the policy 
background of ENP has two distinctive features : first, the static feature of ENP 
instrument. By viewing the initiatives proposed by the strategy paper, there are not 
drastic changes or upgrades of relationship between EU and its partnership. For 
instance, as stated in the Wider Europe communication (which is also the 
fundamentals of the European Neighbourhood Policy), "the full implementation and 
exploitation of the provisions contained in the existing Agreements remains a 
necessary preconditions for any new development" (European Commission, 2003b, 
p.17). Except for pooling of resources and a combined budget-line in EU, there is not 
much new reform in policy towards its neighbours but adding benchmarks for the 
neighbours to follow. Contrast with the static features of the policy instruments, the 
policy naming has changed frequently along the policy formulation. Within the 
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two-year time, the policy has renamed itself by three times: "Proximity policy", 
"Wider Europe" and "European Neighbourhood Policy". Occasionally, the later 
changes were suggested by the European Commission and the European Council 
respectively.7 The discrepancies between the nature of policy instruments and policy 
titles create two fundamental research questions : 
Qo: What is the implication of creating European Neighbourhood Policy 
as the ((single, inclusive, balanced and coherent policy framework " 
(GAERC meeting, 18 February 2008)? 
Ql. What is the implication of European Neighbourhood Policy as being 
called as ((Proximity policy", (( Wider Europe " and eventually ((European 
Neighbourhood Policy "? 
The dissertation, centred as an academic enquiry of the above research questions, 
suggests two possible set of explanations, i.e. the research hypotheses : 
Ho: The European Neighbourhood Policy contains political narratives 
which reflect the process of negotiation in the EU's identity formation, 
through the effect of construction process vis-a-vis the ((neighbourhood" 
in different phrases of policy formulatiOn. 8 (The identity politics of ENP) 
H j : The Wider Europe is suggested by the Commission as it tries to 
produce a softened boundary (based on values or political ideas) toward 
7 It is important to note that as the Commission has drafted the paper on its own for most of the time, 
the change of naming in the last stage will make no sense if we disregard the close supervision from 
European Council as an intervening factor. Therefore even the communication was coming from the 
European Commission instead of European Council, the European Neighbourhood Policy, as both the 
policy and naming, may reflect the view of European Council more than that of Commission. 
8 The neighbourhood is constructed since before the ENP, there is no political discourse in EU's 
documents naming the involved countries collectively as the neighbourhood. This idea is important and 
will be discussed in later chapters. 
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all its neighbours,· and 
H2: The European Neighbourhood Policy is suggested as the Council 
tries to purpose a social boundary which is hard and soft. The narrative 
towards the boundaries consist of hard element (like geographical) and 
soft element. 
In short, the dissertation argues that in order to study the implications from 
European Neighbourhood Policy, there are three crucial elements we need to study: 
identity (national and European), institutional process and political narrati ves. Before 
outlining on the thematic framework, the following section aims to conceptualize 
some key terms which will be repetitively used throughout the dissertation. 
1.3 Conceptualization of Terms 
Illustrated in the last section, the dissertation treats ENP as the interaction of 
identity, institutions and political narratives . While institutions simply mean the 
institutional setting for EU's policy formulation, the remaining two deserve a more 
in-depth discussion and clarification. 
Centred in different researches in social science, the idea of identity has its 
different faces. For instance, it can be understood as "the self-conception rooted in the 
society, a sense of who we are in the relation to other" (Caporaso, 2005, p.66). In 
political science, it can also be viewed as a continuous political process of associating 
oneself with reference individuals/groups, at the same time dissociating from other 
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reference individuals/groups (Pace, 2006, p.3). However, the association/dissociation 
mechanism varies on the importance of political culture as a prerequisite of any 
meaningful identity, constituting the debate on Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.9 In 
short, the difference between the "thick" and "thin" lies on the assumption whether a 
pre-defined political culture or ties shared among the members of the community is an 
essence or a .constructed for political identity. For the essentialist approach on identity 
construction, a pre-assigned political culture is a must for any meaningful identity, 
and the inclusion/exclusion nexus is based on the primordial sources like languages, 
ethnicity, and political culture (van Hamm, 2001 , p.S9). On the contrary, the 
constructivist reading on identity asks for the active acquisition and construction of 
political identity (Rumelili, 2004, p.37). Identity is conditional on the fluid social 
interactions within a political entity, and shared political and social norms are 
"constructed" as the further basis of political entity. In the remaining part of the 
dissertation, the constructivist reading will serve as one of the assumptions in 
analysing the idea of European identity. 
9 For the discussion between Gemeinschaji and Gesellschaji, see Peter van Hamm, European 
Integration and the Postmodern Condition: Governance, Democracy and Identity (London: Routledge, 
2001). For other discussion on identity and its relation to culture, see Lars-Erik Cedem1an, "Political 
Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs", in Lars-Erik Cederman edited, Constructing Europe s Identity: 
the External Dimension (London: Rienner Publishers Inc, 2001 ), pp . 1 - 34; Jacob Torfing, New 
Theories afDiscourse: Laclau, MoLifJe and Ziiek (Oxford : Blackwell, 1999); Rainer Hillsse, "Imagine 
the EU: the Metaphorical Construction of a Supra-nationalist Identity", Journal of International 
Relations and Development, 9 (2006). pp. 396 - 421 
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Another importance concept needs to be explicated is the idea of narratives and a 
more familiar concept, discourse. While most of the time these two concepts are 
interchangeable, the dissertation intends to separate each other. The mild distinction 
between narratives and discourses lies on the fact that discourse is defined as "a 
system that regulates the formation of statements" (Wrever, 2004, p.199).10 In the 
case of foreign policy, discourse is understood as "systems of values and rules in a 
given linguistic context" accounting for the governments ' action in relation to other 
international actors (Larsen, 1997, p.14). On the contrary, political narrati ve serves as 
the indicators for actors ' perceptions, thoughts and beliefs (W rever, 2004, p.198 -
199). Therefore, discourse analysis under International Relations discipline, serves as 
the analytical tool which looking for the meaning of the narratives instead of 
regulating the discourse per se (the pattern of languages). Given the focus is the 
analysis of European Neighbourhood Policy (as a foreign policy), the dissertation 
posit itself along with the IR understanding of the relation between discourse and 
narrati ves . 
10 For the detailed discussion of discourse, see Michel Foucault, A.M. Sheridan Smith translated, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 1 972)~ Jacob Torfing, New Theories of 
Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Ziiek (Oxford : Blackwell, 1999). 
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1.4 Thematic Framework of the Whole Dissertation 
As mentioned, pooling different countries into a single policy framework is 
never new in the studies of EU studies, especially EU and its predecessor EC had its 
traditions in developing regional policy for ACP countries and Mediterranean 
partners. ll However, as Michelle Pace (2006, p.4) suggests, the post Cold War 
transformations of international order lead us to re-evaluate the relations between 
regional subsystems (like EU) and the global system. Apart from the traditional 
analysis of security and economic cooperation, the idea of boundaries, borders and 
identity, together with the autonomous dynamics within the region, has entered the 
agenda of International Relations. 12 The spatial and constructivist turn of IR theories 
has led us to rethink a famous question presented by Dr. Karen Smith : what does 
European foreign policy produce? (K. Smith, 2003 , p.3). 
In her book concerning about the EU-Mediterranean policy, Michelle Pace has 
defined EU as a typical regional security complex (Pace, 2006, p.S). Regional security 
II For instance, EU has two sets of regional policy for the mentioned countries : the Contonou 
Agreement and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
12 See for example, Barry Buzan, People, States and Fears: An Agendafor International Security 
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era , 2nd Edition (New York : Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1 99 1 )~ Barry Buzan 
and Ole W (Ever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of In ternational Security (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003 )~ Michelle Pace, "The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The Mediterranean in the 
Foreign Policy of the European Union", Journal of Europ ean Area Studies , 10:2 (2002), pp .189 - 1 99 ~ 
Michelle Pace, The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean (London: 
Routledge, 2006) 
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complex, coined by its founder Barry Buzan, is defined as "a group of states whose 
primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national 
securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another" (Buzan, 1999, 
p.190). However, such idea of security is not rested on traditional realist security. In 
his later work with W rever and de Wilde, Buzan give five distinctive sectors of 
security: mili.tary, political, economic, environment and societal sector of security. 13 
The security of the collective identity of a political entity is the major concern, with 
the referent objects are usually the members of the political entity in danger - thus 
demanding institutional protection from threats challenging their identity and unity 
(Pace, 2006, p.7). Foreign policy, here, plays an important role in articulating the 
"we-concept". As the "Copenhagen School", which Buzan and W rev er belong to, 
argues that the existential threat challenging the political entity is recognized and 
singled out through "speech act", the narratives in the foreign policy should reflect the 
answer of big questions like "where are we heading", "where are we coming from", in 
relation to the existential threat from the Others (W rev er, 2004, pp.205 - 206). The 
utterance of political terms, i.e. the narratives, in the foreign policy is therefore 
constitutive of identity, thus presenting a claim to counter the threat (Pace, 2006, p.7). 
13 For details, see the influential work done by Barry Buzan, Ole Wcever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: 
A New Framework for Analy sis (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1 998)~ for a summary of arguments, 
see Michelle Pace, 2006, pp .6 - 7. 
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Prior to the end of Cold War, talking of European identity was muted as the 
threat \vas obvious: European Communities as the frontier of liberal-capitalist world 
against the Soviet giant. However, the big-bang enlargement has put the EU-space 
away from the former East-West border of the Cold War, and the boundaries of 
Europe - who is "in and who is "out" - are subjected to debate within the European 
public space .. 14 This may cause direct threats towards EU's security in societal and 
political senses and requires the re-articulation of "we-concept". Coined as the 
"identity hegemony" by Thomas Risse (Risse, 2004, p.169), European Union has to 
respond to the threat of the dissolution of European identity. Therefore, based on the 
similar study on EU-Mediterranean politics by Michelle Pace, the central argument of 
the dissertation is that ENP actually is a process of defining European-self and 
European-others by different actors, through the political narratives emerged from the 
constructed idea of "European neighbours/neighbourhood". 
As the implications of political utterances are the main analytical foci of the 
dissertation, the theoretical base mainly follows the discursive constructivist strand of 
social constructivism, where "social constructivism is combined with discourse 
14 For the importance of boundaries in constituting European identities, see Iver B. Neumann, Russia 
and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1996)~ 
Iver B . Neumann, Uses of the Other the East in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minneapolis Press, 1999) ~ Lars-Erik Cederman (200 1). 
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analysis, thus emphasizing the power of enabling discourses in foreign policy" (Pace, 
2006, p.9). Nonetheless, the dissertation has added a new layer of analysis which 
includes the institutional bargaining between member states and the European 
Commission. Such "rational" layer of analysis is inevitable as Knud Erik J0rgensen 
(2004, pp.12 -13) had concluded, there are three permanent features of European 
foreign policy: aspirations, legitimacy and interests. Exogenous as well as endogenous 
interests are both present in the discussion of any European foreign policy, with no 
exemption from the European Neighbourhood Policy. Such understanding between 
the rationalist account and the constructivist interpretation may also be well-supported 
by Diez's suggestion on "discursive nodal points", except Diez has linked explicitly to 
the integration studies, the governance school and member states ' European policy. IS 
1.5 Methodology and Research Limitations 
Originated from a discursive understanding of European foreign policy, the 
methodology deployed in the dissertation combines the strength of interpretivist 
approach with comparative analysis within the phases . The interpretivist approach, as 
suggested by Sonia Lucarelli (Lucarelli , 2004, p.14), emphasizes on "the 
15 See Thomas Diez, "European as a Discursive Battlegrolilld : Discursive Analysis and European 
Integration Studies", Cooperation and Conflict, 36:5 (2001 ), pp .5 - 3 8~ for the original idea of 
discursive nodal points, see the influential book by Ernesto Lac1au and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985). 
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understanding of EU policy process as socially situated", as well as putting stress "on 
the analysis of the self-understandings of those involved in these process". Rather 
than a positivist assumption of simple causality,16 the "hypotheses" suggested in 
section 1.2 contri butes as a causal mechanism how the idea of interests , identity and 
political narratives are linked. 17 By comparative, the dissertation has separated the 
ENP formulation into three phases : the Proximity Policy (2002 - 2003), the Wider 
Europe (March 2003 - February 2004), and the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(May 2004 onward). While any cutting point among three phases may be arbitrary, the 
approximation for such is supported by the reveal of important political documents on 
ENP: the Wider Europe Communication and the European Neighbourhood Strategy 
Paper. The separating treatment ofENP is also driven from J0rgensen 's permanent 
features of European foreign policy, which each phase carries the idea of identity and 
narratives per se, i.e. each of them has represented a status in European Union. Thus, 
the observation of each phase may also fulfil the category of "hypothesis-generating 
case studies" defined by Lijphart (1971 , p.692), which were started out with the vague 
16 The straightforward causality means the Newtonian model of science and social science: theory can 
be reduced to limited number of independent variables and dependent variables ~ context is not 
important in the theory and the causality is one way, i.e. dialectic relationship is not allowed. For a 
discussion of such worldview and other methodology, see the summary done by Shu-yun Ma, "Political 
Science at the Edge of Chaos? The Paradigmatic Implications of Historical Institutionalism", 
International Political Science Review, Vol. 28 :1 (2007), pp .57 -78. 
17 Therefore, the use of the word "hypothesis"I"hypotheses", unless specified, is a rather ordinary 
understanding but not an academic understanding used in empirical research or N ewtonian science. 
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hypothesis and are subsequently used to test the proposed thematic framework. 
1.5.1 The Selection of Case 
A selection of case will automatically be compliment with a non-selection of 
case. For instance, one is legitimate to ask why European Neighbourhood Policy, but 
not some more contentious policies like Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) 
or Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), was chosen as the tool for "defining Europe". 
Particularly on the CFSP, there are numerous research focused on the relationship 
between policy instruments and the construction of European identity. 18 However, the 
dissertation justifies itself on the selection based on two reasons. First and foremost, 
ENP is the most updated policy which the European Union prepared itself for the 
post-enlargement era. Unlike the CAP, ENP was introduced under the context of the 
big-bang enlargement toward the Central and Eastern European countries. The 
enlargement has its implications in all sensitive areas like identity, security and 
boundaries. As identity is changed in relation to the others, a foreign policy like ENP 
may be more suitable in testing any identity changed after the big-bang enlargement. 
18 See for example, Helene Sjursen, "Enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: 
Transforming the EU's External Identity?", in Karen Henderson edited, Back to Europe : Central and 
Eastern Europe and the European Union, reprinted version (Oxon: Routledge, 2004); Michael Smith, 
"The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Post-modern Policy Framework?", 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.10:4 (2003), pp.556 - 575 ; Ian Manners and Richard G. 
Whitman, "The 'Difference Engine ' : Constructing and Representing the International Identity of the 
European Union", Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 10:3 (2003 ), pp .380 - 404. 
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ENP 's advantage on recency is also accompanied by the fruitful policy documents and 
political actions . Unlike the European Security Strategy, the Commission and the 
Council have published numerous reports and press release on the issues, together 
with concrete actions. Therefore, it allows a multi-dimensional analysis of the impact 
ofENP, including narratives and policy actions (as a kind of social practice reflecting 
European identity). Finally, the overriding advantage ofENP, compared to its 
counterparts, is the scope it covered. Coined with the idea of "neighbours", the policy 
is used to cater "the closest Other" with any further integration to EU. These are the 
most influential reference groups for the European Union to associate with/dissociate 
from, in order to build up its solidarity and political identity. As the result, the 
dissertation argues that any test of identity could be most accurately studied through 
the lens of ENP. 
1.5.2 The Articulation a/Narratives and Discourses 
Given the analytical tools used in the dissertation, one important methodological 
challenge is the identification and articulation of narratives/discourses. As Ole W (;ever 
has pointed out, the discursive reading of foreign policy need to face the challenges of 
finding a discourse on one hand, avoiding a circular argument on the others (W (;ever, 
2004, p.206). In encounter the problem raised, the dissertation, as abovementioned, 
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firstly conceptualizes the languages used in the policy text as "narratives", while 
"discourses" are understood as the system of reference for the meaning of narrati ves . 
Secondly, the dissertation follows the two-step approach suggested by Ole W rever 
(2004, pp.206 - 207). Wrever 's approach involves the combination of diachronic and 
synchronic analysis of texts . In the first (synchronic) step, the research will focus on a 
wider selection of texts , aiming to draft the "discourse dictionary" for latter reference 
in understanding the narrati ves . In the later (diachronic) step, the research will shift its 
focus towards the emerging political processes and political texts made by actors 
involved, vvhich are interpreted on the basis of the "dictionary" conceptualized in the 
first phase. 
J. 5.3 The Source of Narratives and Discourses 
As the dissertation tries to neatly separate the treatment of discourses and 
narrati ves, the sources will be different yet partly related. For instance, the narration 
of EU and EU's neighbours can be detected in terms of regular reference to : 19 
a. Image: what is the image of its neighbours portrayed by EU? 
b. Values : what is the normative relationship between EU and its neighbours? 
19 The context of narratives and discourse is modelled from Pace's similar work on EMP. See Pace 
(2006), pp .16 - 17. 
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c. Institutional context: what is institutional hierarchy between EU and its 
neighbours? 
d. "Reality": what is the real practice in European Neighbourhood Policy, 
compared to the portrayed image of EU and its neighbours? 
For the diachronic step, the fWldamental sources drawn on are the Commission 
Communication on "Wider Europe" (COM(2003) 104 Final), the intermediate 
Communication on "Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument" 
(COM(2003) 393 Final) and the subsequent ENP strategy paper (COM(2004) 373 
Final), the Council decision on ENP, European Parliament's resol utions on ENP and 
speeches or articles done by the Commission representatives , the President (Prodi 
from 1999 - 2004, Barroso from 2004 onward) and the Commission of External 
Relations20 (Patten from 1999 - 2004 ~ Benita Ferreo-Waldner from 2004 onward). 
For the synchronic step, a wider selection of texts would be read . These include 
the memoirs of actors, the domestic understanding, like editorials or soap opera, of 
certain narratives appeared in the ENP, recipients ' comments, influential intellectual 
commentaries and most importantly, the main documents of previous neighbouring 
20 The 2004 Commission has merged the ENP Task Force into the Commission of External Relations, 
and the commissioner has been titled as Commissioner of External Relations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy. 
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policies such as European Economic Area (EEA), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP), the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements towards the Eastern Europe and the Caucasian countries 
(PCAs). 
It is not claimed that the above mentioned materials are representati ve in the 
sense they contain all political groupings and discourses in EU. Again, this is not 
possible for practical reasons . Yet, it does contain most of the infl uential groups in EU 
policy fonnulation: the "policy entrepreneur", the executive and the legislature, and 
the feedback from the recipients and the educated public (the academics) . 
1.5. 4 The Methodological Limitations 
Although the dissertation has tried its best not to be ovenvhelmed by the 
importance of identity and ENP, it acknowledges its methodological limitations and 
what has not been covered in the case. First of all , the main text used in the 
dissertation is English-written, although an understanding of second language is 
provided by various scholars. As a multi-linguistic polity, analysis based on a single 
language may not best capture the overall construction of European identity. The pure 
economic motives of the policy instruments are put aside, despite its non-negligi ble 
role of the European Union within . 
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In addition, since the research concentrates on the elites-Ievel of the policy 
formulation and identity construction, the mass response from the European public is 
not the prime target of the dissertation although the mass has always played an 
important role in identity politics. This is however, inevitable, owing to the lower 
popularity of the policy (Eurobarometer, 2006b; 2007) and the lack of resources to 
produce adequate and representative sample. Therefore, instead of working in the 
quantitative fashion, conducts a rather qualitative approach. The necessity of relying 
on written sources to study the impact of the policy is a limitation, yet it is difficult for 
the author to accessing the insider information via interviews due to the limited 
resources . 
1.6 Potential Contributions 
The aim of the dissertation, as repetitively stated, is to understand the 
development of European identity under the lens of ENP. Therefore, the dissertation 
may contribution to the academic community and the diplomatic community in the 
following ways. 
1.6.1 Contributions to Academic Community 
In his critique against constructivism, Andrew Moravcsik states that social 
constructivism fails to live up with two critical elements of social science: "distinctive 
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testable hypotheses" and "methods to test such hypotheses against alternative theories 
or a null hypothesis of random state behaviour" (Moravcsik, 2001, p.177). Moravcsik 
further set the criteria of valid responds for the above criticisms: 
" ... constructivists must specify concrete causal mechanisms through which the process of 
choosing policies and defining interests takes place, with the ultimate goal of saying 
something about which ideas and discourses influence (or do not influence) which 
policies under which circumstances ... constructivists must seek to specify concrete causal 
mechanisms that help to explain which political crises lead to a change in which ideas 
and discourses under which circumstances" (ibid., p.178) 
This dissertation, however, may potentially provide solutions for Moravcsik's 
critiques. First of all, the methodological setting adopted in the dissertation allows 
alternative theories to step in. For instance, alternative theories have to explain why at 
each critical phrase (the comparative cases), the narration towards the neighbouring 
countries changes on one hand, the policy instruments do not change on the other 
during the transition between phrases. In short, if languages and ideas are 
"endogenous to underlying factors" and "transmission belts for interests" (ibid. , 
p.182), the languages used in the policy texts should not be changed drastically -
provided that the policy instruments deployed do not change much.21 
21 This argument assumes that only the policy instruments will affect the distribution of material 
resources or interests. There will be one exception for the liberal constructivists or ideational liberals. 
Yet, stepping in the area of ideational liberals, the distinction of constructivists and liberal 
intergovernmentalist will be very small. 
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In addition, the dissertation also potentially provides casual mechanism for the 
constructivist argument. The core of the mechanism is the idea of EU's legitimacy (in 
terms of identity) and its construction under the restrained institutional setting. Actors ' 
understandings of its nations, its relations with the Europe and the European identity 
serve as the layered variable in explaining the policy outcome.22 The institutional 
setting in EU :will then mediate the policy bargaining thus affect the final policy 
outcome. Therefore, the dissertation can give a potential answer of Moravcsik 
critiques: "explain which political crises lead to a change in which ideas and 
discourses under which circumstances". 
1.6.2 Contributions to the Diplomatic Community 
Echoed with Michelle Pace's work in EMP, the analysis of ENP will also 
potentially contribute to EU's policy making process on its neighbouring countries. 
First of all , the analysis of EU's involvement in the "neighbourhood" will allow 
critical reflection on the new-born policy, thus clarify and evaluate any possibilities 
for further advancement of future policy in the neighbourhood. It also helps the 
recipients to understand the policy in details, and plan for possibilities of future 
involvement with EU's regional policy. Finally, the analysis of EU 's foreign policy 
22 This outcome can be both material outcome and ideational outcome, which the latter one is 
prevailed as demonstrated in the dissertation. 
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will contribute to a more in-depth understanding ofEU's international role and 
foreign policy behaviours, thus allowing the third parties to anticipate and integrate in 
EU's future planning. 
1.7 Chapter Summary and the Preview of the Dissertation 
This chapter serves as the introductory chapter for the whole dissertation. Laying 
down the conceptualization of keywords in the first section, this chapter has 
introduced the thematic framework of the whole dissertation with the methodological 
setting. Chapter 2 will provide a review on the research done by alternative theories in 
explaining the emergency of ENP. That chapter will conclude that while the existing 
literature has deeply explored the rationale for a common neighbourhood policy and 
the specific policy structure of European Neighbourhood Policy, there is little research 
on the idea of policy discourse and the identity implications of the policy. Such 
limitations will be tackled by the more discussion on the thematic framework in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 - 6 will spark the empirical testing of the suggested framevvork, 
and each chapter will discuss the narratives created in each phase. Chapter 7 will 
summarize the major findings and outline the limitation and the further possibility of 
research under the suggested framework. 
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Chapter 2: A Theoretical Review on European Neighbourhood Policy 
"Despite significant internal disputes, the dominant paradigm in IR scholarship regards 
[European integration] as the practice of ordinary diplomacy under opportunities for 
providing collective goods through highly institutionalized exchanged. .. the EC is 
essentially a forum for interstate bargaining. Member- states remain the only important 
actors at European level... Chiefs of Government are at the heart of the EC, and each 
member-state seeks to maximize its own advantage." 
(Pierson, 1996, p. 124) 
This chapter begins with a brief review of the existing researches on ENP and 
their respective limitations in answering the research questions . With the critical 
review of the current research agenda, this chapter will provide some modifications of 
the existing framework of study, which incl udes the idea of liberal 
intergovernmentalism and the discursive constructivism. 
2.1 IR Theories and their Application in European Neighbourhood Policy 
Although there are a few researches explicitly titled with the theories, the 
traditional IR approaches are still an important tool kit in analysing the EU and the 
ENP. As Hill and Smith (2005) argue in the opening of their chapter, such analysis 
enables us to highlight the interactions between EU policy-making and the 
international political environment, but also exposes the key elements of EU's 
international position (Hill and Smith, 2005 , p.3). This section begins with a brief 
review of the existing researches on ENP and end up with their respective limitations 
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in answering the research questions . Despite a high degree of heterogeneity, the 
theoretical work divided along paradigmatic lines of realism, liberalism and 
constructi vism. 
2.1 .1 Realism and its Variation 
Founded and conceptualized by Hans Morgenthau and reframed as Neo-realism 
by Kenneth Waltz, the realist suggestion of interest-maximization and 
security-maximization remains the dominant interpretation of international relations?3 
Under this interpretation, European Union is merely a temporary strategic alliance and 
a forum for interstate bargaining, aiming to deal with security dilemma and individual 
states ' interest (Pierson, 1996, p . 124 ~ see also Rosamond, 2000, Chapter 7). 
Non-security cooperation or a constitutional international regime is therefore 
"unimaginable" (Stone, 1994, p.449). Thus , the primary motives for a common 
European (foreign) policy are capability aggregation and the control of allies, in order 
to maximize nation-states ' security (Gelpi, 1999, pp. 1 07 - 139).24 Pooling of 
sovereignty in certain non-security areas may on one hand a loss of non-security 
23 For the arguments of realism, see Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power 
and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1 94 8)~ for the arguments of neo-realism, see Kenneth Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics (New York : McGraw-Hill , 1979). For a summary text of the realist 
school, see John Baylis and Steve Smith eds., The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to 
International Relations (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005). 
24 For the rationale of alliance under realist rhetoric, see also Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1997). 
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autonomy but on the other hand an increase in common capabilities and mutual 
control in security issues. Given the logic of security maximization, the emergence of 
European foreign policy can be stimulated either the alteration of bi -polar structure 
(Waltz, 1993; Kaplan, 1996; Stone, 1994) or the containment of the larger European 
states , arguably the Germany (Art, 1996; Morgenthau, 1948; Grieco, 1995). 
Pooling of resources for security purpose is always the agenda for the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (Akgul Acikmese, 2005 ; Aliboni, 2005; Batt et.al , 2003 ; Lynch, 
2005). In sum, the analysis argues that the aim of ENP is to manage its neighbours ' 
security threats. This in fact echoes EU's new perceptions on new security threat and 
management, as putting in the European Security Strategy (European Council, 2003): 
"It is in the European in countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who 
are engaged In violent conflict, weak states where organized cnme flourishes, 
dysflllctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems 
for Europe." (ibid, p.7) 
As the result, although the further integrated neighbourhood policy may 
effectively increase the role of supranational European Commission in the area of 
intergovemmentalism-oriented foreign policy (Delcour, 2007), the European states are 
willing to give up their relative autonomy and allow the Commission to draft country 
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assessment reports and different developmental aid programmes towards its 
neighbours in ENP - as "the best protection of our (European) security is a world of 
well-governed democratic states" (European Council, 2003 , p.1 0). 
2.1.2 Liberal Institutionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
By turning politics into economics, the liberal paradigm is more readily to 
explain the emergence of a European common foreign policy. The first group of 
liberal theories has based on two important notions -liberal as the importance of trade 
(Rosecrance, 1986; Keohane and Nye, 1989) and institutions as the importance of 
rules (Keohane, 2002; Haas, 1968). With the increasing globalization, economic 
considerations have been overshadowed governments ' policy options vis-a-vis 
security concerns. However, the abstraction power of national states is limited in 
controlling the transnational flows of capital and resources. Owing to the relative 
small dimension of European states, they are intended to pool their political resources 
together to a critical mass for competition with United States and China. Nonetheless, 
recalling the "logic of collective actions", the development of public goods does not 
guarantee cooperation among European states? 5 Pooling of sovereignty indeed help 
25 For the illustration of free-rider problem, see the traditional work from Mancur Olson, Logic of 
Collective Actions: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass : HaIvard University 
Press). 
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the European states surpass the free-rider problem, because the supranational 
executives, the Commission, can always check for any free-riding activities. 
The liberal intergovernmentalism, as the second group of the liberals, stresses on 
the domestic preference structure and the importance of intergovernmental bargaining. 
Inspired by the two-level games developed by Robert Putnam26, Andrew Moravcsik 
(1993 ; 1997; 1998) introduces the analogy into the EU politics. By delegating certain 
policies to a supranationallevel, the governments can gain extra resources against 
their domestic rivalries. The government, instead of playing the international 
chessboard only, has to negotiate between the domestic preference structure and 
interstates bargaining. As the result, submission under the common policy is 
conditional unless the policy can secure the domestic interest (Moravcsik, 1998). 
Although the liberal theories are more easily to explain common policy, there are 
few academic researches focused on ENP under the paradigm.27 While Copsey's 
research (2007) investigate the members ' preference and their roles in shaping the 
26 See Robert Putman, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics : the Logic of Two-level Game", 
International Organization, 42 :3 (1988), pp . 427 - 460. 
27 Rather, more researches have been focused on the Southern Mediterranean region instead of the 
whole assessment ofENP. See for example, Fulvio Attina, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Assessed: The Realist and Liberal View", European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8:2 (2003 ), pp .181 -
200 ~ Raffael1a A. Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, "From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with 
European Neighbourhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean?", European Foreign Affairs 
Review, Vol. I 0 : I , pp .I7 - 38 
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ENP, the conclusion of European Round Table is clear: the ENP should be made to 
focus on building an integrated economic region (IER) which argues that "further 
economic integration can increase international competitiveness in both the EU and 
its neighbouring countries, thus raising growth and bringing significant employment 
and welfare gains" (European Round Table, 2004, p.3; see also Dodini and Fantini , 
2006). The ecpnomic concern of ENP is in fact self-evident during the first ENP 
conference, as the participants always asked for constant energy supply from the 
oil-rich neighbours.28 We may also regard them as speaking the liberal rhetoric. 
2.1.3 Constructivism and its Application 
Borrowing the sociological perspectives of the world order, a number of critical 
theories have been concentrated on understanding "from the inside" of the decision 
maker, rather than "from the outside" of the international event. 29 Instead of 
assuming national interests are "exogenous" from the international system (security 
for the realists , economics for the liberals), the constructivists argue that states ' 
28 For example, statements from both the EU side (Vice President of European Investment Bank, 
Slovenian Foreign Affairs State Secretary, Romanian Minister of Development) and the ENP side 
(Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Affairs Minister, Georgian Vice-Prime Minister) have bother 
expressed their concern on energy supply and energy security during their speeches. 
29 For the general text of constructivism, see Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and 
Understanding International Relations (Oxford , Clarendon Press, 1990); Yosef Lapid and Fredrich 
Kratochvil eds ., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers Inc., 1996). 
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interest, if any, are shaped by the idea of state identity (Wendt, 1996, pp.48 - 50 and 
1999, chapter 3). Therefore, states cannot be reduced to any functionally-identical and 
institutionally-identical unit. As the result, actors' motives are "endogenous" variables, 
depending on certain cognitive conditions. In explaining the cognitive conditions, we 
can roughly divide the constructivist camp into two sub-theoretical frameworks. 
The first camp of constructi vists focuses on the power of institutions and 
process - the idea of socialization. 30 European Union is best characterized as the 
Deutschian conception of "security community" (Alder and Barnett, 1998). Informal 
interactions among the elites, between the elites and the mass, and among the mass 
would create incentives for further institutional building and sharing of competence. 
This conception of institution building in fact shares with the neo-functionalist idea of 
spill-over, which is considered as "the official theory" of European integration (Risse, 
2005, pp.293 - 298).31 Accordingly, a "Europeanized" platform of political interests 
and policy option can be reached by different European states even they are 
30 The earliest work of this school can be traced to Deutsch's work, although he did not claim himself 
as a constructivist. See Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ : 
Prentice Hall, 1968); see also Ernst Haas, "Words Can Hurt You; Or, Who Said What to Who about 
Regimes", International Organization, 36 :2 (1982), pp. 207 - 243 ; Ernst Haas and Peter Haas, 
"Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International Institutions", Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies , 31:3 (2002), pp . 573 - 601. 
31 See also Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-states: Functionalism and International Organizations 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and 
Economic Forces, 1950 - 1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968). For a summary of 
functionalism and neo-functionalism, see Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 2000), Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
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"desecuritized" from the haunted Cold War contention (White, 2001, pp.118 - 141). 
Instead of holding singular national interest, EU member states are socialized to hold 
"European interests". 
The other camp of constructivists, on the contrary, focuses on the identity of the 
European states and EU international role. 32 In his theory of regime, Ruggie believes 
that actors may be a utility-maximizing unit before entering the regime, yet the 
creation of regime would create an ideational shift to long-term, common and 
reciprocity of the regime-bounded actor (Levy et. aI, 1995, pp.287 - 290).33 EU, 
instead of being solely public good provider, serves as a normative entity "consisting 
of sets of mutual expectations, generally agree-to rules, regulations and plans, in 
accordance with which organizational energies and financial commitments are 
allocated" (Ruggie, 1975 , p.S69). As the result, the embedded principles - democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights , free markets - "creates an incentive for states to sustain 
those same objectives and constitute a 'European ' identity" (Andreatta, 200S , p.32). 
32 See for example Alexander Wendt, "Identities and Structural Change in International Politics", in 
YosefLapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. , 1996), pp.47 - 64 ~ Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of 
International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. 
33 For details of Ruggie 's regime theory, see John Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: 
Concepts and Trends", International Organization , Vol. 29 :3 (1975), pp . 557 - 583. Ruggie also 
applies his analysis to EC as the first "postmodern state", see John Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond : 
Problematizing Modernity in International Relations", International Organization , 47 : 1 (1993), pp . 
139-174. 
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European states, instead of utility-maximizing, will adopt the "logic of 
appropriateness" or "bounded rationality" in assessing the common position. 34 A 
common policy, especially when it is echoing the "constructed role" ofEU, will be 
adopted. 
Most of the ENP researches are indeed overwhelmed by the idea of "civilian 
power" or the "ethical power" of EU, or its failure to deliver the values (Barbe and · 
Johansson-Nogues, 2008; Baracani, 2004; 2005 ; Bosse, 2007; Harris, 2004; 
Johansson-Nogues, 2007 ; I(ratochvil , 2006; Pace, 2005) but little on the construction 
of national interest (cf. Natorski , 2007). Under the intergovernmental realm, Natorski 
(2007) has emphasized the constructed interest of Spain and Poland in the common 
neighbourhood policy through institutions and learning. Johansson-Nogues (2007 ; 
Barbe and Johansson-Nogues, 2008), on the other hand, shows that the ENP content 
in fact fails to "live up to the strong languages used at the policy 's outset in favour of 
normative promotion" (Johansson-Nogues, 2007, p.192). The general perception is 
that ENP offers little added values to the neighbourhood countries in the field of 
34 For the logic of appropriateness, see the important work by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 
Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York : Free Press, 1 984)~ For 
"bounded rationality" , see Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Politics", in Kathleen Thelen, Sven Steinmo and Frank Longstreth eds., Structuring 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1 - 33 . These two ideas indeed fall into 
the category of institutionalism in general, for a general review see Thomas A. Koelble, "Review: the 
New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology", Comparative Politics , 27:2 (1995), pp .23 1 -
243 . 
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democratic promotion (Barbe and Johansson-Nogues, 2008). Kratochvil 's research 
(2006) will probably one of the most inspiring constructivist research on ENP, as he 
pointed out the four conflicting interpretation of ENP by different groups of states -
and this claim will be revisited in the later section of the chapter. In short, from the 
constructivist realm, the ENP is the reflection of "enlargement experience" and the 
European values towards its neighbours. 
2.2 Problems of the Traditional IR Theories 
Although the traditional conceptual lens can provide us with fruitful research 
questions as well as analysis, the existing IR theories may not provide a satisfactory 
for the research questions. The suggested answers of each theory for the research 
questions are summarized in the following table (Table 1.1): 
What does ENP produce? Why does ENP produce as such? 
Realism Enhanced security of Intergovernmental bargaining 
European states through the between security maximizing states 
alliance built between EU 
and the neighbours 
Liberalism Liberal institutionalism: Intergovernmental consensus in order 
Enhanced economic benefits to eradicate any free-riding European 
and constant energy supply states 
through expansion of the 
institutionalized common 
market 
Liberal Intergovernmental bargaining 
intergovernmentalism: between interest maximizing states 
Enhanced nati onal interests 
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through limited cooperation 
wi th European states 
Constructivism European identity - as a Socialization School: 
normative power35 Natural spill-over effect, reflecting 
the general European interests 
Identity School: 
Reflection of EU international role 
and European identity 
Table 1.1 : Summary ofIR theories 
However, in his conceptualization of Europe's international role, Christopher 
Hill and William Wallace argue that the EPC has provided both substantial and 
methodological challenges to tradition IR scholarships (Hill and Wallace, 1996, p.1).36 
In sum, there are three limitations in traditional IR scholarship, which may hinder any 
comprehensive analysis of the research questions . 
2.2.1 The Maltreatment afBargaining Game within EU 
Referred to the last table, both realist and the liberals rely on the 
intergovernmental bargaining or consensus in explaining the policy outcome. The EU 
is "essentially a forum for interstate bargaining" which "each member-state seeks to 
35 The term used here serves as the general usage but not specific academic meaning. In fact , the idea 
normative power is different from the idea of civilian power, ethic power. See the discussion of terms 
in Chapter 5 of the dissertation. 
36 For Hill 's criticism on the application of traditional IR scholarship in EU foreign policy behaviours, 
see also Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International 
Role", Journal of Common Market Studies , 31 :3 (1993), pp.305 - 328; Christopher Hill, The Changing 
Politics of Foreign Policy (Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 ). See also Roy H. Ginsberg, 
"Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical 
Capability-Expectations Gap", Journal of Common Market Studies, 37:3 (1999). pp . 429 - 454 
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maximize its own advantage" (Pierson, 1996, p.124). One of the main assumptions for 
realism and liberal institutionalism is that states, or governments of the states, are the 
most important actors in the international system. However, the state-centric 
assumption of international relations has been challenged empirically. As many 
political scientists have demonstrated in their researches , there is a growing 
emergence of .deepened alliance and everyday politics in Brussels and Stras burg. 37 In 
fact, recent reflections of IR disciplines have somehow rejected the state-centric 
ontology, as nowadays international relations are all "about cross-border transactions 
or the development of forms of world society" (Rosamond, 2000, p.164). The idea of 
state-as-actor in the international relations is the academic legacy ofWestphalian 
system, which was partial be replaced by the globalization. 
In analyzing EU foreign policy behaviours, the state-centric ontology has led to 
the general ignorance of European Commission as the policy actor. Indeed, the 
founder of liberal intergovernmentalism, Andrew Moravcsik, has also acknowledged 
the importance of European Commission as "informal entrepreneur" in the 
negotiation of Single European Act (SEA) (Moravcsik, 1999, pp.292 - 298).38 Unlike 
37 See for example, James Caporaso and John Keeler, "The ElITopean Union and Regiona l Integration 
Theory", in Sonia Mazey and Carolyn Rhodes eds., The State of European Union: Building a European 
Polity?, Vo!. 3 (Boulder, co: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Simon Hix, "CP, IR and the EU! A Rejoinder to 
Hurrell and Menon", West European Politics, Vo!. 19:4 (1996), pp. 802 - 804 . 
38 However, it is important to note that Andrew Moravcsik believes that the occasion for such informal 
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an interest-free agent, the European Commission can create a "bureaucratic drift" of 
the policy outcome, through either selective supply of information or selective 
implementation of the agreed policy - even the policy is formally out of the 
competence of European Commission (Hix, 2005, pp.27 - 31; pp.67 - 69). As the 
result, the European Union cannot be treated as a forum of bargaining or information 
exchange which is dominated by nation-states. At least, we should include the 
European Commission as one of the principal actors in the bargaining game. 
2.2.2 The Maltreatment of EU Polity 
Although the constructivist theory is more relax on the state-centric assumption, 
it has another limitation in explaining the research questions. The idea of role-identity 
in international politics has presumed that EU can be appropriately analysed as a 
single actor. We may have multiple roles or multiple identities, but the discussion of 
roles and identity is limited to a singular human being or a unitary political 
community (like the rolelidentity of a nation). Conversely, if we describe a policy 
reflecting the identity or the role of a political community, we assume that the 
entrepreneurship is rare, see Andrew Moravcsik, "A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and 
International Cooperation", International Organization, 53 :2 (1999), pp.267 - 306; For a detailed 
discussion of political entrepreneurship of European Commission, see Giandomenico Majone, "The 
European Commission as Regulator", in Giandomenico Majone edited, Regulating Europe (London: 
Routledge, 1996), pp.61 - 82; see also Laraine Laudati, "The European Commission as Regulator: the 
Uncertain Pursuit of the Competitive Market", in Giandomenico Majone edited, Regulating Europe 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp.229 - 264. 
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description should apply to the whole community, or at least the majority to its 
members . 
However, this assumption is not valid in analysing EU's foreign policy 
behaviours. In his evaluation of European foreign policy, J0rgensen states one 
important feature ofEU: "the multiple realities" (J0rgensen, 1998, p.12). Fraser 
Cameron even termed EU as suffering from "schizophrenia" (Cameron, 2007, p.1S). 
In practice, the EU does have different respondents for different questions : in trade 
area, the partnered countries may need to find the European Commission; for security 
issues , however, the partnered countries may have to go strict to the European Council. 
The problem of "who speaks for Europe" not only gives bad images to EU 's partners , 
but also raises the academic implication of non-unitary and multi-level entity ofEU.39 
2.2.3 The Maltreatment of EU Foreign Policy 
The spill-over school, on the other hand, may undermine the importance of 
European foreign policy. In fact, the spill-over school does not look for any purposive 
39 For the complexity of such multi-level analysis, see Michael Smith, "The European Union's 
Commercial Policy : Between Coherence and Fragmentation", Journal of European Public Policy, 8:2 
(2001), pp . 787 - 802~ Michael E. Smith, "Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-making: Multi-level 
Governance, Domestic Politics and National Adaptation to Europe 's Common Foreign and Security 
Policy", Journal of European Public Policy, 11 :4 (2004), pp, 740 -758 ~ Brian White, Understanding 
European Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave, 200l ) ~ Brian White, "Foreign Policy Analysis and 
European Foreign Policy", in T. Christiansen and B Tonra eds., Rethinking European Foreign Policy 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp.45 - 61 . 
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action in the foreign policy formulation, but a state of being. Instead, they are more 
focused on how the policy is "felt" by the third party (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, 
p.27). However, even the founders of the idea of "presence", AlIen and Smith, have 
extended their research questions : "how does EU make its presence felt? To what 
extent can it move from presence to purpose?,,40 In fact, Knud Erik J0rgensen (2004) 
points out that EU's external relations are tangled permanently with three issues : 
"aspirations", "legitimacy" and "interests" (J0rgensen, 2004, pp.12 - 13). Therefore, 
taking socialization as granted may have the risk of overlooking the internal 
complexity of foreign policy formulation, which is a fruitful source of valuable 
hypotheses and implications. 
On the other hand, the liberal intergovemmentalist argues that state elites carry 
strict instrumental rationality toward ENP. However, the liberal intergovemmentalism 
has assumed that the states (or the elites in the states) must gain after the action, 
which is difficult to be tested. The difficulty lies on the fact that "the application of 
formal game theory to international relations requires a variety of information, which 
has to be gained ex ante ~ otherwise the hypothesis cannot be tested" (Wolf and Zangl, 
1996, p. 356). In addition, as J0rgensen reminds us, EU's external relations have 
40 It was cited from Ginsberg (1999), p.448. For the details of Allen and Smith critiques, see David 
Allen and Michael Smith, "Western Europe 's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena", 
Review of International Studies, 16: 1 (1990), pp.19 - 37. 
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features related to aspirations and legitimacy - which both of them are difficult to be 
linked with formal game theory calculation. In fact, it is arguable whether the idea of 
legitimacy "can be deployed and purchased at specific if variable costs" (M. Smith, 
1994, p.38) - as questioned by Risse in his study ofneo-functionalism and European 
identity (Risse, 2005, pp.298 - 299).41 Therefore, liberal intergovemmentalism may 
have to be amended in order to apply to contemporary European foreign policy.42 
2.3 From IR Theories to Policy-oriented Analysis 
Mentioned in the earlier section, the ENP also attracts policy analysts, seeking to 
explain the uniqueness ofENP 's structure. What differentiate the set of studies from 
the above-reviewed set of literature is that the policy analysts try to theorize the 
formulation of "means" while IR theorists try to theorize the "ends". Under the 
policy-oriented appro'ach, two characteristics of ENP have always been stressed: the 
imitation from the previous enlargement success and the cross-pillar characteristics of 
ENP. 
41 For the detail discussion of neo-functionalism, and European identity, see Thomas Risse, 
"Neo-functionalism, European Identity and the Puzzles of European Integration", Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 12 :2 (2005), pp. 291 - 298; Emst Haas, The Uniting of Europe . 
42 Possibly the liberal intergovenunentalist will take the critiques as it does not fundamentally harm its 
theoretical values, For example, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Constructivism and European Integration: A 
Critique", in Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik J0rgensen and Antje Wiener eds., The Social 
Construction of Europe (London: Sage, 2001 ), pp . 176 - 188. 
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2.3.1 The Enlargement Experience of the Usual Reference 
Most, if not all , of the ENP analysis are "overwhelmingly consider the 1990's 
enlargement process as a reference to study neighbourhood policy" (Delcour, 2007, 
p.l21, italic as original). The reliance of "enlargement wisdom" includes the 
explanation of policy 's creation43 , policy modes44 and policy tools45 . The choice of 
policy structure, as this set of literature argues, is the path dependency of the policy' 
making. As Judith Kelley (2006) suggests, the ENP is a policy of "New Wine in Old 
Wineskins", which is a "direct mechanical borrowing" from the successful 
enlargement experience (Kelley, 2006, p.32). The ENP has borrowed, for example, the 
idea of conditionality (the Copenhagen proximity criteria versus the Copenhagen 
criteria for accession), the monitoring mechanisms Goint assessments , unilateral EU 
reports , country reports) and the personnel (the Head of the ENP Task Force, Michael 
Leigh, was the former Director in DG Enlargement). The difference among this subset 
43 See for example, Marise Cremona, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: Legal and Institutional 
Issues", CDDRL Working Paper 25 (November 2004). 
44 See for example, EIsa Tulmets, "The Introduction of the Open Method of Coordination in the 
European Enlargement Policy: Analysing the Impact of the PHARE/Twinning Instrument", European 
Political Economy Review, 3: 1 (2005), pp. 54 - 90. 
45 See Michael Emerson, ""European Neighbourhood Policy : Strategy or Placebo?", CEPS Worldng 
Document nO 215 (November, 2004)~ Judith Kelley, "New Wines in Old Wineskins : Policy Adaptation 
in the European Neighbourhood Policy", Journal of Common Market Studies , 44 : 1 (2006), pp . 29 - 55 ~ 
EIsa Tulmets, "Adapting the Experience of Enlargement to the Neighbourhood Policy: The ENP as a 
Substitute to Enlargement?", in Petr Kratochvil edited, The EU and its Neighbourhood Policy: Policies, 
Problems and Priorities (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2006), pp.29 - 58. 
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of literature, as Delcour reviewed, is the complexity of policy adaptati on of ENP from 
the enlargement experience (Delcour, 2007, p.122). 
2.3.2 The Cross-pillar Characteristics of ENP 
Another subset of research literature focuses on the "cross-pillar" characteristics 
of ENP. The central argument of this approach starts from the inter-transferability 
between the internal and external governance.46 The idea of external governance, as 
Lavenex describes, is "the institutional/legal boundary is moved beyond the circle of 
member states ", aiming to "manage the external interdependence of the EU as a 
nascent political system" (Lavenex, 2004, pp.683 - 685). For example, by reviewing 
the articulation of stability and prosperity, Cremona and Hillion suggest that ENP is 
"an attempt to integrate the pillars within the framework of one policy" (Cremona and 
Hillion, 2006, p.l). EIsa Tulmets, on the other hand, has highlighted the open method 
of coordination used to create ENP was the first transferral of decision making pattern 
in internal enlargement policy to external neighbourhood policy.47 It is also evident 
from the European Security Strategy (2003) which indicates the needs for bringing 
diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environment policies under the same 
46 See Sandra Lavenex, "EU External Governance in ' Wider Europe" ', Journal of European Public 
Policy, 11:4 (2004), pp . 680 - 700. 
47 See Tulmets (2006). 
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security agenda. Thus, the ENP is serving a security propose by using the first pillar 
instruments. 
2.3.3 Criticisms of the Policy-oriented Approach 
Although the policy-oriented approach can help us to identify the rationale of the 
policy structure, few researches have been focused on comparison of actual 
implementation among the neighbours (Delcour, 2007, pp. 125 - 127): how can they 
accoWlt for the similarity and the difference between two sets of neighbours , the West 
New Independent States and the Mediterranean countries? How can they account for 
EU's management on the existing policy and the new initiatives? In fact, as a part of 
social practices, the whole ENP policy process, from idea generation to policy 
structuring, and the policy implementation, does carry the social meaning through a 
system of representations .48 For instance, why does EU "apparently" unified its 
neighbourhood policies on one hand; implement the Neighbourhood Policy in a 
differentiated approach on the other? Instead of being labelled as "partnership", these 
countries have been upgraded to "neighbours" or "privileged partners". What are the 
difference "neighbours" and "partners"? Or more fundamental, what is the conception 
48 Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
Methods", Journal of International Relations, 5:2 (1999), pp. 225 - 254 ~ Henrik Larsen, "Discourse 
Analysis in the Study of European Foreign Policy", in Thomas Christiansen and Ben Tonra eds., 
Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp .62 - 80. 
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of "neighbours" in EU's point of view? This will become more puzzled when we take 
the Commission statement on the implementation into the account: "supplement and 
build on existing policies and arrangements" (European Commission, 2003b, p.IS) . 
Kelley 's "mechanical borrowing" thesis or Tulmets ' "policy adaptation" thesis cannot 
effectively explain the whole picture across the neighbourhood, although the existing 
literature "has. convincingly demonstrated the reality of such a transfer in policy 
design" (Delcour, 2007, p.127). 
2.4 Common Shortfalls of IR Theories and Policy-oriented Analysis 
A common shortfall in the above reviewed theoretical approaches is that they 
presume that the social configuration of "neighbourhood" and the European identi ty 
as entities that already exist. Some approaches , like the liberals and the policy 
approaches , speak of the states or bureaucratic institutions as actors in the 
neighbourhood making proj ects . States or bureaucratic institutions are therefore 
presumed of having autonomy and choice to construct the region as desired. Other 
approaches , like the realism and institutionalism, the structure is important but no 
autonomous states . The anarchical international order or the bureaucratic dependency 
will determine the actions of any actors involved in the system. No matter for 
actor-based or structure-based approaches present above, the common deficiency is 
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that they both present a static framework for the analysis .49 However, judging from 
the development of ED, the content of neighbourhood, even in the most stringent 
definition, has changed vis-A-vis the enlargement process. 50 As the result, static 
analysis of the policy may not be able to capture the subtle dynamics within the actors 
and policy formulation. 
Apart from the static nature of the abovementioned theories , another pitfall of the 
abovementioned theories is the general misassumption on languages . Little 
explanation has been placed on "how the actions putatively covered by the term were 
organized and enacted in particular circumstances" (Milliken, 1999, p.241). In fact, 
traditional IR theories and policy analyses try to downplay the importance of 
languages in international relations . 51 For example, rationalist approaches like 
realism and liberalism see language as a neutral medium or reference terms; 
psychological and structuralist linguistic approaches try to assume the use of 
languages as pure reveal of actors ' beliefs and idea for communication.52 However, 
49 This deficiency is also found in the constructivist work reviewed. The identity school has assumed 
the nonnative power is the strong ideational structure for EU's foreign policy, while the socialization 
school presumed that socialization will also result in a single European interest. 
50 Here, we can at least identify two changes . Politically, the end of Cold War makes the Eastern 
European countries as recognized neighbours of EU. Geographically, the boundaries ofEU has shifted 
in 1995 and 2004 enlargement, so do the member states which are nonnal known as neighbours - even 
though the EU did not explicitly call them as neighbours until the development of ENP. 
51 See Larsen, 1997, chapter 1. 
52 Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U. S. 
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such assumption is rejected empirically. 53 Instead, language is first of all never 
constant and value-free. The "impact" of words is coming from the social values 
assign to them, and only by interpreting the languages with social values we can make 
sense of the world. 54 Thus, languages, narratives and discourses have jointly 
constructing the world rather than being silent in international system. Discursive 
practices on neighbourhood, in this dissertation, are thus taken as the main units of 
analysis. 
2.5 Chapter Summary and Preview of Next Chapter 
This chapter begins with a brief review of the existing researches on ENP: while 
the realists and the liberals look for material gains in security and economy 
respectively, the constructivists believe identity matters and the policy analysts argues 
for an institutional me·chanical borrowing from the success of last enlargement. 
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines", International Quarterly , 37 (1993), pp .297 - 320, 
especially pp .299 - 305 for the idea of post-positivist analysis~ Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, "Beyond 
Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations", European Journal of 
International Relations, 3, pp . 193 - 237, especially pp .195- 209 for the relations between ideas and 
rationalism ~ for psychological understanding of languages, see Mark L . Knapp, Interpersonal 
Communicaiion and Human Relationship (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1984) and Michael Argyle, The 
Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1974). 
53 For empirical studies, see Glen Fisher, International Negotiation (Chicago : International Press, 
1980). 
54 See Michel Foucault, A.M. Sheridan Smith translated, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1972) ~ Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (London: Methuen, 
1982); Jacques Derrida, Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B . Naas translated, The Other Heading: 
Reflections on Today s Europe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) . 
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Although these theories start from different epistemic or ontological assumptions of 
European politics , they share the same shortfalls in analysing the European 
Neighbourhood Policy: they both present a static framework for the analysis and 
ignore the importance of language in social practice. In order to fill in the analytical 
gap, the next chapter at the end suggests a new theoretical framework, by breaking 
down into two components : the constructivist conception of "identity politics" and the 
liberal conception of "the politics of identity". Hypotheses are suggested under each 
components and the justification will be suggested in the next chapter. 
Defining Europe 48 
Chapter 3: The Tangled Relations between Identities and Interests 
"Our common foreign policy cannot just be interested-based. Protecting and promoting 
values, which are part of our history and very dear to the hearts of our citizens, must 
continue to be a priority. The values of solidarity of tolerance, of inciusiveness, of 
compassion are an integral part of European integration. We cannot give up on them, 
especially now that ugly racist pulsions are surfacing again,' and that fighting against 
poverty is becoming critically important to prevent whole societies falling prey to 
radical and terrorist tensions. " 
(Solana's address on Danish Institute of International Affairs, Copenhagen, May 2002) 
Reviewed in the last section, one common shortfall of the traditional analysis is 
the failure in addressing the dynamic nature of European Neighbourhood Policy. The 
complexity of European foreign policy, rather than traditional beliefs of its lacking of 
consistency, is the tangled relations between identities and interests at both national 
and European level. Any meaningful analysis, as the dissertation so argues, must 
deconstruct the interests and identities of the main actors separately in national and 
European level. The disintegrated elements will be re-integrated under the 
institutional arrangement of EU thus affecting the final outcome. 55 By taking this 
position through the dissertation, this chapter is structured to discuss the elements 
involved in the European Neighbourhood Policy. The whole thematic framework will 
be sketched in the chapter, and leads to the discussion on empirical chapters at the 
55 This outcome can both be material one (security or economic benefits) or ideational one (identity) . 
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end. 
3.1 The Political Context of European Union in the 21st Century 
To start with, this section will discuss the general background of European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Argued by post-structuralists and constructivists, an in-depth 
review of the changing political context will help us to locate the background of the 
tangled relations of identities and interests - which both of them are 
context-dependent. In sum, there are three major changes in international systems 
which redefine EU's political behaviours towards its neighbours: the end of Cold War, 
the rise oftransnational challenges, and the big-bang enlargement. 
3.1.1 The End afCold War 
Although some a~ademics view that the international system does not change 
since the end of Napoleonic France or Wilhelmine Germany, the end of Cold War 
with the breakdown of the Warsaw counterpart, has marked as the revolution in the 
international affairs in itself. 56 As Christopher Hill (2003, pp.ll - 12) emphasizes, 
the impact rests on the destruction of a maj or transnational ideology, but not simply a 
56 See for example, Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), 
chapter 5; Fred Halliday,. The World at 2000 (London: Palgrave, 2001 ); Christopher Hill, The 
Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. 
Defining Europe 50 
humiliation of another "empire". The impact of such destruction is even more severe 
in Europe, as it was the battlefront between the two ideologies . In the past, poor and 
new-born European states after the WWII had been relied on Soviet aid or the 
reassurance against the capitalist Americans. Opponents of communism also turned to 
U. S. directly, and the European Coal and Steel Community and the later European 
Community had worked under such context. Indicated by the accession of Portugal, 
Spain and Greece, the Community has been viewed as the refuge against the Soviet 
threats and towards the capitalist prosperity. The removal of Soviet threats and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, as predicted by Mearsheimer (1990, p. 47), has altered 
the ground of cooperation by the structural change in the capabilities distribution 
across the continent. The Central and Eastern Europe, formerly controlled by the 
Soviet Union, has become a power vacuum which requires the European Union 
reorient its position towards the new independent states. 
On the other hand, both sides of the Atlantic had acknowledged the underlined 
truth: European Union has to/begins to diverse from the United States. Such sentiment 
may be firstly found from the tactless talk from Kissinger, yet by the time 
US-European relations was bound by common interests in anti-communism and the 
oil crisis (Hill and Smith, 2000, p.97). However, the removal of Soviet threats, 
together with EU 's aspirations to assert its identity, has widened the gap between the 
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Atlantic partners . Disagreement in different new issues, like the war on terror, nuclear 
crisis and attitude towards international multilateralism, has hammered the harmony 
between the only hegemony and the rising normative power (cf. Ford, 2006; Patten, 
2006). Such differentiation and repositioning, however, do not confine to material 
interests only, but more importantly ideological one. Europeans have relied heavily on 
the long episode of the Cold War in constructing their political identities (Preston, 
2005, p.497). The end of Cold War, not only alters the material interest of Western 
European states towards their Eastern counterparts, but also alters the view of their 
institutions. As the former jobs of the ED institutions, i.e. providing collective security 
and prosperity, are less concerned under the removal of threats , one may be tempted 
to ask the question raised by the realists : "is there any ground to further cooperate, at 
the expense of losing part of the sovereignty?" Thus, ED has to further justify its 
existence to their respective citizens. 
3.1.2 The Rise ofTransnational Challenges 
The end of Cold War, together with the advancement of technology, has also 
opened up channels for frequent cross-border communication among states . However, 
while the globalization has boosted the cooperation among states , the nation states 
have also need to deal with huge labour and capital flows within their territories and 
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across borders. With the 91 I-Attack and rise of terrorism, states have to face both 
enemies inside their own territories and outside theirs. Transnational crimes, illegal 
migration, and of course global terrorism have taken up the security agenda of 
nation-states. With the Internet and different advanced communication channels, the 
regional terrorist organizations can have easier linkage with other terrorist groups, 
resulting in the massive global campaign of terrorism, also anti-terrorism. States 
therefore have to cooperate with each other in order to fight against these economic 
and security threats. 
Judging from the above arguments, it seems that the European Union is more 
necessary in the eyes of the member states. Nevertheless, the shifting of power and 
responsibilities can also cause the shift of expectation. States would have to take up 
the expectations from their citizens for satisfying the priority goals, and states would 
also have expected the EU institutions to satisfying those too. In addition, although 
EU cannot be characterized a democratic state, it fits into the definition of a 
functioning political system (Almond, 1956; Easton, 1957). Therefore, EU is also 
required to address the expectations from European citizens, especially if the political 
agenda of EU is never dismissed (Prodi , 2002) . Nonetheless, since the establishment 
of Single European Market and the ratification of Maastricht Treaty, support for the 
EU has dropped significantly about 20%, from more than 70% (1 99 1) of public 
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support to just below 50% (1996), and fluctuated around 50% since then. (Hix, 2005 , 
p.150; Eurobarometer, 2006c, p.26) In addition, less than 40% of the EU citizens 
believe that EU is on the right track (Eurobarometer, 2006c, p.18) and more than 40% 
of the citizens describe EU as "technocratic" and "inefficient". (ibid, p.24) These 
survey results, together with the rejection of Constitutional Treaty in France and 
Netherlands, has alarmed the European politicians that the legitimacy or creditability 
of European Union is in fact in doubt. 
In addition, internal cohesion is further weakened by the idea of multiculturalism 
in Europe, compared to nationalism in Europe. As one of the most influential scholars 
on the topic claims, instead of moving towards cosmopolitanism, the current 
development on political identities can be termed as "ethnic revival", which 
consolidates or even fragments, the existing nation-states. 57 On one hand, Anthony 
Smith argues that even the states ' boundaries are dismissed during globalization, the 
nation has to acquires its sphere of own living regardless of the states, to "be nurtured, 
protected and rendered" effectively. A territorial state is traditionally viewed as the 
"most obvious and best-placed candidate" for protecting the culture of a nation, 
57 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). See also his 
discussion on nationalism and European Unity, especially on the idea of how to shape a European 
identity. Anthony D. Smith, "National identity and the Idea of European Identity", International Affairs, 
68: 1 (1992), pp .55 - 76. 
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although "it is not the only one" (A.D. Smith, 1995, p.112). On the contrary, 
multicultural constructions lack historical depth and consequently fail to gain 
resonance from the mass conducive to political loyalty. Habermas, one important 
figure in contemporary discussion on civic identity, has characterized EU as "the 
political sphere is fragmented into national units" (Laffan, O'Donnell and Michael 
Smith, 2000, p.17). According to Anthony Smith again, those values emphasized in 
different European Treaty has just added up as "families of culture" but not "unity in 
diversity" (A.D. Smith, 1992, p.70). As the result, the more extensive globalization, 
which is probably the right trend, it is more difficult to consolidate the regional EU, in 
respect to the growing protectionism in national identity. 58 
3.1 .3 The Big-bang Enlargement in 2004 
Perhaps the most important background for the rise of a new neighbourhood 
initiative is the negotiation and final adoption of the enlargement process in 2002. 
With the conclusion at Copenhagen Council in 2002, the European Union projects its 
membership from 15 to 25 in 2004, and subsequently changes to 27 wi th the final 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania. The rapid integration between the developed 
European Union and less developed Central and Eastern European countries is a 
58 This problem can be partially shown by the rejection of Constitutional Treaty by the EU founding 
members France and Netherlands. 
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two-edged sword. On one hand the enlargement of internal market towards the 
eastward boundaries creates the economies of scale, a rich abundance of natural 
resources (especially stable oil supply) and debatable stabilization of the East. On the 
other hand, the explosive enlargement towards the countries behind the Iron Curtail 
has put the risk on the solidarity of the original members. It is generally agreed that 
such enlarge~ent would substantially challenge the institutional structure of the EU, 
"which was initially designed for a Union of six members states" (Steunenberg, 2002, 
p.3). The "enlargement fatigue" has come to the concern of the old member states, 
which involves both the ideational and mentioned material fatigue. The ideational 
fatigue includes the dilution of internal solidarity, which the West has to take the 
formal "Others" into their prosperous club. In addition, the difference in culture, 
political systems and languages has further challenged the cultural ground, the 
political unity of the Union, which is previous as a collection of liberal democratic 
states. Although the CEECs have done their best to approximate the Western style of 
li ving, the difference is not easily to be ironed out. 
However, the Treaty of European Union has not closed the door for further 
enlargement, at least in theory. Article 49 of the Treaty says any European country 
may apply for membership ofEU, providing that it has satisfied the so-called 
Copenhagen Criteria suggested in 1993. The word "European" means two distinctive 
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meaning, one is geo-cultural and one is socio-political. Accession of Union therefore, 
has to complete both process. However, the geographical limits of European are 
always in doubt. It is difficult for the Union to draw clear geographic boundaries in 
the East on one hand, difficult to reject all application on the other. As Wrever (2000, 
p.263) says, it is important for the Union to avoid a concrete "no" for further 
enlargement, ~lse it will hammer the most effective policy in handling the Eastern 
European countries: "membership is not denied but deferred". Therefore, a strict 
geographical definition of spatial "Europe" is avoided by both the member states and 
the Commission. Therefore, the only way out of defining Europe is the temporal and 
ideational dimension. An intermediate policy should therefore share this burden of 
constructing Europe. 
3.2 The Demand for a European Identity 
The changing political context has pushed the actors within the European 
institutions to rethink the notion of European identity. However, it does not mean that 
they must be working in unison for a single European identity, as presumed by the 
neo-functionalists. As suggested by Moravcsik's influential works (Moravcsik, 1998), 
in order for the member states to subscribe into supranational integration and policy, 
motives and advantages must be provided for further submission under the name of 
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common policy/approach. Therefore, this section will search for any deviation in 
between the actors, i.e. the established states, the new member states and the 
Commission, for their position in European neighbourhood construction. In short, part 
of the answers is given in term of the change of international structure and the issues 
within the neighbourhood policy, and part of them, are given by the characteristics of 
the actors. 
3.2.1 The Common Objective: the Maintenance of EU Institutional Stability 
Although the actors may not act in total unison for the construction of European 
identity, it is possible for the room of those motives merging at one point. Noted after 
the consolidation of Maastricht Treaty, the EU has faced severe legitimacy challenges 
and lack of creditability. Credibility and legitimacy of the common institutions are 
fundamentally important to EU because it will shake the ground of contemporary 
European political stability, which the EU institutions have played an important role. 
As suggested by scholar G 1. Ikenberry and Robert Cox, the collapse of any old order, 
for instance EU institutions, will imply the failure of old paradigm to produce 
regularities and patterns of behaviours. 59 Shared assumptions of precedence, 
59 See G. J. Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment", World Politics , 39: 1 
(1986), pp.53 - 77~ Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist 
Theory of State Action", International Studies Quarterly (1989), 33:4, pp.457 - 474 ~ Robert W. Cox, 
"State, Social Forces and World Order: Beyond Inten1ational Relations Theory", in Robert O. Keohane 
edited, Neorealism and Its Critics (New York : Columbia University Press, 1986)~ Robert W. Cox, 
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legitimacy and identity are no longer existed among the regional or local elites. 
According to the "equation of stability" Cox suggested, (Cox, 1986, pp.222 - 223), 
the dismissal of EU institutions will strip away the elements contributed to Europe 
stability: the EU institutions could serve as the coherent conjunction of European 
states, a specific norm for settling European conflicts and administer the order with a 
certain degree of universality. 
Therefore, the maintenance of EU institutions is crucial for the member states to 
secure their national interest on one hand, promote a consensual reform in European 
level on the other. The dismissal of EU institutions will violate the realist assumption 
of state which argues that states will try to maintain the "maximum level of order in 
the parts with the minimum of disorder in the whole" (Smith, 1994, p.29). The current 
EU institutions serve as the established model for European political exchange and 
minimize the transactions cost. As laid down by Andrew Moravcsik, the current EU 
institutions are the "choice for Europe" which tries to reduce the transaction cost in 
economic/security development. 6o Under the national interests inscribed in the EU 
"Multilateralism and World Order" , Review of International Studies , 18:2 (1992), pp.161 - 180. 
60 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from M essina to 
Maastricht (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999); Andrew Moravcsik, "A New Statecraft? 
Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation", International Organization , 53 :2 (1999), 
pp. 267 - 306; See also Fraser Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy 90xon: 
Routledge, 2007); G. J. Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment" ; Paul Pierson, 
"The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis", Comparative Political 
Studies, 29:2 (1996), pp. 123 - 163 . 
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machinery to be well-functioned, the member states, as well as the Commission, 
would try to maintain the institutions not being severely challenged and maintain its 
legitimacy. However, as the legitimacy is always conditional, member states will 
always have to make "strategic adjustments" mediating the differential changes in 
domestic systems and international systems, such that the legitimacy of the domestic 
structures and .international institutions could always be maintained at certain level. 61 
For realists and functionalists, the idea of legitimacy as purely material and "can 
be deployed and purchased at specific if variable costs" (Smith, 1994, p.38). As Risse 
(2005, p.295) has suggested, identity formation at the European level was largely lost 
as an object of study for neo-functionalists: "the conventional wisdom simply held 
that European integration was somehow marching along without any noticeable 
transfer of loyalty from the nation-states to the European level." (ibid) Nonetheless, 
the idea of legitimacy and international structure is strongly ideological and normative. 
An established European order should be fixed and supported with the consensus of 
the relevant elites - the international structure is constructed by the elites. The nature 
of legitimacy and international structure is based on how the relevant actors, including 
61 G. J. Ikenberry, "The State and Strategies of International Adjustment"~ Michael Smith, "Beyond the 
Stable State? Foreign Policy Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe", in WaIter Carlsnaes 
and Steve Smith eds., European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe 
(London: Sage Publications, 1994). 
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the states, citizens and the politicians perceived the order and the European context. 
The notion of European order, if any, is in fact an ideological construct and identity 
serves as the fundamental element of building and maintaining such ideational 
structure. 62 
3.2.2 The Established States: Striving/or the Ownership a/the Order 
Although both the member states and the Commission may be unison in the 
construction of "a European identity", the interests thus the construction of "the 
European identity" differ among each actors. Roughly differentiated among the actors 
involved, the dissertation has identified three sets of actors, namely the established 
states, the new corners and the Commission. 
For established states like Germany, France and Britain (sometimes being 
recognized as EU3), they are generally monolithic, relatively autonomous and 
formally sovereign. These states usually "see themselves on a different plane from 
other member states and often meet to discuss policy matter" (Cameron, 2007, p.61). 
Thus, EU is a platform of "scapegoat" for these big states to eliminate the negati ve 
62 For the importance of ideational structure in international relations, see Alexander Wendt, "Identities 
and Structural Change in International Politics", in YosefLapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds., The 
Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1 996)~ for 
the relations of identity and legitimacy, see Sylvia Kritzinger, "European Identity Building from the 
Perspective of Efficiency", Comparative European Politics , 3 (2005), pp . 50 - 75 
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international policies externalities (lkenberry, 1986, p.62; Moravcsik, 1993, p.485). 
Defined by Moravcsik, negative externalities "occur where the policies of one nation 
imposes costs on the domestic nationals of another, therefore undermining the goals 
of the second government's policies" (Moravcsik, 1993, p.485). However, negative 
externalities also occur when the situation of some nations imposes costs on the 
regional coop~ration regime, undermining the policy objectives of other nations - the 
big-bang enlargement and the dissolution of old orders are the externalities of this 
kind. With the dissolution of capitalist-socialist boundaries in Europe, there is no 
longer an agreed institution to speak for the European norms, after the end of the Cold 
War (M. Smith, 1994, pp.39 - 40). As mentioned earlier, the established states will try 
to maintain the EU's machinery workable with 27 members, which the original design 
was for 6 members only. 
Yet, apart from maintaining the order, the established states are more ambitious 
interests in identity. As the existing order is fluctuated and there is lacking of 
consensus among the relevant elites, the fluid nature of contemporary European order 
has led to the important question of what Michael Smith called "the ' ownership' of 
the international order" (M. Smith, 1994, p.2S). For realist concern, the best way to 
survive is to change the order which potentially benefit to the actors themselves. The 
logical consequence of such argument is that the actors will try to perform or maintain 
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their dominant ideologies or identity in the construction of the new order. This 
ambition has met with institutional nature of foreign policy making in EU which is 
characterized as collectivity and multi-level (Bicchi, 2002, pp.4 - 5~ M.E. Smith, 2004, 
pp.742 - 745). 
Such differentiated interests in issues are empirically found during the discussion 
of other EU policy. For instance, Southern member states have the tendency to 
liberalize EU's market towards Southern Mediterranean members, the Central 
European member states tends to bring benefits towards the Eastern countries, and 
UIZ and the Nordic members tends to reject unnecessary integration and liberalization ~ 
for political issues, the Franco-German motor is rather restrictive towards integration 
vis-a-vis deepening while the UK is rather pro-enlargement. 63 Their perceptions 
towards the idea of Europe differ too: a federal Europe versus a Europe-wider free 
trade area. However, the established states have one thing in common that the national 
sovereignty should not be the expense of further integration. It can be shown from the 
rejection of Constitutional Treaty by France and Netherlands, and the rejection of 
63 For different countries analysis, see Nathaniel Copsey, "The Member States and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy", European Research Working Paper Series, 20 (July 20007) ~ Iris Kempe, "The 
German Impact on the European Neighbourhood Policy", Foreign Policy in Dialogue , 7: 19 (2006), 
pp.26 - 34~ Maxime Lefebvre, "France and the European Neighbourhood Policy", Foreign Policy in 
Dialogue , 7: 19 (2006), pp.17 - 3 3 ~ Michal N atorski, "Explaining Spanish and Polish Approaches to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy", European Political Economy Review, 7 (Summer 2007), pp .63 -
101. 
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Treaty of Lisbon by Ireland. Preserving the national autonomy is the first agenda of 
established states, unless the benefits from integrative solution have overplayed the 
general desire. 
3.2.3 The New Acceding States: Searchingfor Justification 
Although the policy was initiated in 2002 and finalized in May 2004, the 10 
acceded states have also taken part in the discussion process .64 Prior to formal 
discussion, Polish, the largest acceding state, has published the non-paper concerning 
about the policy (Varwick and Lang, 2007, p.222). Most of the initiatives - but not the 
agenda - have been integrated into the finalized version ofENP (Copsey, 2007, p.13). 
For the new member states , they are rather pro-enlargement compared to the 
established states (Eurobarometer, 2006a, p.3) and well-informed on Eastern 
neighbouring countries (Eurobarometer, 2006b, p.3). Nonetheless, their support on 
enlargement is stemmed partly out of the desire of not being EU eastern border 
forever (Copsey, 2007, p.l3). This idea of pro-enlargement is also supported by 
different cultural and historical reasons , constructing the "national interest" (Buras 
and Pomorska, 2006, p.3 ; Natorski, 2007, p.65). Therefore, unlike the established 
64 The newly acceded states took part in the formal discussion process as early as the 16 June 2003 
GAERC meeting. 
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states further enlargement should be supported by the neighbourhood initiative 
(Buras and Pomorska, 2006, p.36 - 37; Natorski , 2007, p.73). As the result, in 
determining the identity proposed to the European Union, the new member states 
should secure the door of "being Europe" remain opened. 
Apart from the position on enlargement issues , the other motive of 
neighbourhood policy is the security in the borderland. Internationally, the CEECs 
were placed into the power vacuum of the region, with three dominant forces in the 
arena pulling each other: the United States needs the CEECs as the loyal allies in 
fighting the global terrorism; the EU wants to secure the backyard of the territories 
through the cooperation with CEECs; Russia wants to regain the control of the region 
as the opposition of NATO enlargement. Therefore, they have paid utmost attention to 
the stability and their independence of the direct neighbours (Buras and Pomorska, 
2006, p.34; Eurobarometer, 2006b, p.4; 2007, pp.4 - 5). These historical reasons, met 
with the geographical proximity, have made the Eastern neighbourhood as the vital 
security area of the acceding states . Not only the physical borders, these new member 
states have to "secure" their mental borders not too close to the "Russian Empire", as 
they may once again suffer from the influence of authoritarian Russia (Natorski , 2007, 
p.80). Domestically, the CEECs are facing the problem of political instabili ty and 
economic restructuring, although the entire new member states have fulfilled the bas ic 
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accession criteria of being democratic, liberal and market economy. Back to the 
Ikenberry 's argument again, the use of the common foreign policy is to strengthen the 
countries position domestically and internationally. The border permeability and 
security like cross-border trade, visa regulations, Balkans stability etc. are therefore 
the priority issues for them. Their preference on European foreign policy relies on the 
capacity ofth~ policy to minimize the cost of dealing the problems and secure their 
position in EU. In the end, the legitimacy and the identification of the new 
government is built on the economic rationality (Kritzinger, 2005, p.52) . 
3.2.4 The European Commission: Pushingfor the Supranational Europe 
If the components of the Council have represented the intergovernmental vision of 
European Union, the Commission can say to be represented the supranational ideal of 
European Union. The dominant image of European Commission is borrowed from 
traditional public choice theory which public officials are "budget maximizers", or 
power-hungry organization which try to gain autonomy from its principal- the 
member states .65 Followed the above analyses , the Commission "single-mindedly 
pursues the integration of Europe along ' supranational ' or federal lines" as it is 
65 For general analysis of bureaucrats, see William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and R ep resentative 
Government (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, 1971 ); Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and 
Public Choice : Explanations in Political Science (New York: Harvester, 199 1). 
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permeated by an "institutional commitment to deeper integration" (Dimitrakopoulos 
and I(assim, 2005, p.182). However, the Commission preference on certain issue is 
more complicated than a simple monolithic organization like national cabinet (ibid, 
pp.182 - 183).66 
As revealed by one of the directors in the European Commission co-ordinating 
the Neighbourhood Policy, the emergence ofENP "is partly strategic and partly 
practical" (Wissels, 2006, p.8). At first glance, it seems the reason of initiating the 
ENP fit with the intergovernmental branch. However, these official reasons are further 
driven by the Commission preference on building its supranational ideal and working 
as the putative European government, if we further analyse the situation faced by the 
Prodi 's Commission. Unlike other Commission, Prodi 's Commission has two 
distinctive characteristics: first, Prodi 's Commission was formed under the resignation 
of Santer's team that people's faith towards the Commission has been eroded~ second, 
Prodi's Commission has also firstly enj oyed the enhanced power from the reforms in 
Amsterdam Treaty and mandate to reform EU granted by the European political elites, 
66 Different scholars have paid specific attention on the Commission preference formation in, during 
the Jacques Delors' period. For the specific impact brought by Jacques Delors, see Ken Endo, The 
Presidency o/the European Commission under Jacques Delors: the Politics o/Shared Leadership 
(New York: S1. Martin Press, 1999\ George Ross, Jacques Delors and European Integration (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995) ~ For the interaction between different EU institutions in different 
areas, see Morten Egeberg, "EU Institutions and the Transformation of European-level Politics: How to 
Understand Profound Change (If it Occurs)", Comparative European Politics, 3 (2005), pp. 1 02 - 117. 
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to restore the confidence of EU. Being a former Prime Minister of Italy, Prodi posited 
the Commission and the EU as the government-in-crisis, seeking for solution for 
solving the problems and improving the functioning of EU (Dimitrakopoulos and 
I(assim, 2005, pp.187 - 188). In fact, by different measures and speeches done by 
Prodi, he has always asserted the Commission as the government of Europe, working 
for the Europe~ citizens directly instead of the European member states.67 This 
supranational safeguard and the European ambition have been most obvious when 
Prodi gave his speech on the Proximity Policy (the precedent of ENP) that "we 
cannot water down the European political project and turn European Union into 
just a free-trade area on a continental scale" (Prodi, 2002).68 Therefore, the main 
interests in ENP are promoting the European political project, and safeguarding the 
supranationalism in the eyes of the citizens. All in all, a desire to construct a European 
identity is always in the Commission's agenda: "a stable and enlarged Europe with a 
stronger voice in the world" (Patten, 2000). 
Of course, the Commission wants to establish itself in the international arena too, 
67 For example, Prodi 's Commission has initiated initiated the idea of "Dialogue with Europe" which 
personally involves in the discussions with citizens and representatives of civil society. Prodi himself 
also was accused of being the government of Europe . See Peter Norman, The Accidental Constitution: 
the Making of Europe s Constitutional Treaty (Brussels : EuroComment, 2005), p.29 
68 Further discussion on the Proximity Policy will be given in later chapter, which serves as a part of 
the discursive practice in neighbourhood policy. 
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partly driven by the Treaty of European Union and partly by the bureaucratic nature. 
This sentiment can be shown by Prodi 's Commissioner of External Relations, Chris 
Patten's communication on 10 June 2000 (ibid). Therefore, the best way to recapture 
the "functions" is to create a European foreign policy which most of the resources and 
policy instruments are concentrated in Commission 's hand. A European foreign policy, 
with less milit~ and hard security issues involved, is therefore favoured the 
Commission control- as it has controlled most of the EU budget. As Majone (1996, 
p.65) rightly concludes, "The utility function of the Commission is positively related 
to the scope of its competences rather than to the scale of the services provided or to 
the size of the budget". 
3.3 The Supply of European Identities 
Again, a demand for a European identity does not strictly mean that the 
European identity present in the continent cannot fulfil actors ' demand. Rather than a 
hollow conception, the idea of Europe has its long history with different stages of 
evolution. This section starts with a brief reflection of the ideas present throughout the 
development of European politics. In short, there are four version of European 
identity. 
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3.3.1 Europe as the Christendom 
The very first idea of Europe may probably come from the realm of myth and 
folklore - Homer 's Hymn to Apollo. Yet, probably Europeans would start to define 
themselves as sharing common culture and history when the Christian era began, with 
the powerful Roman Empire and Catholic Church as the centre of loyalty. For 
instance, European identity was characterized as "multiple and overlapping levels of 
authority and identity" over the whole Christendom and the idea of Europe was the 
"militant Christianity, aggressive mercantile expansion, exploration and imperial 
conquest" (Hyde-Price, 2000, p. 30; Lowenthal, 2000, p.314). Although the whole 
continent was divided into different kinships and feudal states, "the idea of a Christian 
community provided not only a legitimating myth for the medieval kingship, but also 
served as a medium of cultural cohesion for groups otherwise separated by language 
and ethnic traditions" (Delanty, 1995, p. 33). 
However, the genuine emergence of a common "European identity" did not come 
until the above ideas were strengthened by the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. 
The enduring mobilization of crusades gave a strong sense of territorial integrity to 
the fuzzily-bound medieval Europe. The word "Europe" was always used in the 
relation with the hegemonic Ottoman Empire and in the context of the Turkish 
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threats.69 Instead of a social or cultural resonance, the sense of European identity was 
"shaped more by defeat than victory and was buttressed by the image of the Orient as 
its common enemy" (Delanty, 1995, p.36). By the end of the Middle Age, the content 
of European identity was a consciousness which was constructed by the principle of 
exclusivity rather than any common celebration of advancement or internal cohesion. 
3.3.2 Europe as a Disintegrated System a/Nation-states 
Stipulated the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, the bloodletting of the 
Thirty Years ' War has also remarked the emergence of new forms of collective 
identity in Europe - what Martin Wight described as the "revolution in loyalties" 
(Hyde-Price, 2000, p.30). The Medieval order, as mentioned earlier, was eroded by 
the Renaissance, which emphasizes the idea of palis, and the Reformation, which 
emphasizes the separation of spiritual authority and the secular identity. While in 
Middle Age, the European identity was largely rested on the conditions of the 
Ottoman Empire, it was "secularized" against the Christendom after the 16th century 
(Delanty, 1995, p.66). Instead of spiritual unity under the Christianity, the idea of 
Europe has once turned to a cultural and social model of the West. The new polarity 
69 Peter Burke, "Did Europe Exist Before 1700?", History of European Ideas, Vol. 1 (1980), pp.21 - 29 ~ 
Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity and Reality (Hampshire: MacMillan Press, 1 99 5 ) ~ 
Denys Hay, Europe: the Emergence of an Idea (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968). 
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has shifted to one of the civilization versus the other: Europe as a civilization versus 
the non-European world, which signified the "barbarity" of uncivilized nature. 
"Europe" had therefore become the symbols of progression and freedom, opposite to 
the autocratic Hapsburg and Papal, and the socially backward Ottoman and Russian 
regImes. 
The consolidation ofWestphalian Treaty was accompanied with the 
crystallization of "a vertical pattern of territorial states, each with increasing authority 
inside the defined geographical border" (Bull and Watson, 1984, p.15). Such 
development of the international society has come to the convergence the identity of 
Europeans on the entity of state. The Treaty of West ph alia has led to "the creation of a 
pan-European diplomatic system based on the new principles of sovereignty and legal 
equality, and a balance of power that would prevent drives for hegemony" (Holsti , 
1991, pp.25 - 26). Brought with the new international system, the rise of sovereign 
states has also led to the rise of nationalism. As Ernest Gellner has written on the topic, 
nationalism is "a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983, p.1). As Douglas 10hnson has reminded us , "Le 
national replaced le roi in the hierarchy of the state" (Hyde-Price, 2000, p.33), the 
most dominant form of collective identity has become the national identity, instead of 
any spiritual or cultural identity in the past. New cultural-political spaces were created 
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which linked the idea of Europe with the cradle of democratic nation-states system 
and gradually took shape of Christian humanism and "occidental rationalism" in the 
late modernity (Delanty, 1995, p.66). 
However, the secularization of European identity is a two-edge sword. The 
nation-building, implying the identity-building, has subsequently an arbitrary process 
and "it is often defined through social or territorial boundaries to distinguish the 
collective self and its implicit negation, the ' Other '" (Hyde-Price, 2000, p.34). 
Nations and identities are "invented" instead of genuinely existed, and it is always 
invented through subsequently conflicts between the "us and them".70 Identifying the 
"Others", therefore, serves as a crucial step in creating collective identity in modem 
Europe and the European identity has never taken shape as the unity of European 
civilizations. 
3.3.3 Europe as the Frontier of Capitalism 
The "re-unification" of European civilization did not come until the continent 
was devastated by two "world" wars in half a century: domestically, the embryonic 
European Coal and Steel Community was set up in searching for the return of 
70 BenedictAnderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 199 1\ Linda Colley, Britons: Forging 
the Nation 1707 - 1837 (London: Pimlico, 1992) 
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prosperity in Europe; internationally, the end of the total war has constructed a new 
bi-polar international structure, leaving the European countries allied themselves 
within the ideological construct. The two bloc system has permanently changed the 
identity structure of Europe since the consolidation ofWestphalian system. Instead of 
the importance of religion in the medieval Europe and the nationalism in Napoleonic 
period, the war~ on ideologies have been placed to the central discursive role of 
identity construction. 71 Such ideological battle has undermined other political and 
cultural identities in Europe (the idea of Mitteleuropa for example). As the result, the 
Western European states was easily unified and identified who "we" were and who 
the "barbarians at the gate" were, under the Cold War structure. 
Apart from the change in international structure, the end of the total war has also 
demolished the sense of superiority in the idea of Europe. The devastating ruins done 
by the successive wars had transferred the leaderships of the West to the Americans. 
The West was no longer solely belonged to Europe, as a place for political and 
cultural advancement, but included the "Atlantic" West. The brutality in the total wars 
71 For the impact of Cold War in constructing European identity, see Peter Wallace Preston, "Reading 
On-going Change : European Identity", The Political Quarterly, Vo. 76:4 (2005), pp.497 - 504 ~ Richard 
Robyn, "Introduction: National Versus Supranational Identity in Europe", in Richard Robyn edited, The 
Changing Face of European Identity (London: Routledge, 2005)~ Martin Marcussen, Thomas Risse and 
Daniela Engelmarm-Martin et. aI. , "Constructing Europe? The Evolution of Nation- state Identities", in 
Thomas Christiansen, , Knud E . J0rgensen and Antje Wiener edited, The Social Construction of 
Europe (London: Sage Publication, 2001 ) 
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was served as the self-referential point for the post-war Europeans .72 Prevention of 
the third total war was necessarily running through elites ' mentality. It may be best 
reflected from French leader General de Gaulle 's belief in a "Europe of 
Nation-States", which each European states pursue its own interest "independently 
with the cooperation of each other" (Delanty, 1995, p.126). The new European 
identity, as Ge~ard Delanty (ibid) argues, was heavily "shaped by the mass of 
prejudice and paranoia that Cold War was able to generate" and undergoes a process 
of de-politicalization. 73 The new notion of Europe had nothing to do with spiritual 
(Christianity) or philosophical (Kantian federalism) proj ect of Europe, but an 
economic and materialist proj ect about the establishment of "common market" and 
the new consumerism of post-war reconstruction. 
3.4 Unsatisfied Demand-Supply - The Limitations of European Identity 
The talk on European identity is muted before the collapse of Soviet Union but 
now it has become a salient issue within the European communities. The debate on 
question "What's Europe/Where does Europe end?" has in fact uncovered the lack of 
72 Such argument may be best represented by Tony Judt 's influential works on European history, which 
he argues that the history of Europe is constructed in such a way of selective memory. See Tony Judt, 
Postwar: a History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press). 
73 The idea of de-politicalization of European politics is the central argument pursued by Jean Monnet 
and Robert Schumann, the founding politicians of European Coal and Steel Community. For the 
academic explanation of such loyalty transferal, see Ernst B . Bass, The United Europe: Political, 
Social and Economic Forces 1950 - 1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968) 
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European solidarity on EU's future. Different scholars have made efforts in explaining 
the embryonic characteristics of European identity?4 In short, we can summarize into 
three important characteristics . 
3.4.1 Lacking of Shared Roots 
Although they hold different views on whether a genuine European identity 
could exist, both essentialist and constructivist view on identity agree that there 
should be something in common in order for the individuals to realize the collective 
identity.75 For example, essentialists argue that collective identity is realized from the 
primordial components, such as blood ties, ethnicity, inherent culture etc, of the 
political community (Torfing, 1999, p.19S; van Hamm, 2001 , p.S9). However, it is 
self-evident that European communities themselves do not share, or perceived to 
74 See James A. Caporaso, "The Possibilities of a European Identity", Brown Journal of World Affairs, 
Vol. XII:I (2005), pp .65 - 75 ; Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe: Social Theory 
and the Implications of Europeanization (London: Routledge, 2005); Rainer Hulsse, "Imagine the EU: 
the Metaphorical Construction of a Supra-national Identity", Journal of International Relations and 
Development, Vol. 9 (2006), pp.396 - 421 ; Dirk Jacobs and Robert Maier, "European Identity: 
Construct, Fact and Fiction", in Maria Gastelaars and Arie de Ruijter eds. , United Europe: the Quest 
for a Multifaceted Identity (Maastricht: Shaker, 1998), pp.13 - 34; Peter Wallace Preston, "Reading 
On-going Change: European Identity"; Richard Robyn edited, The Changing Face of European 
Identity (London: Routledge, 2005) 
75 Lars-Erik Cederman has made a good summary on the difference between essentialist and 
constructivist account on identity construction, see Lars-Erik Cederman, ""Political Boundaries and 
Identity Trade-Offs", 2001 ; see also Rainer Hulsse, "Imagine the EU: the Metaphorical Construction of 
a Supra-nationalist Identity", 2006. For an in-depth essentialist account on European identity 
construction, see Anthony D . Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity", International 
Affairs, Vol. 68 : 1 (1992) . pp. 55 - 76; a construction account on European identity can be found in 
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), Chapter 7. 
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share, such inherent ethnical or cultural roots?6 In fact, as Lowenthal (2000, p.318) 
revealed, European people always cherish their traditional uniqueness in policy and 
philosophy~ stereotypes against others, historical rivalries and grievances, 
idiosyncrasies of thought and behaviours make Europe culturally discordant. 
For the constructivist account of identity construction, political institutions, 
political values instead of the inherent ties, are the ingredients for identity 
construction. Instead of identifying with the inherent cultural collectivities (the 
concept of nation), people choose to identify with the political institutions (the 
concept of state). It is an active acquisition and construction of political identity rather 
than an inherent cultural identity (Rumelili, 2004, p.37). However, this kind of 
identity is "thin" in the sense that the identity is conditional on the fluid social 
interactions within a political entity and shared political and social institutions, and 
does not guarantee any unity. For instance, there are five senses of European identity 
identified by Marcussen, Risse, Engelmann-Martin et. aI, Liberal nationalist identity, 
Europe as a community of values, Europe as a (( third force )J , a modern Europe as 
part of the Western community and a Christian Europe. 77 As discussed in the early 
76 It is not important whether these communities really materially share the ethnical and cultural roots, 
but a realization of such is more important in identity construction. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities (London: Verso, 1991), Chapter 1. 
77 For details of these identities and the disparities among nation-states, see Martin Marcussen, 
Thomas Risse and Daniela Engelmann-Martin et. aI. , "Constructing Europe? The Evolution of 
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section of this chapter, both the European Commission and European member states 
may possess different version of Europe, even though they simultaneously claim 
themselves as "European". This problem is more salient after the Cold War, as new 
(or submerged) ideological struggles re-emerge with the removal of capitalist-socialist 
dichotomy. 78 
3.4.2 Absence a/Territorial Space 
In her discussion of European identity and the nature of European Union, Brigid 
Laffan (1996, p.82) has summarized the nature of European Union as "developed on 
the basis of a relative congruity between bounded territory, functional tasks and a 
shared identity". While the assumption of shared identity is contested after the end of 
Cold War, the assumptions on bounded territory and functional tasks are nearly 
vanished after the collapse of Soviet Union. As Benedict Anderson argues in his 
theory of nations and nationalism, the imagination should be limited "because even 
the largest of them (the nations), encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, 
has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations" (Anderson, 1991, 
Nation-state Identities". 
78 This argument is proposed by Samuel Huntington whom argues that the end of Cold War will foster 
the struggles between civilizations, because it is no longer necessary to remain undivided against the 
enemy bloc. See Samuel Huntington, The Clash ojCivilizations and the Remaking oj World Order 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), especially for Chapter 1. 
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p.7). Such boundaries can be ethnical, cultural or ideological, but geographical 
boundaries also play an important role in defining the limits of a nation. 
The importance of political territory has in fact gone beyond Max Weber 's 
conception, which argues that its existence formalizes "power relations in space 
where violence is legitimate" (Berezil1, 2003, p.8): it is social because people inhabit 
it collectively (or imagined to inhabit collectively); it is political because citizens 
would defend as well as enlarge their space; it is cultural because it is embedded with 
the collective memories of its inhabitants; it is cognitive because it is exclusive to 
subjectify social, political and cultural boundaries, making it as the core of public and 
private identity proj ects (ibid, p. 7). 79 
However, "Europe is unfamiliar territory" (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, p.120) 
and "has always been more of a mental construct than a geographical or social entity" 
(Lowenthal, 2000, p.314). EU Europe, in terms of its geographical boundaries , 
remains uncertain (Christiansen, Tonra, Petito, 2000). In the past, the fuzzy 
boundaries can be compensated by the mental construction of Europe-space: the 
Islamic territory in the medieval time, the inferior world in the imperialist Europe, and 
79 For more discussion on the territorial impact on identity, see Robert D. Sack, Human Territoriality: 
Its Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)~ James C. Scott, See ing Like a 
State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998). 
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the Soviet Union in the Cold War period - "where does Europe end?" was not a 
question in the past. However, when "the collapse of received certainties" (Preston, 
2005, p.497) appears since 1991 , the idea of Europe requires new conceptualization in 
terms of spatiality. The dissolution of former mental space not only requires the 
"external governance" of the borderlands, but successively weakens the identification 
of Europe/ Eur9pean Union in general. 
3.4.3 Absence of the (( Others " 
In his discussion of territoriality and modernity, John Ruggie (1993 , pp.168 -
174) has characterized EU has a "post-modem polity" which resembles the medieval 
system with "non-exclusive forms of territoriality" and "overlapping forms of 
authority". However, some scholars, including John Ruggie himself, have somehow 
overemphasized the avant-garde nature of European Union, which has downplayed 
the role of constitute difference (Rumelili , 2004, p.28). Identity, from a sociological 
understanding, can be self-substantiated through socialization among international 
states - "if a process is self-organizing, then there is no particular Other to which the 
Self is related" (Wendt, 1999, p.22S). Therefore, they will EU as the best example 
testing ground where states see their EU partners as an extension of self rather than as 
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other. 80 
However, Wendt's analogy has conflated the identity construction at state level 
and the construction at European level. At state level, the socialization among states 
and citizens have already prescribed under the idea of nations, nationalism and state 
boundaries (Rumelili, 2004, p.32). The representation of state identity in international 
politics is just the re-articulation of the pre-existed social identity. European identity" 
on the contrary, does not rest on any bounded political community. It is a pure 
collective identification which, by definition, concerns "a relation of self and other by 
which the identity of the self is constituted in symbolic markers" (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005 , p. 51). It must involve two independent but interrelated processes : 
subjective understanding of self and relational difference with others (ibid). For 
subjective consciousness of collectivity, it can be formed through identification of 
cultural heritage or discursive practice of self-understanding, and it must be socially 
constructed and transferred from community elites to mass .81 However, such 
80 For such argument on International Relations theories, see Jeffery Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, 
and National Identity in Contemporary Europe", International Studies Quarterly, 43 (1999), pp .S3 -
114; Kathinka Dittrich van Weringh, "Is there a European Identity?", 1 February 2005 [accessed at 
hUP;.!!.\Y,\Y\Y: .. ~.~: ITg0}:I..LtgXg!, on 20 June 2007] 
81 A cultural perspective of construction of identity can be found in David Lowenthal , "European 
Identity: an Emerging Concept", Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 46 :3 (2000), pp.314-
321; For discursive practice of self-understanding, see Jonathan Potter, Representing Reality: 
Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction (London: Sage Publication, 1996); See also Anthony 
Giddens,Modernity and Self-Identity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991 ); Manuel Castells, The 
Rise of the Network Society (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) 
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construction project has inevitably involved the idea of other. Even the construction of 
differences are "located temporally (internally)" or not "anti -self' (for example the 
Islamic territories in the past construction), it does not mean that the differences are 
not "simultaneously located spatially (externally)" and implicated in the 
construction. 82 The end of Cold War, however, has brought the mental "Others", 
Central and E~tem Europe, to the European Union. The Cold War European identity, 
which emphasizes the idea of democracy and capitalism, is no longer useful in 
differentiation from the East and distinguishing from the West. Therefore, for most of 
the Europeans, especially state elites, have to re-conceptualize the idea of Europe. 
3.5 The Reconstruction of Post Cold War Identity 
In response to this emptiness, the EU has to find the way to express its identity or 
values. This has led to ·the construction of European values, or what Jurgen Habermas 
called civic nationalism or constitutional patriotism.83 In sum, there are three main 
steps for such constructing of civic nationalism: the symbolic creation of EU 
commons, the establishment and implementation of Copenhagen Criteria and the EU 
82 The use of Others in the construction of European identity is best illustrated by Iver B. Neumann's 
research on the impact of Russia. See Iver B. Neumann, Uses of Others: the East in European Identity 
Formation (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press, 1999) 
83 See Jurgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of 
Europe", Praxis International, Vol. 12: 1 (1992), pp. 1 - 12. 
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C onsti tuti on proj ect. 
3.5.1 The Symbolic Creation of the EU Commons 
In the very first attempt to build a post-national political community, the 
European Union pursued to fashion a European identity through nationalistic tools : 
the flag84, anthem85 , currency and the sense of common culture and history (Delanty, 
1995, p.128). The introduction ofEuro is one of the most important steps for making 
"Europe real and reifies it as a political order", as "money has always been a symbolic 
market in nation-building efforts and is strongly related to collective national 
identities" (Risse, 2003 , p.487). However, the effect of such identity project is not 
salient. The politics of Europeanism has proved to be failure in 1980s (Delanty, 1995, 
p.128), and arguably failed in nowadays Europe. Comparative studies of the survey 
data has in fact shown that the effect may be strong for the first few survey after 
introduction, but the effect diminished since the second year, no matter in the EU 12 
86 
or new member states . 
84 The current flag was the adopted as the flag of Council of Europe in 1955, which subsequently being 
adopted as the flag of European Communities 1986. 
85 The anthem, Ode to Joy from Beethoven's 9th Symphony, was adopted as European anthem in 1972, 
which also being adopted by the EU heads of states and governments as official anthem in 1 985. 
86 For the details figures of the survey, see EOS Gallup Europe, "The Euro, Two Years Later", Flash 
Eurobarometer 153 (Brussels : European Commission, 2003 )~ EOS Gallup Europe, "The Euro, Three 
Years Later", Flash Eurobarometer 165 (Brussels: European Commission, 2004)~ EOS Gallup Europe, 
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3.5.2 The Copenhagen Criteria 
Considering the actual facts, the Eastern enlargement may be relatively 
undramatic in terms of its scale of expansion and economic impact. 87 However, in 
preparing and implementing the enlargement, the Copenhagen Criteria arisen from the 
negotiation can be viewed as a significant definition of European values and identity. 
Prescribed in the Maaschict Treaty, any European states can apply for EU 
membership. Instead of giving a working definition of "European", the consensus of 
the member states is to give a working definition of EU's principles - or the criteria 
for membership (the Copenhagen Criteria) : "stable institutions that guarantee 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities"; 
"a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the pressure of 
competition and the market forces at work inside the Union" and "the ability to 
assume the obligations of membershi p, in particular adherence to the obj ecti ves of 
political, economic and monetary union" (European Council, 1993). The implication 
of the Copenhagen Criteria is twofold: first, the Criteria have given the international 
"The Euro, Four Years after the Introduction of Banknotes and Coins", Flash Eurobarometer 175 
(Brussels: European Commission, 2005); The Gallup Organization, "Introduction of the Euro in the 
New Member States - Analytic Report", Flash Eurobarometer 207 (Brussels: European Commission, 
2007); The Gallup Organization, "Introduction of the Euro in the New Member States - Analytic 
Report", Flash Eurobarometer 214 (Brussels: European Commission, 2007) 
87 For different views and impact of different European enlargement, see Neill Nugent edited, 
European Union Enlargement (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004) 
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society, also European society what EU is: a coherent club for democratic and 
capitalist states. The Criteria not only pragmatically give protection of the club by 
imposing strict conditions on potential member states, but also ideationally give 
definition of Europe by showing its civic values to European citizens. In return, the 
European citizens can easily identify what Europe/EU is. 88 Second, the Criteria have 
successfully transformed the European identity to a temporal dimension instead of 
spatial or cultural dimensions. As the Criteria are a set of benchmarks to being Europe, 
it is a matter of time whether to candidates (as non-Europe) to become a member (as 
Europe), in so far they have fulfilled the requirements. As the result, the Copenhagen 
Criteria has shown that Europe and European identity are rather a temporal and civic 
concept, rather than a spatial and primordial concept. 
3.5.3 The EU Constitutional Project 
The above policy may possibly be driven by a pragmatic concern of EU 
development but such pragmatism is less important in the EU Constitution project. 89 
Rooted from a social contract tradition, European societies view the constitution as 
88 This can be shown by the regular Eurobarometer survey on citizens' identification on EU's values, 
see for example Eurobarometer, The Future of Europe (Brussels : Eurobarometer, 2006) 
89 For example, Andrew Moravcsik has used the notion of "an exercise in public relations" to describe 
the constitution-making project to create "a deep sense of common identity". See Andrew Moravcsik, 
"What Can We Learn From the Collapse of European Constitutional Project?", Politische 
VierteljahresschriJt, Vol. 47 :2 (2006), pp. 219 - 241. 
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the de facto social contract governing the relations between the state and the citizens . 
The constitution per se therefore represents the "understanding" of EU institutions 
and its values by the European societies. By establishing a democratic and 
deliberative political institutions as prescribed in the drafted constitution, the erosion 
of social solidarity, welfare states and public sphere can be prevented (Pfiban, 2005 , 
pp.137 - 138)., The Constitution has formalized the cosmopolitan citizenship and 
invented the EUropean demos which are extended from the boundaries of the 
nation-states (ibid). With the symbolic effect of the constitution, for example the 
renewal of motto from "Ever Closer Union" in 1958 to "Unity in Diversity" and the 
inclusion of European symbols and official currency, help to invented demos to 
anchor their political loyalty through identification of symbols, motto and most 
importantly, the Constitution of "Europeans". 
In addition to the text of the constitution, the whole constitution-making project 
also contributes to the creation of European identity. As suggested by Andrew 
Moravcsik (2006, p.222), the logic of such identity argument involves three steps : 
first, the discussion of constitution has opened new political opportunities for public 
participation; second, greater public participation generates informed public 
deliberation and consensual decision-making; finally, informed deliberation and 
decision-making increases political trust and generates a deeper sense of common 
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identity. Through "politics" and "communication", a civic version of European 
identity can be formed in European societies (Lucarelli , 2006, p. 12). 
3.6 From Identities to Policy - Liberal-Discursive Constructivism 
With the lengthy discussion on the tangled relations between identities, interests 
and foreign policy in European Union, the dissertation suggests the liberal-discursive 
constructivist framework for the study of European Neighbourhood Policy. The 
framework rests on the discursive constructivist understanding of European foreign 
policy, but adding a layer of liberal concern in policy formulation. 
3.6.1 Constructivist [fnderstanding of European Foreign Policy 
With the review of European identity and recent development of European Union, 
we can reach to an important conclusion: it is empirically evident that European 
Union is moving from the construction and the regulation of material unity, the 
common market, to ideational unity, identity. Witnessed from the constitution-making 
project, the European elites are concerned with the legitimacy and the identification of 
EU institutions. Therefore, the emergence of ENP, which has a similar timeframe of 
the Convention on the Future of Europe, may also serve as the part of identity 
construction project agreed by the member states. 
Defining Europe 87 
Indeed, one important role of "foreign policy" is to mediate the relationship 
between a state and the rest of the world. By defining what is "foreign" and the 
boundaries of the policy instrument, we can reflect what is "self': foreign policy per 
se "as aperformance of identity" (Ifversen and K0lvraa, 2007, p . 5 ~ emphasis as 
origin). Drawing from the empirical evidence in American foreign policy, David 
Campbell (199~, p.62) argues that foreign policy is always a "boundary-producing 
political performance" which involves the construction of the Self and the Other. The 
identity of any political communities is "performatively constituted by the very 
' expressions ' that are said to be its results" (Weber, 1998, p.90) and in order to 
maintain the identity, the political communities have to perform their "normative 
resources" or pre-established ideas about the communities (Ifversen and K0lvraa, 
2007, p.5). Therefore, the dissertation hypothesizes, 
Ho: The European Neighbourhood Policy contains political narratives 
which reflect the process ofnegotiation in the EU's identity formation, 
through the effect of construction process vis-a-vis the "neighbourhood" 
in different phrases of policy formulation. 
3.6.2 Liberal Conception of European Identity Bargaining 
However, as discussed in last chapter, any holistic reading of EU foreign policy would 
have to address the "multiple realities" of European Union (J0rgensen, 1998, p.12). 
As constructivists assume in their theories , there exist European interests, and these 
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interests are dependent on the idea of Europe. However, constructivists have to face a 
catch-22 situation, either they argues that there are a rather stable social ideal of 
Europe for those "interests" to be depended on, or they have to "distinguish between 
the interests of EU as a whole and those of the specific interests of its individual 
member states and other influential non-state actors within it" (Hyde-Price, 2004, 
p.1 02). Howev~r, judging from the contested nature of European identity, the first 
proposition is deemed to be rejected. For the latter proposition, it is possible to 
distinguish the Commission's interest from the member states ' interests - although the 
Commission's interests are not ontologically equated to European interests. 
Accordingly, the policy can also be reduced to a more liberal approach, based on 
actors ' "constructed" interests and the inter-actors bargaining, namely "the politics of 
identity". There are possible three conceptions of European identity suggested by 
different actors . 
3.6.2.1 Established European States - Bounded European Identity 
As reviewed in earlier section, the primary interests of established states in 
European identity are the maintenance and the ownership of European order. Any 
participation of European integration is always subj ected to calculated benefits .90 
90 For the detailed of such liberal argument, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the 
European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", Journa l of Common lvlarket Studies , 
Vol. 31:4 (1993 ), pp.473 - 524; Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory 
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National identity is always prevailed as they are already locked into such "power 
containers" for ages, and standardized over quite wide areas (Gellner, 1983, p.121). 
The political elites , in order to hold their respective power, will continue supply the 
national agenda to the public and integration is always bounded. The construction of 
European identity cannot be in expense of national identity and national interest. 
However, the construction of a thin European identity is still possible. As Ernst 
Gellner (1983) reminds us in his study of nationalism, nations and nationalism are the 
functional-response of the crisis created by modernity. It is therefore possible any 
loyalty transfer if the actors satisfied with the performance of the supranational 
structure, the more they will support the political institution (Risse, 2005, p.294) - but 
it is always issue-dependent. 
3.6.2.2 New EU Member States - Pan-Europeanism 
While the established member states separate their national identity from the 
European identity, the newly acceded states have their identity rooted in the European 
ground. The idea of Mitteleuropa is re-introduced among the newly acceded states, for 
their strong proof of "returning to Europe". They defined the idea of Europe in terms 
of the Habsburg heritage, which covers from Hungary to a truncated eastern and 
of International Politics", International Organization, Vo151 :4 (1997), pp.51 3 - 553 ~ Andrew 
Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999) 
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south-eastern Europe. 91 More importantly, the idea of Mitteleuropa is selectively 
reiterated and by all means a strategic indication of forgetting the brutal history of 
communism. In order to walk out from the shadow of communism, the new member 
states have used the idea of Mitteleuropa as the alternative political identity, thus the 
national identity of these new member states has a strong European attachment, and 
such ideal is expanded to their current neighbours owing to the geographical meaning 
of Mitteleuropa. 
3.6.2.3 European Commission - Post-nationalism 
Although the members of the Commission are nominated by the nation-states and 
scrutinized by both the Council and the European Parliament, we cannot simply 
equate their conception of European identity to their homeland. Followed the 
institutionalist argument, Morten Egeberg reveals in general, the institutional 
interaction between the Commission and the Council has sharpened perception of the 
Commission "as an engine of integration, while the Council embodies national 
control" (Egeberg, 2005, p.l 09). Being perceived as the role of safeguarding 
Community interest, the Commissioners are therefore perceived themselves as 
91 For the discussion of the idea of Mittele uropa , see Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity 
and Reality (Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1995) ~ Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking 
Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization (London: Routledge, 2005), Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3~ Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: a History of the World 1914 - 1991 (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1994) ~ 
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European bureaucrats rather than national politicians (which their former position 
usually) and willing to defend the supranational idea1. 92 The political identification of 
European ideal has partially eroded their political loyalty towards their homeland. 
Therefore, both national and European identity is rather in the same level which both 
identification of political institutions. It is important to note that such construction of 
European identi:ty is a rather thin one. Those Commissioners, instead of appreciating 
the cultural commons of Europe, appreciated and socialized under the same 
insti tuti ons. 
The identity matrix of different actors can be summarized by the below table: 
Identity \ Actors Established states New ED member European 
states Commission 
National Level Thick Thick Thin 
European Level Thin/none Thick Thin 
Table 3.1 The Identity-Actor Matrix 
92 This is the traditional argument posed by the role-theorists and political psychologists. For details, 
see Kalevi Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648 - 1989 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991 ) 
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3.6.3 Discursive Reading of Boundary Formation 
Having sketched the respective identity positions, we can now articulate the 
second-level hypotheses about the influence of policy formation . The cornerstone of 
the hypotheses is the idea of social boundaries. Social boundaries , as Karl Deutsch 
suggested, are "a sharp drop in the frequency of some relevant transaction flow" 
(Deutsch, 1969, p.97). Deutsch argues that by locating the density of transaction 
declines, we can make up a specific density curve for each community, and the 
boundaries are found when the density curve exhibit a sudden fall (ibid, pp.98 - 99). 
Drawing inspiration from Deutschian idea on social boundaries, Lars-Erik Cederman 
(2001 , pp.17 - 20) has introduced four follow-up hypotheses on supranational identity 
formation - which the dissertation will take three of them: 
1. Bounded Integration (Figure 3.1): Cederman suggest that the 
bounded-integration theory "accepts the existence of trade-off but maintain 
but maintains that the shape of the boundary profiles differs from issue area 
to issue area" (ibid, p.19). Therefore it can be possible for the supporter of 
this theory, i.e. the established states, to hold an identification to Europe in 
one issue while retreat in another issue. In addition, as the 
bounded-integration theorist rejects the essentialist approach on European 
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identity construction, the variation of identity can also be found within the 
same issues, as a function of particular discourse or policy practices . 
2. Pan-Europeanism (Figure 3.2): For Pan-Europeanism, i.e. the new acceding 
states, the cultural plateau has reached the national and European identity 
formation. However, when things go beyond the cultural plateau, the 
possibilities for identification dwindle quickly. In this sense, Cederman 
argues that the identity-holder may refuse to accept any identity trade-off at 
national level , but they will advocate a shift to European level and trade-off 
is always possible if the aggregation of European identity is attained. 
3. Postnationalism (Figure 3.3): Finally, for post-nationalism, i.e. the European 
Commission, both national identification and European identification retain 
as a thin one. Therefore, the identity-social boundaries trade-off is not 
necessary. Viewing states and nations are functional communities rather than 
cultural one, the political identities "include a swift outward shift of 
interactive scale from national level, to Europe, and often even beyond that 
scale toward a fully global identity" (ibid). Any exclusion-dilution trade-offs 
are sceptical from the post-nationalists ' point of view. 
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Figure 3.3 Post-nationalism 
However, Lars-Erik Cederman does not show how such boundaries can be 
realized in term of foreign policy. As the result, the dissertation suggests that the 
discursive practice and narratives incorporated in the European Neighbourhood Policy 
can be the base of such boundary construction. Mental boundaries are constructed 
through the use of political narratives and the policy practices. The realization of such 
constructed boundaries is through three elements suggested by lennifer Milliken 
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(1999, pp.228 - 231; see also Larsen, 2004, pp.66 - 67): discourses as systems of 
signification; discourse productivity and the play of practice. Taking the boundaries 
suggested in the previous paragraphs, the dissertation further hypothesizes : 
HI: The Wider Europe is suggested by the Commission as it tries to 
produce a softened boundary (based on values or political ideas) toward 
all its neighbours; and 
H2: The F;uropean Neighbourhood Policy is suggested as the Council 
tries to purpose a social boundary which is hard and soft. The narrative 
towards the boundaries consist of hard element (like geographical) and 
soft element. (The Politics of Identity) 
One may find why the interests of new EU member states do not reflect in the 
second-level hypotheses . This indeed reflects the realpoltik of everyday EU decision 
making. Revealed by an experienced EU practitioner, the established states, especially 
Germany, France and United Kingdom have worked closely and these states usually 
"see themselves on a diff~rent plane from other member states and often meet to 
discuss policy matter" (Cameron, 2007, p.61). The recent trend, therefore, is that the 
EU3 would informally discuss the policy issues off the table of General Affair and 
External Relations Council (GAERC), reaching a consensus before the real lobbying 
takes place, while the smaller states can exert little influence. Nevertheless, the new 
member states have played some role in the policy formulation and it will be 
discussed in the final conclusion. 
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3.7 Chapter Summary and Preview of Next Chapter 
This lengthy chapter serves as the theoretical base of the whole dissertation. With 
the review of the political context faced by the European Union, the chapter reveals 
some basic structural setting for the European Neighbourhood Policy: on one hand, 
the end of Cold War has introduced drastic structural changes to the European 
political order, which demand a new turn for European identity; on the other hand, the 
EU member states have actively constructed a mental solidarity of EU through 
different domestic or foreign policies; finally, different actors in European politics 
have their different interests in the European identity, thus they will try to impose their 
conception to the construction of new European identi ty. Followed the discussion of 
the setting of contemporary European politics, the chapter suggests a theoretical 
framework involving three components : the constructivist understanding of European 
foreign policy, the liberal conception of European identity and the discursive reading 
of boundary formation. Three hypotheses are suggested from the theoretical 
framework and these hypotheses will be subsequently tested by the empirical findings 
discussed in the next few chapters. 
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Chapter 4: The Contestation between the Actors - "Proximity" 
"My aim is giving them incentives, injecting a new dynamic in existing processes and 
developing an open and evolving partnership. This is what we call our proximity policy, 
a policy based on mutual benefits and obligations, which is a substantial contribution 
by the E U to global governance" 
(Romano Prodi, Speech in Sixth ECSA-World Conference 2002) 
With the general discussion on the thematic framework of the dissertation, this 
chapter turns to the empirical findings of the dissertation. As Patten and Solana has 
also mentioned in the letter, there is a complex consideration of the choice of labelling 
and re-labelling (Patten and Solana, 2002). Therefore, it is meaningful to reconstruct 
the development of ENP via the policy labels and narrative. This chapter starts the 
historical trajectory of the neighbourhood policy, which includes policies prior to the 
Proximity Policy. Then the chapter will locate the narrative within the policy initiation 
phrase and rediscovers the construction of European identity, through the construction 
the European Space via the idea of proximity, by the two different parties : the member 
states and the Commission. 
4.1 EU Policies Prior to the Proximity Policy 
Prior to the European Neighbourhood Policy, European Union has pursued three 
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policies instruments towards its neighbours: 93 European Economic Area (hereafter 
EEA) enjoyed by the European Free Trade Association (hereafter EFTA) countries,94 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (hereafter EMP) targeted to the Mediterranean 
countries and different Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (hereafter PCAs) 
negotiated between the EU and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 95 The below 
sections will provide some basic background for each policy, providing aid with the 
later discussion of the political narrative hidden in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. 
4.1.1 European Economic Area 
The concept of EEA was introduced by the Luxembourg ministerial meeting 
between the European Community (hereafter EC) and EFTA in 1984, by the time it 
was called "dynamic European Economic Space" (Gould, 2004, p.178). The 
negotiation of EEA finally sparked with Jacques Delors, the Commission President, 
speaking to European Parliament in January 1989. With three years negotiation 
93 For the sake of simplicity, the word "neighbours" means countries which are incorporated in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy unless specified. 
94 Although Switzerland does not contract to the EEA after the referendum, the Swiss government has 
enjoyed the similar treatment ofEEA countries by the EU. For the sake of categorization, the treatment 
of Swiss agreement is combined with the analysis of EEA. 
95 In fact, there is a regional programme named as Northern Dimension which covered Norway, 
Iceland and Russian Federation. The thesis drops the policy for comparison because the case does not 
cover the ENP countries or being compared with ENP. 
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between the parties, the EC and the EFTA members signed the Agreement of Creating 
the European Economic Area (hereafter EEA Agreement) in May 1992 and entered 
into force in 1 January 1994.96 
From the EU's official point of view, the EEA was an alternative of the EFTA 
countries which wish to "participate in the Internal Market, while not assuming the 
full responsibilities of EU membership" (European Commission, 2008b). Under the 
EEAAgreement, the EFTA countries have to entail the four fundamental pillars of the 
Internal Market, "the four freedoms", i.e. the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital (Article 1.2 of the EEA Agreement). In return, the EFTA countries 
are guaranteed the access of EC market in equal footing as the member states. In 
addition, co-operations in the areas like research and development, educations, social 
policy etc. , collective known as "flanking and horizontal" policies are covered in the 
EEA Agreement (EFTA Secretariat, 2007, p.1 8) Also, EFTA countries do not 
participate in most of the "common" policies ofEU, such as Common Agricultural 
Policy, Common Trade Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Monetary 
Union, etc (1 bid.). In his analysis of the characteristics of EEA Agreement, Tim Gould 
(2004) has identified four distinctive characteristics vis-a-vis other similar 
96 By the time of enforcement, Austria, Finland and Sweden have been scheduled to join EU in 1995 ; 
Switzerland, as mentioned, opted out to join the EEA after the referendum. 
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agreements. 
First of all , the EFTA states had either accepted the Internal Market "package" as 
full , or left with nothing. As Delors ' speech in 1989 has clearly said that "it is 
extremely difficult, within this all-embracing union, to provide a choice of menus", 
the EFTA states have to commit themselves to taking EC legislation, at least in all the 
fields related to the four freedoms (Gould, 2004, pp.178 - 179). No permanent 
exceptions of any Community acquis in those fields will be granted for any EEA 
members, but only given limited transition periods. 
Secondly, the EFTA states are passive when the EC have proposed new 
Community acquis which also affects the EFTA countries . Although the Agreement 
has laid down institutional procedures for the EFTA states to intervening in the 
preparatory stages of the new Community acquis (Article 99 and 100 of the EEA 
Agreement), they have little practical influence on the final policy outcome (Gould, 
2004, pp.179 - 181). It is true that the contracting parties can request consultations or 
negotiate adaptations to new Community acquis at "special circumstances". However, 
the EFTA states can neither sit nor vote in the European Parliament or the European 
Council in the final stage, thus in reality the prevailing choices for EFTA countries are 
simply "take it or leave it" (Cameron, 2007, p.12S). 
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Thirdly, the day-to-day operation of the Agreement has effectively bound the 
EFTA states to the EU's control. In order to maintain the homogeneity of the Internal 
Market, the EFTA states have to be prepared for EU's competition policy and 
complied with the surveillance and enforcement mechanisms (Article 102, 105 and 
107 of the EEAAgreement). Yet, there are no common institutions which enforce the 
effective surveillance over the contracting parties. Duplicating the EU's institutions, 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority is set up to make sure the EFTA states will fulfil 
their legal obligations and match with EU's competition policy (Article 107 of the 
EEA Agreement). Again, the EFTA courts are bound to accept the case law of the 
European Court of Justice in EEA related disputes. As the result, the EFTA states have 
indirectly beholden to decisions of EU and its organs, even though they are formally 
out of the EU's reach (Gould, 2004, p.181). 
Finally, EU has forced the EFTA countries to take a reluctant multilateral 
approach and uniform "EFTA voice". The Stockholm Convention which created the 
EFTA has implicitly laid down the "intergovernmental" principle of the Association.97 
Unlike the European Council of the EU, the Council in EFTA is administrative in 
nature (Chapter XVI of the Consolidated Version of the Convention Establishing the 
97 Although the fonnal text of the Convention does not cover any text of "intergovernmental", the 
introduction of the EFTA has highlighted its characteristics of intergovernmentalism. See EFTA 
Secretariat, This is EFTA - The European Free Trade Association 2007 (Brussels : Drifosett, 2007), p.6. 
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European Free Trade Association). There is no formal mechanism or organs to 
formulate a con1mon view on any given issue. In fact, in managing the free trade 
agreements signed with the third parties, separate joint committees are formed on a 
bilateral basis (EFTA Secretariat, 2007, pp. IS - 16). However, in EEA Agreement, the 
EFTA states are "forced" to speak with one voice before negotiating or meeting with 
EU in the EEA. Joint Committee (ibid, p.21). It is far beyond the expectation by the 
EFTA participants before joining the club (Gould, 2004, p.182). 
4.1 .2 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Prior to the emergence of ENP, the main common policy of EU towards its 
southern neighbours was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, sometimes being 
named as the Barcelona Process. On 27 - 28 November, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held in Barcelona. Followed by the 
Barcelona Declaration, a wide political framework was set up between the EU and the 
southern Mediterranean countries (referred to as "Mediterranean partners"). 98 
Compared with other agreements , the EMP has four distinctive features , which can be 
referential in later discussion. 
98 The original contacting parties include the EU 15 countries and 12 Mediterranean countries (Algeria, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey). The 2004 enlargement has brought Cyprus and Malta as well as the 8 CEEC countries to EU. 
In addition, Libya has been acquired the status of observer since 1999. 
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Firstly, EMP has covered a much wider agenda between EU and the 
Mediterranean partners. Unlike other agreements, the EMP has launched a triple 
partnership between EU and its Mediterranean partners : partnership at political and 
security level aiming at "a common area of peace and stability"; partnershi p at 
economic and financial level aiming at "creating an area of shared prosperity"; 
partnership at s.ocial and cultural level aiming at encouraging better understanding and 
exchange between cultures and civil societies (Philippart, 2003, p.201). On one hand, 
the three baskets of the EMP operate independently and with different speed, on the 
other hand it considers that "security, socio-economic and cultural problems are 
conceived as multi-faceted and interlinked" (ibid, p.209). In achieving its agenda, EU 
is in fact banking on several positive spillovers between these different spheres. This 
is , however, not a guaranteed result. 
Secondly, the EMP has mixed both the regional and bilateral co-operations 
between EU and its Mediterranean partners. One of the innovative approaches for the 
EMP is that it creates a regional framework to assist the current bilateral cooperation. 
Regional strategy papers and indicative programmes are drafted by the European 
Commission every six years and three years respectively. Regional dialogues are 
taken place at different levels of Euro-Mediterranean conferences, and regional 
programmes like EuroMeSCo or disaster prevention and management system are 
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sponsored by the EU for building the foreign policy institute network. However, the 
regional, or multilateral, dimension serves as the assistance of the existing bilateral 
relations - "supports and complements the bilateral actions and dialogue taking place 
under the Association Agreements" (European Commission, 2008a). Similar to the 
regional cooperation, independent country strategy papers and national indicative 
programmes ar.e provided for each Mediterranean partner. Each partner has signed the 
bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement (hereafter EM AA) with EU and 
is entitled different treatments according to the EU's evaluation and negotiation 
between the parties. As the result, the EMP is a policy mix of the same regional 
strategy but different bilateral agreements. 
Thirdly, owing to the mixing up of the multilateral and bilateral faces of the 
policy, the EMP has adopted a rather complex institutional structure, compared to that 
of EEA. The multilateral conference, "Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs", is the "top steering body of the Barcelona Process" (European 
Commission, 2008a). Complementing the conference, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Committee, consists of EU troika99 and representati ves from members states and 
Mediterranean partners, acts as an overall steering body for monitoring and preparing 
99 After the Treaty of Amsterdam, the troika has involved four political figures: the current EU 
presidency, the next EU presidency, the Commission representative and the High Representative for the 
CFSP. 
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progranunes and conferences . At bilateral level, each EMAA is governed by the same 
pattern of institutions (Ministerial Council and Senior Official Committee) (Philippart, 
2003, p.203). These conferences and committees, from EU's perspective, are working 
on the basis of strict equality - following the guiding principle of "equality in the 
partnership" (ibid, p. 202). 
Finally, although EU stresses that EMP is guided by the principle of equality 
between parties, in practice, the equality is not strictly hold in two senses : between 
EU and the Mediterranean partners as whole and among Mediterranean partners. In 
the EMP funding model, the decision-making and contribution are entirely on EU 
institutions. The Conunission and its delegations have drawn funds from the total EU 
budgets, through for example the MED A programme. In the area of free trade, though 
the EMP embraces the idea of a "fair and equitable multilateral trading system", the 
EMP gives "special and differential treatment" based on objective differences (ibid, 
p.209). The priority of assistance is given to weakest parties to fight poverty and 
achieve political reform especially. The obj ectivity however is never clearly defined. 
With the dependence of the fund and the unclear objectivity, the EMP in fact reflects 
the imbalance of the EU-Mediterranean relations . It is perceived as a soft form of 
hegemony rather than a real partnership (ibid, p.2lS). 
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4.1.3 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
For Eastern and Central Asian countries, EU has pursued a series of Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements bilaterally with them. The PCA is a bilateral agreement 
which, as EU argued, are "based on the respect of democratic principles and human 
rights, setting out the political, economic and trade relationshi p between EU and its 
partner countries" (European Commission, 2008e). Each PCA will be automatically 
renewed by the consent of the contracting parties. Although all the PCAs are 
negotiated independently, the agreements have something similar among each other. 
The most fundamental characteristic of the peA is the idea of "partnership". 
Although the EMP also emphasizes the idea of partnership, the peA take the 
emphasis of the idea in another way. Compared with the text of Barcelona Process, 
the presentation of "partnership" is different in peA: 
"RESOLVED to establish to that end a multilateral and lasting framework of relations 
based on a spirit of partnership, with due regard for the characteristics, values and 
distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants" (Barcelona Declaration) 
"CONSIDERING the commitment of the Community and its Member States and of 
Ukraine to strengthening the political and economic freedoms which constitute the very 
basis of the partnership" (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine) 
While the idea of partnership between EU and the Mediterranean partners is the 
spirit of the Barcelona Declaration, the idea of partnership between EU and the peA 
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parties is the basis - which means the partnership is conditional. As the clause has 
bluntly put, the constitution of "partnership" is depended on the "strengthening" of 
political and economic freedoms. That means without any reform, the EU can in fact 
put down the political instruments by the time of renewal. 
Secondly, although less being emphasis , the PCA follows the strict bilateral 
equality. Under the PCA, the annual bilateral Summit meeting is the platform for 
political dialogues between the President of Ukraine and the EU troika. The 
Cooperation Council and the Cooperation Committees are the steering decision maker 
and the steering committee for the implementation of the peA. These working organs, 
similar to other bilateral agreements between EU and the third parties, are worked in 
bilateral fashion and governed by the idea of strict equality. lOO Thus, from the 
institutional perspective, the contracting parties are in equal footing in negotiating the 
agreements, for example the agreement can be always rejected by the countries after 
10 years period. 
100 The idea of strict equality is laid down in Article 310 of the Treaty of European Union, which is 
written as: "the Community may conclude with one or more States or international organizations 
agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and 
special procedure" . 
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4.2 The Proximity Policy as the First Label 
As abovementioned, the policy idea could be traced from the "proximity policy" 
termed by British Foreign Minister Jack Straw. In fact, prior to the communication 
proposed by the European Commission in March 2003, the use of "Proximity Policy" 
is connected and inter-changed with the latter narrative "Wider Europe". 101 Therefore, 
the term "ProxImity" may serve as the important political narrative at this phrase. 
4.2.1 Proximity as a Competitive Construct 
What is the idea of "proximity"? Immediate reply of the definition of proximity 
may come from authoritative dictionary, which means "the fact, condition, or position 
of being near or close by in space; nearness" (Oxford English Dictionary, 2008; 
emphasis added) . This partially echoes the latter survey on the idea of neighbours, 
which geographical proximity is an important independent variable in determining the 
concept of neighbours . 102 However, the concept of proximity is not so 
self-explanatory if we investigate the political narrative emerged from the discussion 
101 For example, the speech of Romano Prodi was titled as "A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as 
the Key to Stability" (Prodi, 2002)~ The joint letter from Chris Patten and Javier Solana, on the contrary, 
was titled as "Wider Europe", but the letter has subsequently mentioned the "proximity agreement" and 
"a new proximity instrument". 
102 See the different reports from Eurobarometer. Eurobarometer, "The European Union and its 
Neighbours", Special Eurobarometer 259 (Brussels: European Commission, 2006), pp .12 - 18 ~ 
Eurobarometer, "The EU's Relations with Its Neighbours: A Survey of Attitudes in the European 
Union", Special Eurobarometer 285 (Brussels: European Commission, 2007), pp.4 - 17 
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of the policy. 
4.2.1.1 Proximity as a Geographical Concept 
The initiation of policy discussion may start with the pragmatic concerns in the 
context of Eastern enlargement. However, the discussion of the policy has its 
geographical context different from the final version. By reviewing the minutes of 
GAERC meetings involved, it can be revealed the geographical limits of the idea of 
"proximity". 103 
Explicitly in his letter to Brussels, Jack Straw targeted the proximity policy 
towards four "future" neighbours: Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. However, 
such pragmatism has its geographical limit, which partially reflects the European 
identity held among the heads of the government. It is interesting to compare the 
political narratives used in the joint letter from Patten and Solana with the minutes in 
the GAERC meetings: 
"What should be the geographical coverage of this exercise? The enlarged Union's 
neighbours fall into three main regional groupings: the Mediterranean (Barcelona 
Process); the Western Balkans (Stabilization and Association Process); and Russia and 
the other eastern neighbours (partnership and Cooperation Agreements). In addition 
there are the EEA countries and Switzerland who seem likely to remain satisfied with 
103 There are totally three publicly-disclosed meetings about the issues prior to the council conclusion: 
2421 st meeting (15 April 2002), 2450 th meeting (30 September 2002) and 2463 rd meeting (18 
November 2002). 
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the status quo, the candidate countries that are already engaged in negotiations but will 
not make the first intake of enlargement, and Turkey" (Patten and Solana, 2002 ~ bold as 
origin, underlined added) 
"The Council had an exchange of views on relations between the future enlarged EU 
and its Eastern neighbours ... It was also underlined that, beyond the question of Eastern 
neighbours, the broader question of 'wider Em'ope' deserved consideration" (GAERC 
meeting, 30 September 2002 ~ emphasis added) 
"With the forthcoming biggest ever enlargement in its history, the EU will have borders 
with a nunlber of new neighbours .. . In particular, the EU wishes to put in place further 
conditions ,which would allow it to enhance its relations with its Eastern European 
neighbours : Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus ... Based on experience with this initiative, 
the Council might subsequently reflect on those elements which could be relevant for 
relations with partners in other bordering regions" (GAERC meeting, 18 November 
2002 ~ emphasis added) 
Although both texts involve the idea of "eastern (European) neighbours", the 
meeting records from the GAERC meetings have used the capitalized "Eastern" -
which means it has a specific meaning vis-a.-vis the meaning of "eastern neighbours" 
in the joint letter. In fact, the latter conclusion has explicitly clarified the difference: 
Eastern neighbours as Eastern European neighbours . In the joint letter, the 
de-capitalized "eastern" means the countries which are having PCA agreements with 
EU - which have covered ten East European and Central Asian countries. Taking into 
the account of the other two regional groupings mentioned in the joint letter, the 
intergovernmental version of "proximity" has its own geographical limit - Europe to 
the extent of new neighbours only. 
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4.2.1.2 Proximity as a Socio-political Concept 
The idea of proximity is arguably consistent, until the high-profile Prodi has 
produced the speech of "A Wider Europe" in early December. Prior to Prodi 's speech, 
the Commission position was in line with the Council , which the geographical 
coverage of the new initiative is the Eastern neighbours (Patten and Solana, 2002). 
However, such 'geographical understanding of proximity was broken after Prodi 's 
speech, and in return affected the final decision in Copenhagen European Council. In 
fact, by reviewing Prodi 's speech in details, the idea of "proximity" has shifted from 
"nearness" to "closeness", which the latter one is the less dominant usage of 
proximity (Oxford English Dictionary, 2008). 
The idea of proximity has another understanding, which describes "the fact or 
condition of being near or close in abstract relations, as kinship, time, nature, etc" 
(ibid; emphasis added) . This understanding of "proximity" is fundamentally different 
from the previous version, as the idea of "closeness" is not based on concrete facts 
like spatial arrangement, but abstract relations which implicitly assume the sharing of 
certain ties like ethnics, culture or history. Such conception of proximity can also 
reflects what Risse suggests the concentric circle model of European identity.104 The 
104 Risse has made three models of European identity, for details see Thomas Risse, "The Euro 
between National and European Identity", Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12:2 (2003), 
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idea of Europe can be as far as the distant United States to the closest of course the , , 
members of European Union. 
Such conception of proximity is best reflected by Prodi 's idea of "ring of 
friends" and "Copenhagen Proximity Criteria". In his defining speech on "A 
Proximity Policy", Prodi has introduced an idea of "the ring of friends", which 
"surrounding the Union and its closest neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the 
Black Sea" (Prodi, 2002). Compared to the GAERC meeting records , the 
geographical coverage of the Proximity Policy suggested by Prodi has reached the 
"unmentioned" Black Sea.105 Prodi has also introduced a ''''substantive and workable 
concept of proximity" which is defined by "a set of principles, values and standards 
which define the very essence of European Union" (ibid). Suggested by Prodi, these 
criteria are known as the Copenhagen Proximity Criteria, which modelled from the 
Copenhagen Criteria. 
4.2.2 Proximity as the Mapping of European Space 
Even though the member states and the Commission view differently on the 
pp.487 - 505 
105 However, it is consistent with the concept suggested by Patten and Solana's joint letter that the 
relations between EU and countries in Black Sea are governed by the peAs. 
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definition of proximity, the term "proximity" itself carries a discursive meaning of 
"Others". This is more explicit when the "Wider Europe" is dropped off from the 
agenda of GAERC meeting, and replaced by "a new neighbourhood initiati ve". 106 
The idea of proximity, indeed, gives a notice of where Europe ends, especially when 
the candidate and potential candidate countries were excluded from the discussion of 
initiative. Nonetheless, in viewing the boundaries, there were some distinctions 
between the member states' conception and that of the European Commission. 
4.2.2.1 Proximity Policy as a Hard Boundary Mapping 
With the review of the meeting records of the discussion about the policy 
initiative, the member states have always referred the policy under the context of 
"enlarged EU and its Eastern neighbours". Throughout the discussion and the 
conclusion, the primary focus of the proximity is to manage the opportunities and 
threats brought from the 2004 enlargement, "with the objective of creating stability 
and narrowing the prosperity gap at the new borders of the Union" (GAERC meeting, 
18 November 2002, emphasis added). In addition, such policy is "an ambitious, 
long-term and integrated approach towards each of these countries" (ibid), which tries 
106 The term "Wider Europe" was used in the first meeting discussing about the policy, but was 
subsequently dropped in the 2nd meeting. The term was re-introduced when the Commission took the 
initiative after December 2002 - and it will be discussed in-depth in the next chapter. 
Defining Europe 116 
to effectively rule out the prosperity of accession. 
Indeed, the policy can be viewed as the "commodification" and 
"bureaucratization" of EU Space (Gregory, 1994, p.402). By bureaucratization, it 
refers to the administrative system which not only "maps out its own territory, stakes 
it out and signposts it", but also "invclves the installation of juridico-political grids by 
means of which social life is subject to systematic surveillance and regulations by the 
state" (ibid). Through identified which countries are proximate to EU, the member 
states have already "signposted" what is the limit of Europe in the Eastern 
boundaries - not to the extent of new neighbours. In addition, the policy practices 
prescribed in the conclusion of the policy initiative have installed juridico-political 
grids by the European states. For instance, the juridico-political grids included the 
objectives of the policy - "ensure greater stability and prosperity at and beyond the 
new borders of the Union" and the policy mode - "a differentiated approach" which 
depend on their will , implementation of further reforms and respect of international 
norms (GAERC meeting, 18 November 2002). As result, by creating the narrative of 
"proximity" and the implementation of the respective policy, a mental European space 
is constructed through hardening the new borders and boundaries in the East. 
4.2.2.2 Proximity Policy as a Soft Boundary Mapping 
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The boundaries constructed between the EU member states and the neighbours 
by the Commission, on the contrary, are rather soft political boundaries. The meaning 
of "soft" is twofold: first of all , it does not carry a geographical meaning, compared to 
the member states ' discussion of the policy. With the Copenhagen Proximity Criteria, 
the neighbours are in fact being categorized from more European to less European, as 
he deliberately categorized the EU as "a pole of attraction" and the neighbouring 
countries as "backyard" (Prodi, 2002). Secondly, the "proximity" defined by the 
Commission does not rule out the possibility for "the other" become "self'. This 
hidden meaning can be reviewed by two discursive practices by Prodi: the 
"Copenhagen" Proximity Criteria and the European Economic Area. Coincidently, the 
2002 Council of Europe met in Copenhagen, so the "Copenhagen" Proximity Criteria 
may mean the criteria suggested in the Copenhagen meeting. However, Copenhagen 
Criteria has its specific meaning of which it determines the accession of Eastern 
European states. A "Copenhagen Proximity Criteria" modelled from Copenhagen 
Criteria therefore gi ves a hope for the new neighbours that they may be one day being 
valued by accession-related Copenhagen Criteria - the Copenhagen Proximity 
Criteria were just an intermediate step. 107 
107 This expectation is especially popular in new member states like Poland and new neighbours like 
Ukraine. See Piotr Buras and Karolina Pomorska, "Poland and the European Neighbourhood Policy", 
Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Vo1.7 : 19 (2006), pp.34 - 43; Iryna Solonenko, "European Neighbourhood 
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This discursive practice is strengthened by the analogy of the Proximity Policy 
with EEA - argued as being the EEA H. Mentioned in the earlier section, the EEA is 
an exclusive club for countries which can join ED but temporarily reject the 
membership owing to domestic reasons. Indeed, the EEA has its distinctive identity 
val ue, which has been stated in the preamble of the EEA Agreement: "the high 
priority attache.d to the privileged relationship between the European Community, its 
Member States and the EFTA States, which is based on proximity, long-standing 
common values and European identity" ("Agreement on the European Economic 
Area", 1992). By contrasting the proximity policy to the EEA, Prodi has presented 
rather permeable European boundaries, "as history shows, being member of the EEA 
does not exclude membership of the ED at a later date" (Prodi, 2002). 
4.2.3 Proximity as the Reflection of European Project 
While the Council conclusion has been focused on the pragmatic issues, Prodi 
has linked the proximity policy to the political project of Europe. From Prodi 's 
perspective, the proximity policy is a safeguard solution to prevent EU into a free 
trade area: 
Policy - the Perception of Vkraine " , Foreign Policy in Dialogue , Vol.7 : 19 (2006), pp.44 - 51 ; Anmeli 
Vte Gabanyi, "The European Neighbourhood Policy - The Perspective of Moldova", Foreign Policy in 
Dialogue, Vol. 7: 19 (2006), pp.52 - 57 
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"I do not deny that this process (enlargement) has worked very well . But we cannot go 
on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn 
the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale. We need a 
debate in Europe to decide where the limits of Europe lie and prevent these limits being 
determined by others. 
In addition, the proximity policy was being seen as the contribution of EU as a 
real global player. By contributed to global governance by EU 's proximity policy, 
Prodi ,vas in fact ambitious to turn EU (especially the Commission)lo8 into an 
important global actor: 
"If we want to satisfy the rising expectations and hopes of countries abroad and the 
peoples of Europe, we have to become a real glo bal player ... This is what we call our 
proximity policy, a policy based on mutual benefits and obligations, which is a 
substantial contribution by the EU to global governance ... We need to institute a new 
and inclusive regional approach that would help keep and promote peace and foster 
stability and security throughout the continent, ultimately promoting the emergence of 
better global governance" 
This contradicts to the member states ' pragmatic concern on the policy which is 
to manage the opportunities and threats brought from the 2004 enlargement. A 
proximity policy has become a vital part of the supranational agenda for the European 
political project. 
108 Prodi has mentioned that "it is the Commission's responsibility to come up with a way of improving 
relations with all these countries". 
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4.3 Chapter Summary and Preview of Next Chapter 
This chapter initiate the empirical discussion of the dissertation. It has first 
reviewed policies pursued by EU prior to the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Followed with the identification of the characteristics of each policy, the chapter turns 
to the historical traj ectory of the Proximity Policy, which is the ancestor of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. A detailed discussion is presented in the chapter on · 
the understandings of the keyword: proximity, and revealed that each actor holds a 
distinctive conception of "proximity". However, the idea of proximity was soon be 
replaced by the idea of Wider Europe, after the Commission has presented the "Wider 
Europe" Communication in March. The next chapter will focus on the concept of 
Wider Europe and more complex discourse analysis techniques will be used with 
reference from lennifer Milliken's work. 
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Chapter 5: The Commission-led Narration - "Wider Europe" 
"It repeated the Union s determination to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe 
and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the 
Union" 
(The Wider Europe Communication, p.4) 
With the final conclusion by the Copenhagen Council in 2002, the Commission 
has been endorsed with power to formulate the new neighbourhood initiative. The 
idea of "Wider Europe" was then eventually entered the policy agenda. Based on the 
policy communication presented in 11 March 2003 (COM(2003) 104), this chapter 
will deconstruct the political texts inscribed in the communication, and rediscover the 
Commission's perception of European identity. With the analytical tool suggested by 
Larsen (2001) and Milliken (1999), the analysis will be divided into three aspects : 
representation, policy practice and play of discursive practice. 
5.1 Representation of "Wider Europe" 
From communicati ve approach of identity construction, key foreign policy 
speeches and documents contain "assertions referring to subjective we-feelings of a 
cultural group and its specific customs, institutions, territory, myths and rituals" 
(Aggestam, 2004, p.83). In return, by analysing the text, we could discover how the 
decision-makers want to present its identity to the rest of the world, including the 
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citizens and the third-parties in the international arena. Across the communication, 
there are three important representations reflected in the Wider Europe 
Communication. 
5.1.1 Core Europe as the Land of Prospedty and Stability 
The essence of foreign policy is about "the core elements of sovereignty it seeks 
to defend; the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad" (Wallace, 1991 , p.65), 
therefore the first representation we ought to find from the "Wider Europe" is the 
narrative towards Europe or non-Europe. 
One of the aims of the initiative "Wider Europe" is to "develop a zone of 
prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood" (European Commission, 2003b, p.4). The 
emphasis of the idea of prosperity and stability in EU territory is always seen within 
the communication: 
"Over the coming decade and beyond, the Union's capacity to provide security, stability 
and sustainable development. . . " (ibid, p.3; emphasis added ; European Commission, 
2003b, p.1) 
"It is repeated the Union's determination to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe 
and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the 
Union" (ibid, p.4 ; emphasis added) 
"The EU can and should work to spread the benefit of enlargement for political and 
economic stability in the neighbouring countries and to help reduce prosperity gaps 
where they exists" (ibid, p.9; emphasis added) 
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"To work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared 
prosperity ... " (ibid, p.9; emphasis as origin)109 
On the contrary, the neighbouring countries, in the communication, have been 
given a general impression of economically backward and politically unstable. In the 
communication, the Commission has spent nine pages to describe the poverty and 
instability of neighbouring countries (ibid, pp.7 - 9 ~ pp.19 - 26). For example, 
detailed GDP and economic growth of all neighbouring countries, especially paying 
attention to the past: 
"Poverty and social exclusion has increased sharply in Russia and the WNIS over the 
past decade as a result of falling output and increased inequality in the distribution of 
income" (ibid, p.7; emphasis added) 
"Egypt, Israel and Tunisia are the only to have exceeded 2% growth since 1975, while 
Algeria, for example, shows a small negative growth rate" (ibid ; emphasis added) 
"In Russia and the WNIS, poverty rates have increased considerably since 1990" (ibid ; 
emphasis added) 
The years indicated in the Communication are not arguably since each of them 
has indicated an important event. The year 1990 is well-known for the signal of the 
end of Cold War. The year 1975 indeed is the year which EEC consolidated the Lome 
Convention with 71 ACP countries. The Lome Convention is an important preferential 
109 Similar phase has also appeared in p.6 of the Wider Europe Communication. 
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trade agreement with former European colonies which provides non-reci procal trade 
preference to the ACP partners, which arguably helped the ACP countries enjoy 
economic growth. An implicit narrative is created by acknowledging these events: 
compared to the Russia and the WNIS , the core Europe has chosen the right road thus 
now the European Union is one of the most affluent land compared to its European 
neighbours; compared to Mediterranean region, the Mediterranean region did not 
enj oy much growth compared to its neighbouring countries , the EU and the ACP 
countries - since they did not share the prosperity brought from EU. This narrative is 
finally visible when coming to the second communication prepared by the 
Commission,l1o where one of the objectives of the Wider Europe initiative is to tackle 
accentuated difference in living standard "as a result of faster growth in the new 
Member States than in their external neighbours" (European Commission, 2003a, 
pA). 
For the same token, the narrative of instability is given to the neighbouring 
countries, by comparison and detailed description. Identified immigration as one of 
the major issues, the Wider Europe Communication has included detailed statistics for 
immigration from the neighbouring countries (European Commission, 2003b, pp.23 -
liD See European Commission, "Communication from the Commission - Paving the Way for a New 
Neighbourhood Instrument" (Brussels: European Commission, 1 July 2003 ) 
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25). However, such reference are never cited and added as the supplementary 
footnotes under the heading of "prosperity and poverty", but not under the heading of 
"proximity" which discussed the impact of migration. In the final discussion of the 
situation of the neighbouring countries, the communication has ended it with two 
issues which again showed the instability and threat brought: 
"Conflict and political division in Mediterranean (Western Sahara, Palestine) over the 
past half century has seriously retarded the development of the region. Unrecognized 
statelets such as Transdniestria are a magnet for organized crime and can de-stabilise or 
throw off course the process of state-building, political consolidation and sustainable 
development" (ibid, p.9) 
By including the pair-wise narrative on the issues of stabilitylinstability, 
prosperity/poverty throughout the document, an abstract boundary is drawn between 
ED member states and non-ED neighbouring states : Europe as the land of prosperity 
and stability. Suggested by Iver N eumann (on Russia and the Eastern European 
countries) and Michelle Pace (on Mediterranean countries), the detailed description 
on the situation of neighbouring countries not only constructs a narrative towards the 
neighbouring countries (poor and unstable), but also implies a counter-narrative 
towards the Europe on the other (affluent and stable) - and the same logic can also be 
found in the Wider Europe Communication. Ill 
III The detailed argument can be found in Michelle Pace, "The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The 
Mediterranean in the Foreign Policy of the European Union", Journal of European Area Studies , Vol. 
Defining Europe 126 
5.1.2 Wider Europe as an Empire of Unity in Diversity 
However, both the others and the self have shared a common ideal of "Wider 
Europe" - the Europe-other is in also part of the Europe. Continuously emphasized by 
both Prodi 's speech and the Communication, the Union is determined to avoid 
drawing new dividing lines in Europe (Prodi, 2002; European Commission, 2003b, 
p.4). As the result, the Wider Europe communication has always projected an image 
of "Wider Europe" (emphasis added). Therefore, one of the political narratives 
contained in the communication is the idea of "common"/ "shared". For example, the 
Commission has repeatedly expressed the shared prosperity and common interests in 
the neighbourhood: 
"To work with the partners to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and 
values based on deeper economic integration .. . and shared responsibility for conflict 
prevention between the EU and its neighbours" (European Commission, 2003b, p.9; 
emphasis added) 
"Closer geographical proximity means the enlarged EU and the new neighbourhood 
will have an equal stake in furthering efforts .. . as well as even more important shared 
interests in working together .. . " (ibid, p.3; emphasis added) 
"The EU must act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation and 
integration .. . in our shared environment" (ibid, p.3; emphasis added) 
"A shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing 
the threat to stability created by conflict and insecurity" (ibid, p. 12) 
10:2 (2002), pp.189 - 209; Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations", European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2:2 (1996), pp.139 - 174 
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In addition to sharing material interest, the communication has also emphasized 
the idea of shared values - "notably democracy, respect for human rights and the rule 
of law" (ibid, footnote 2) . For example, the Wider Europe initiative aims to "enhance 
relations with its neighbours on the basis of shared values" (ibid, p.4). Rewards from 
EU will always be given "in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values 
and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms" 
(ibid) .112 and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional 
reforms" (ibid).l13 The rhetoric has is crucial for constructing the "Europeanness" of 
the neighbouring countries, as these values are common identified by European 
citizens on the idea of Europe. 114 By implicitly constructed the neighbouring 
countries, like Ukraine, possess "the historic links and common values" (European 
Commission, 2003b, p.6), the European Commission in fact is constructing "fuzzy" 
borders as the idea of boundaries has blurred and "produced interfaces and 
intermediate spaces between inside and outside of the policy" (Christiansen, Petito 
and Tonra, 2000, p.393). As Holm argues, the idea of Wider Europe has "indicated 
112 However, the idea of such rhetoric consists of two meanings: shared between the EU and 
neighbours or shared among EU member states. In the latter part of the thesis, this issue will be 
discussed which the later conception is prevailed. 
113 However, the idea of such rhetoric consists of two meanings: shared between the EU and 
neighbours or shared among EU member states. In the latter part of the thesis, this issue will be 
discussed which the later conception is prevailed. 
114 See for example, Eurobarometer, "The Future of Europe", Special Eurobarom.eter 251 (Bnlssels : 
European Commission, 2006) . 
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inclusion of new countries into Europe thus referring to a perspective of future 
membership" (Holm, 2005, p.17). 
However, the "Wider Europe" has also included a complimentary narrative, 
which focuses on the difference among the countries. Such difference includes the 
difference in starting situations, starting points of relations , stages of development and 
types of relations: 
"The situations of Russia, the countries of the WNIS and the Southern Mediterranean 
are very different judged by most standards .. . Theses forces have not necessary led to 
greater convergence" (European Commission, 2003b, p .4 ~ emphasis added) 
"Differences are reflected in the variety and intensity of Union 's existing relations with 
and among the countries of its new neighbourhood" (ibid ~ emphasis added) 
"Different stages of reform and economic development also means different rates of 
progress can be expected from the neighbouring countries over the coming decade" 
(ibid, p . 6 ~ emphasis added) 
"Some partners already have FTAs with differing degrees of scope and depth" (ibid, 
p.lS) 
By iterate the common and shared values and interests in Wider Europe on one 
hand, the difference and the differentiation on the other, the Wider Europe initiative 
has in fact reemphasized the important rhetoric in defining post Cold War European 
identity - "Unity in Diversity". 
The complimentary emphasis on difference also helps to create a "unique" 
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concept of borders in modern international system, which has "a more or less flexible 
border spaces with overlapping territories, shared sovereignty, diversified institutional 
arrangements and multiple identities" (Kahl, 2007, p.63) Instead of fixed geographical 
boundaries, a concentric circle or a variable geometry with functional borders is 
produced. lIS Thus, the fuzzily bounded European space is produced with the "Wider 
Europe" as the Empire of Unity in Diversity, through the implementation of the Wider 
Europe initiative. 
5.1.3 European Union as a Benevolent Normative Civilian Power 
In the Treaty of European Union and Prodi 's speech, both the member states and 
the European Commission want to assert EU's identity through foreign policy. As the 
result, the communication consists of different narratives describing EU's 
international role. 
One important implication from the communication is about the idea of 
responsibility, which the EU aims to take up towards the neighbouring countries . 
Throughout the communication, the EU has imposed an image of, using William 
115 For the discussion of European borders, see Pierre Hassner, "Fixed Borders or Moving Borderlands? 
A New Type of Borders for a New Type of Entity", in Jan Zielonka edited, Europe Unbounded: 
Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002); Thomas 
Christiansen, Ben Tonra and Fabio Petito, "Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: The European 
Union's 'Near Aboard"', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 35:4, pp.386 - 416; Jan Zielonka, 
"Introduction: Boundary Making by the European Union", in Jan Zielonka edited, Europe Unbounded: 
Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002). 
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Wallace's words, "looking after the neighbourhood" (Wallace, 2003). 
"Responsibility", "duty", "willingness" can be common found in description EU's 
commitment towards its neighbouring countries : 
"The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the new member states, 
but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion 
and economic dynamism" (European Commission, 2003b, p.3) 
"A share~ neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing 
the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity" (ibid, p.12) 
"Greater EU involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats 
would be a tangible demonstration of the EU's willingness to assume a greater share of 
the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries" (ibid, p.12) 
"The EU also needs to make a greater effort to create a positive Image In the 
neighbourhood and act to combat stereotypes which affect perceptions of the countries 
within the EU" (bid, p.12) 
Such conception of responsibility has moved the EU beyond the traditional idea 
of "ci vilian power". 116 The idea of "civilian power" is defined according to three 
distinctive features: "the centrality of economic power to achieve national goals ; the 
primacy of co-operation to solve international problems; and the willingness to use 
legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress (Manners, 
2002, pp.236 - 237). For normative power, it is firstly introduced on the distinction 
116 The earliest conception of "civilian power" was formulated by Franyois Duchene, see Franyois 
Duchene, "Europe 's Role in World Peace", in Richard 1. Mayne, Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans 
Look Ahead (London: Fotana, 1972), pp .32 - 47; Franyois Duchene, "The European Community and 
the Uncertainties of Interdependence", in Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager, A Nation Writ Large? 
Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 1 - 21. 
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between economic power, political power and power over opinion and presented itself 
avvay from the empirical and material impact but focusing on the ideational and 
cognitive process with "both substantive and symbolic components" (Manners, 2002, 
p.239; see also Carr, 2001, pp.120 - 131). Although scholar Thomas Diez (2005 , 
p.635) argues that "the concept of 'normative power ', rather than being distinct from 
'ci vilian pow~r', is already embedded in the latter",117 there are some difference, in 
terms of means and ends, between the two notions of EU identity. 
First of all, as lan Manners has suggested, a ci vilian power EU is a rather 
postcolonial agenda, of which the EU acting "in the name of a civilization of 
international relations" through "the EU's biggest project of all , its mission 
civilisatrice" (Manners, 2006, p.175 ; emphasis as origin; see also Diez, 2005, p.617 
and 629). On the contrary, Manners argues that the normative power is the ability to 
"shape the conceptions of 'normal'" (Manners, 2002, p.240). The distinction here is 
that while the first one has the idea of superiority of the Europe and European values, 
the latter one suggests or pursues values which are universal in the international 
system. Secondly, the basis of civilian power is about the importance and impact of 
economic resources, objectives and strategies, which contrasts with the emphasis on 
117 Diez has also argued that '''civilian power ' also specifies a particular kind of ' normative power '" so 
the distinction between them is even more bllUTed. 
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non-material exemplification and the promotion of norms through imitation and 
attraction (Manners, 2006, p.176). Finally, owing to the communitarian nature, the 
civilian power implicitly argues that the power "exercised primarily for the benefit of 
those exercising it" (ibid). However, for normative power, Manners stressed on the 
cosmopolitan nature which placing the commitment on "the universal norms and 
principles at t~e central of its relations within member states and the world" (ibid). 
By using the above analytical tool , the Wider Europe Communication in fact has 
shown both international identity of civilian power and normative power, or the term 
"hesitant empire" suggested by Ifversen and K0lvraa (2007, p.2S). On one hand, the 
communication has frequently called for the idea of benchmarking, with those 
benchmarks are modelled from UN Human Rights Declaration, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe standards (European Commission, 2003b, p.16). International 
organizations, "notably the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) and the IFIs" (ibid), are invited to establish benchmarks. 
This shows the commitment ofEU as a normative power, by establishing universal 
val ues on human rights and economic freedom. EU also eager to hel p the 
neighbouring countries "normalize" themsel ves, by providing assistance to them in 
entering into international organization like WTO, and removing the stereotypes from 
both within EU and within international arena (ibid, p.1 2 and p.14). On the other hand, 
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the civilian power EU can also be discovered through its narratives and the idea of 
responsibility. As the communication has implicitly labelled the neighbouring 
countries as economic less fortune and political inferior, the communication has 
implied a superiority of EU, which EU has a duty to help them. Firstly illustrated by 
scholar William Wallace (2003), EU has a moral responsibility to civilize the 
misfortune ne~ghbouring countries: the "hesitant empire" Europe has "its undeniable 
moral responsibility as a nonnative model of peace and stability in a world" and "the 
neighbours -longing for Europe, plagued by instability and inescapably ' our 
responsibility ' are co-cast enrolled and suited for exactly this performance" (Ifversen 
and K0lvraa, 2007, p.25). In addition, the civilian resource of EU is more outspoken 
in the communication, as the Commission has explicitly used the Internal Market 
approximation as a fruitful reward towards the EU-friendly neighbours (European 
Commission, 2003b, p.4). The civilian resources, including the common market, 
economic assistance and personnel development, makes EU as a powerful civilian 
power, assisting the normati ve agenda of EU. 
The combination of civilian power and normative power has a crucial dis tinction 
of identity with its ideological-twins, the United States. As Diez (2005, pp.620 - 621 ) 
and Manners (2002, p.241) has observed, the normative power is not new and 
monopolized by EU: American foreign policy is also equipped with a moralistic and 
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idealistic tone (Diez, 2005 , p.621). The distinction between U.S and EU is merely the 
means to achieve its nonnative position - and it is especially important after the 911 
attack and the rise of neo-conservatism in United States. Contrasting to the enmity 
approach in Bush 's administration, EU regards the neighbouring countries as "a ring 
of friends" or essential partners (European Commission, 2003b, pp.3 - 4) . The 
political instruments deployed by EU in the Wider Europe communication are mainly 
"civilian" in nature, rather than military forces. 118 If U. S. after the 911 attack can be 
characterized as a normative and military power, the political narratives emerged in 
the Wider Europe Communication give EU a distinctive international identity - a 
benevolent normative civilian power in the post 911 world. 
5.2 Policy Practice in Wider Europe 
As Larsen (1997 ;· 2001) and Milliken (1999) have suggested, as a social practice, 
policy on one hand is constructed (by the policy-maker) through a system of 
representation, on the other hand policy is understood (by the outsiders) through a 
system of representation. Although the Wider Europe Communication does not 
"actually" being implemented, the policy practice it suggested could also shed the 
light of the discourse effect brought by the policy initiative. 
11 8 The counter-argument, of course, is that the EU has no military means. 
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Unsurprisingly, the policy suggested in the Wider Europe communication is quite 
in line with most of the representation the Commission wants to present in the world. 
Many of the "policy incentives" included in the communication are focused on the 
civilian attraction and norms promotion (European Commission, 2003b, pp. 1 0 - 14). 
For example, policy incentives of "greater EU political involvement in conflict 
prevention anq crisis management" or "greater efforts to promote human rights , 
further cultural cooperation and enhance mutual understanding" (ibid, pp.12 - 13) 
reflect EU's commitment towards universal and liberal values (Larsen, 2004). 
"External of the Internal Market" and "preferential trading relations" has provided the 
neighbouring countries with "civilian" incentives to approximate the EU's norms and 
acquis . Benchmarks are set according to international standards and EU's shared 
values provide "positive conditionality" towards the neighbours . 
The introduction of EU acquis and benchmarks based on shared values not only 
encourage approximation, but also construct the EU space. As the communication has 
explicitly put, the Wider Europe initiative in long run will "resemble the close 
political and economic links currently enjoyed with the European Economic Area" 
(European Commission, 2003b, p.lS). As discussed in the previous chapter, the EEA 
serves as the closest approximation of EU which the membership would be offered if 
the country is willing join. T he Wider Europe has included numerous policy 
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incentives which aim to "further integration and liberalization", to the extent of 
"everything but institutions": 
"Participation in selection EU activities and programmes, including aspects such as 
consumer protection, standards, environmental and research bodies, could be opened to 
all neighbouring countries" (ibid, p.l 0) 
However, the diversity side of the European space is also constructed through "a 
differentiated,' progressive and benchmarked approach" (ibid, p.lS). The policy will 
be conducted through the preparation of individual country and! or regional Action 
Plans (ibid, p.16). Each country will have its own Action Plans, containing "the 
overarching strategic policy targets and benchmarks by which progress can be judged 
over several years" (ibid). Engagement is conditional on meeting targets for reform 
and incentive are introduced progressively. As the result, the Action Plans reflect the 
position of the neighbouring countries in the EU concentric circles, and such 
approximation could always be alerted by future reforms. Differentiation among the 
two regions, the WNIS and the Mediterranean countries, are also signal through the 
suggested policy implementation. As laid down in the communication, "full 
implementation and exploitation of the provisions contained in the existing 
Agreements remains a necessary precondition for any new development" (ibid, p.17). 
As the Commission has acknowledged, the basic bilateral framework is similar across 
the region: Association Agreement and Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The 
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main importance difference between EU 's policy attitude towards the region, as 
mentioned in the earlier chapter, is that "an explicit regional dimension encouraging 
the development of intra-regional initiatives and cooperation in a broad range of 
sectors is included" (ibid, p.8; emphasis added). On the other hand "encouragement 
for regional political cooperation and/or economic integration has not so far formed a 
strong compo~ent of EU towards Russia and the WNIS" (ibid). Therefore, the 
Commission suggested in the Wider Europe communication, "further regional and 
sub-regional cooperation and integration amongst the countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean will be strongly encouraged" (ibid). Instead, "new initiative to 
encourage regional cooperation between Russia and the countries of the Western NIS 
might also be considered", which subjected to the experience of the Northern 
Dimension concept (ibid). In receiving the new Wider Europe initiative, the policy 
content between two different regions is differentiated by the way of cooperation. 
5.3 Play of Discursive Practices in Winder Europe 
As Roxanne Doty (1996) and lennifer Milliken (1999) have explained, 
discourses themselves are unstable, requiring work to "fix the ' regime of truth '" 
(Milliken, 1999, p.230). The limit of the dominant discourse are constituted by other 
subsidiary discourses that are "open, inherently unstable, and always in the process of 
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being articulated" (Doty, 1996, p.6). This fluidity is also applicable in the 
investigation of narrative created by the Wider Europe, as narratives are less stable 
than discourse, thus it is more demanding on articulation and re-articulation of 
narratives in order to stabilize. Subsidiary narratives or representation therefore 
should be separated from the dominant representation, and require further attention. In 
short, there ar~ two subsidiary representations embedded in the communication, 
which are particularly targeted to the WNIS countries . 
5.3.1 A Freezing Relation towards the WNIS 
As Patten and Solana (2002) have discussed in the joint letter, the position of 
future Eastern neighbours "fall(s) somewhat uncomfortably in between". Therefore, 
one particular objective is to make their position "less ambivalent and more 
comfortable", particularly Ukraine "which is more actively seeking more concrete 
recognition for her European aspirations" (ibid). However, one important 
characteristic for the implementation of Wider Europe initiative is the continuity: 
" .. . the new neighbourhood policy should not override the existing framework for EU 
relations with Russia and the countries of the Western WNI S, and the Southern 
Mediterranean. " (European Commission, 2003b, p.15) 
"When it comes to the institutional and contractual arrangements of the Association 
Agreements and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, the full implementation and 
exploitation of the provisions contained in the existing Agreements remains a necessary 
precondition for any new development. Thereafter, the EU will examine the scope for 
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new Neighbourhood Agreements to build on existing contractual relations" (ibid, p.17; 
bold as origin, underlined added) 
Although the Commission has separated EU's relations of Russia from the rest of 
WNIS neighbours, the differentiation among them in policy implementation is very 
weak from the Wider Europe initiative was indeed very weak (Delcour, 2007, p.136). 
Prior to the Wider Europe initiative, EU policy towards the WNIS countries and 
Russia is simi'lar: the PCA and TACIS programmes.1l9 For the PCA between Russia 
and Ukraine, it provides similar conditions, similar institutional framework and 
similar rewards (ibid, pp.128 - 129). EU has used "a single policy pattern" for all 
former Soviet Republics, and particularly similar for Russia and Ukraine. The PCAs 
are focused on bilateral trade matter only, with little reference against the "shared 
values". Political values , especially those namely as European, "have not always 
ranked high on the political agenda of EU relations with its neighbours in the East" 
(Bosse, 2007, p.42). 
The idea of continuity stressed in the Wider Europe communication would then 
have an implication for WNIS especially Ukraine, which are not in line wi th the 
overall representation. While the Russia, in the past years , has been looked as the 
outsider of the Europe, the building on existing relationship for the WNIS countries 
119 See Karen Smith, European Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge : Polity Press) 
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has implicitly locked them to the Russian "Others". The modelling of the existing 
relationship and agreement in the future Wider Europe initiatives has frozen the 
further development of the relationship between EU and the WNIS countries - as 
"shared values" are not always the concern on the implementation or the articulation 
of further development. Instead gi ving a representation of becoming part of the 
Europe, the WNIS has indeed been given a false hope of being European through the 
Wider Europe initiative. The problem is even severe if we take the Mediterranean 
countries into the account, which are without doubt non-European countries. The 
Communication has made no attempt to differentiate their overall treatment and 
making it comparable to EEA or SAP, even although the communication has 
acknowledged the potential difference in the perspective of membership (European 
Commission, 2003b, p.5). Thus, severe disappointment has been given by the aspirant 
country (Solonenko, 2006, p.45 ; Wolczuk, 2004), which is contradicted to friendly 
neighbourhood and progressive. 
5.3.2 A Pseudo European Economic Area 
Another subsidiary narrative hidden in the communication is whether the Wider 
Europe will become an extended European Economic Area. As abovementioned, the 
European Economic Area has its implication in both the membership and the 
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European identity construction. Therefore it may require more investigation for the 
Commission creditability on implementing this long-term goal. Although the 
Commission has either explicitly spoken (European Commission, 2003b, p. lS) or 
implicitly hinted (the political discourse of Four Freedoms, see Gould, 2004) that the 
Wider Europe will be the EEA 11, the policy implementation does not support the 
political narr~tive . At least two important distinctions can be found between the EEA 
and the Wider Europe initiative. 
First of all , the uptake of ED current and future acquis , which is crucial for EEA, 
is not guaranteed in Wider Europe initiati ves. An important feature to run the 
Economic Area is the unreserved uptake ofED current and future acquis by the EFTA 
countries . As mentioned, exemption may only be taken for the reason of preparative 
situation or outside the scope of the agreement. The EFTA countries have to either 
receive or reject the proposal as a whole. However, the Wider Europe initiati ve has 
stressed on the idea of equal partnership and selective approximation. Action Plans 
would be discussed with the partner countries concerned before it come to 
implementation and "a political endorsement by the ED and the partner(s) involved" 
should be given to the drafted action plans. This means in theory, the partners could 
reject the action plans or amend the details of approximation. Such arrangement is 
totally different from what EEA is being launched between ED and the EFTA 
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countries . Without a guaranteed approximation, it is foreseeable that the EEA-type 
arrangement could never be achieved - as the approximation of EU standards will 
always hinder the full development of Four Freedoms. 
Secondly, the institutional arrangement, especially for the WNIS countries, is 
different from the EEA and EMP - which both of them have the idea of common 
market. Instead of a multilateral approach and institutional setting, the Wider Europe 
initiati ve does not form a similar institutional framework towards the WNIS. As 
suggested by Gould (2004, pp.189 - 190), "the deep integration with the Community 
cannot be pursued on a purely bilateral basis". Being the deepest and the most 
complex integration with the Union, any EEA-typed of agreement cannot be settled 
without a multilateral institution. However, strongly stressed in the Wider Europe 
communication, the WNIS will not receive any new multilateral institutional 
arrangement. The Northern Dimension suggested address only cross-border and 
transnational issues. As the result, the creditability of any EEA-type agreement is in 
doubt. As the EEA has representation an identity commitment of EU towards 
European countries , the pseudo European Economic Area representation in fact 
hammered the aspirations of approximation towards EU, echoing the first subsidiary 
representation. 
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5.4 Chapter Summary and Preview of Next Chapter 
This chapter continues the empirical findings of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. With the endorsement of the European Council, the European Commission has 
started its policy communication on the "new neighbourhood initiative". However, 
instead of echoing the member states ' ideal of Proximity Policy, the Commission has 
initiated the concept of "Wider Europe". 
By applying the discourse analysis techniques suggested by Larsen and Milliken, 
this chapter deconstructs the policy narratives and reconstruct the European identity 
proposed by the European Commission: Core Europe as the Land of Prosperity and 
Stability, Wider Europe as an Empire of Unity in Diversity and European Union as a 
Benevolent Normative Civilian Power. The above concepts are supported by different 
policy initiative and a soft boundary construction, which is contradicted to the 
geographical image suggested by the member states. Submerged narratives, however, 
are also found and leaned towards the intergovernmental conception of "proximity". 
This Wider Europe Communication was widely accepted until in late February 
2004, when the GAERC held a meeting to hold the progress of the Action Plans . Such 
turnaround of the progress has resulted in the final version of the policy, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, entering the policy agenda and being adopted. The next 
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chapter will give a detailed account of the European Neighbourhood Policy, with an 
intensive comparison between the identity construction in ENP and Wider Europe. 
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Chapter 6: The Council-led Narration - "European Neighbourhood" 
"Neighbour, everybody needs a good neighbour, But here s a friendly word of warning, 
Just be careful what you say... Neighbour, you pick your friends but not your 
neighbours, And the mayhem never ends. Neighbours, interfering with each other, Be 
sure that that s where the friendship ends." 
(Words sung to the theme tune for the TV soap "Neighbour") 
Previewed in the last chapter, this chapter will continue the empirical findings on 
the last phrase of policy discussion. Prior to February 2004, the European Council and 
the GAERC are positive towards the Wider Europe Communication. 120 However, in 
the 2563rd meeting, the GAERC has made an accusation against the Commission: 
"It emphasised the importance of ensuring coherence and coordination with Council 
policies and consistency with other foreign policy development. .. " (GAERC meeting, 
23 February 2004, p.7) 
Therefore, the GAERC has instructed the Permanent Representatives Committee 
"to examine in detail a number of aspects in relation to New Neighbourhood Policy in 
order to ensure that the Council is able to give the necessary guidance to further 
work" (ibid). The Wider Europe, as a concept and a policy name, was then abolished 
and replaced by European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This chapter will apply the 
discursi ve toolkits again, in order to rediscover the member states ' conception of 
120 See the meeting records from the GAERC meetings (2501 st meeting and 2533 rd meeting on 14 April 
2003 and 13 October 2003 respectively) and the Thessaloniki European Council Conclusion on 19 - 20 
June 2003. 
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European Neighbourhood Policy and the idea of Europe compared to the 
Commission-led Wider Europe. 
6.1 Changes in Representation in ENP 
The term "European Neighbourhood" was not new in 2004 as it first appeared in 
the joint letter by Chris Patten and Javier Solana (2002), which was used to describe 
the upgraded PCA relationships with Ukraine and Moldova. It is not until the Council 
meeting in February to use the term to describe the whole policy, which subsequently 
affected the later communication and implementation. 121 This section will discuss the 
change of narrative from "Wider Europe" to "European Neighbourhood". To start 
with, we should understand the meaning of "neighbour" and "neighbourhood". 
6.1.1 From Friends to Partners/Neighbours 
The root of the idea "neighbourhood" starts with the idea of "neighbour", which 
originated from West Germanic language, meaning the words "near" and "dweller, 
especially a farmer" (Meloni, 2007, p.26). The idea of neighbours, in European 
121 Johansson-Nogues has suggested the answer of changing name as the name Wider Europe wi ll stir 
up both the negative imagery for formal colonies and member states. For details , see 
Johansson-Nogues, "The (Non-)Norrnative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An 
Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?", European Political Economy Review, NO .7 (2007), p. 
184. However, such reason for the change does not conflict with the thesis, as the later one focus on the 
explanation of the new choice. 
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cultural sense, has two distinctive and opposite meanings. 
The very first idea of neighbours is linked with the Christian teaching, articulated 
in Leviticus 19: 18 - "love one's neighbour as oneself '. Such conception of loving 
your neighbours is usually linked with love of God, as these linked imperatives have 
represented the moral principle par excellence (Meloni , 2007, p.26). Under the 
traditional Christian universalism, the "neighbours" to be loved as oneself are 
everyone. Even there is a stranger who has been injured in the middle of the road, "the 
Good Samaritan stops by and provides its help" (ibid). Such conception of neighbours 
is extended to the conception of "fellow", which presumes that everyone is part of the 
only community of fellow humans or community of God's beloved subjects. 
The secular meaning of "neighbours" can be characterized as "other than me" 
(Meloni, 2007, p.27; see also Ifversen and K01vraa, 2007; Zaiotti , 2007). Instead of 
the universal love proposed in Christian reading, the idea of neighbours is 
characterized as hostility or even hatred - as the neighbours are just some pass-by of 
our lives. 122 Instead, neighbours should be viewed as between the two distinct 
reference points of "friends" and "enemies" and this idea of neighbours is contrast to 
122 For the objection of universal love towards our neighbours, see Sigmund Freud, lames Strachey 
translated and edited, Civilization and its Discontent (New York: W. W. Norton, 1 962) ~ C. Stephen 
Evans, Kierkegaard's Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and M oral Obligations (Oxford : Oxford 
University Press, 2004), Chapter 8 
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the classic study of Georg Simmel, which he classifies the ambivalent position as "the 
stranger" (Ifversen and I<.0lvraa, 2007, p.lS). While "strangers" are constituted by 
"the lack of knowledge" and "the inability to locate and identify", the concept of 
"neighbours" surely implies certain degree of knowledge and identification - at least 
in the claim of proximity. On the other hand, we also do not expect the relationship 
between our neighbours is comparable with that of our friends - as quoted from Chris 
Patten, "that's where the friendship ends" (Patten, 2006, p.179). 
Such categorical difference has highlighted one important representation in 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Compared to the term "friends " which frequently 
appeared in the discussion of Wider Europe, the European Neighbourhood Policy 
shows a sense of distant towards the neighbours: 
"The European Neighbourhood Policy 's vision involves a ring of countries, sharing the 
EU's fundamental values and objectives ... " (European Commission, 2004, p . 5 ~ 
emphasis added) 
"The importance of a neighbourhood policy is also highlighted in the European Security 
Strategy ... which states that the EU's task is to ' make a particular contribution to 
stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood [and] to promote a ring 
of well governed countries ... , 123" (ibid, p . 6~ emphasis added) 
By using a more distant and neutral descriptor "countries" instead of "friends", 
123 Although the original statement appears in the European Security Strategy which is drafted by the 
European Council instead of the Commission, such quotation used in the policy paper is also partially 
reflected the changed in representation of the policy. 
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the European Neighbourhood Policy in fact has shifted away from the original 
friendly position, which treated the neighbours as friends . 
The concept of neighbours has more subtle impact toward the Eastern European 
countries. 124 The experience of kommunalky or kommunalnye kvartiry - apartments 
shared by several families with services in common, has paradoxically increased the 
social isolation (Meloni , 2007, p.30). Meloni further argues that the main language" 
the Slavic, does not consider neighbours as a concept of friends . Meloni (2007, 
footnote 3) has used the diplomatic statement by Russian President Putin, describing 
Ukraine as a "Slavic friend" but not a "Slavic brother" as the illustration of such 
dissent. Therefore, by emphasizing the idea of "neighbourhood", the EU has fenced 
out the Eastern European countries as being the friends of European Union, as 
"friends and fences do not get on well together" (Zaiotti, 2007, p.144). 
The distance shown in ENP can also be reflected by another frequently appeared 
narrative, "partners" or "partner countries". Although the Strategy Paper does not 
mention the relationship between the EU and ENP partners as "partnership" (Zaiotti , 
2007, p.150), partnership is later used to describe the ENP after three-year 
implementation: 
124 See for example HannahArendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1973). 
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"And so the idea of a European Neighbourhood Policy was born ... A policy that is 
established on partnerships that offer Europe's neighbours substantial encouragement 
and support in their reform efforts, if they want it" (Barroso, 2007) 
"This is a partnership of equals and it is essential that we listen carefully to the interests 
of our neighbours ... We would like to hear our neighbours ' views on where they would 
like to see the greatest emphasis in our relations, where they see their interests reflected, 
and where, perhaps, they still feel that there are gaps to be filled ... " (Ferrero-Waldner, 
2007) 
It is interesting when we put the idea of partnership to what Commission 
describe the relations with neighbour: "privileged". Occasionally, the Commission has 
used the term "privileged partnership" when the Commission gave their formal press 
release in EU's delegation of Georgia and Armenia: 
"The Action Plans will define the way ahead over the next three to five years. The next 
step could consist in offering a new privileged partnership in the form of European 
Neighbourhood Agreements, to replace the present generation of bilateral agreements, 
when Action Plan priori ties are met" (European Commission, 2004a, p. 3) 
The image of "privilege partnership" is even more prominent in the academic 
discussion of ENp' 125 However, the concept of "privileged partnership" has a 
contextualized meaning rather than a simple idea of "more than partnership and less 
than membership" (Prodi, 2002). The underpinning concept of "privileged 
partnership" was firstly suggested by Christian Democratic Union (CDU), when the 
125 See for example, Fadi Hakura, "Partnership is No Privilege : The Alternative to EU Membership is 
No Turkish Delight", Chatham House Briefing Paper, EP BP OS/2 (September 2005); Rob Boudewijn, 
Evelyn van Kampen and Jan Rood, "Overview Paper for EU Policy Seminar: Exploring the Scope of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy - Towards New Forms of Partnership" (Hague: 11 April 2008). 
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party was preparing its Election Manifesto (Maurer and Haerder, 2007, p.204). In the 
party documents involved, the cnu used the term to describe the problematic 
accession of Turkey to European Union. The party argues that the accession of Turkey 
will suspiciously damage EU's capacity for integration, resulting in "over-stretch, a 
loss of identity and the ' de-integration ' ofa ' burgeoning political union '" (ibid). Thus, 
the "privilege partnership" serves as a "real alternative" which binds the Turkey to EU 
in a long-lasting manner. 
If the Communication Commission appeared in Georgia and Armenia and its 
website is not a slip of tongue but a real representation, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy has another important implication: it is a real alternative for all neighbouring 
countries . While for the Mediterranean partners which are looking for an enhanced 
relationship another Barcelona Process, such alternative is welcomed provided that 
there is a progressive integration to EU prosperous Internal Market. However, for 
Eastern European countries (like Ukraine and Georgia) which have European 
aspiration, such "real alternative" would definitely hammer their European dreams 
and lead to frustration (Kratochvil, 2006, pp.22 - 23). 
Unlike the EEA, the idea of partners does not bare the shared identity and values 
in broad agreement within EU (Bosse, 2007, pp.41 - 46). Focused on the economic 
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activities, the idea of partnershi p merely demonstrates the style of institutional 
arrangement Goint-ownership) or the commitment towards economic cooperation. 
The emphasis of partners in ENP therefore represents a status-quo in narrati ve 
towards the neighbouring countries, or a worse narrative if we take the idea of 
"privileged partnership" as the real narrative. Therefore, by changing the policy from 
Wider Europe to European Neighbourhood, it shows the EU try to describe the 
neighbouring countries as closest "Other" or different "Other" rather than a broader 
"Self'. 
6.1.2 FrOln Friendly Neighbourhood to Problematic Neighbourhood 
It is not possible to deny the security agenda far from the introduction of the 
policy (Akgul Acikmese, 2005, p.2; Cremona and Hillion, 2006, p.3; Emerson, 2004, 
p.l7). However, while security is one of the agenda stated in the Wider Europe 
communication, the European Neighbourhood Policy has placed stability and security 
into the highest priority. In the Wider Europe communication, the Commission 
identified the main challenges brought the neighbours are about "proximity, 
prosperity and poverty" (European Commission, 2003b, p.6). Security is one of the 
items listed out under the challenges from proximity (ibid), complimentary items 
includes transports, mutual trade and investment. On the other hand, in ENP Strategy 
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Paper, the Commission has bluntly put in the communication that the aim of ENP is to 
enable neighbouring countries sharing the benefits "in terms of increased stability, 
security and well being" (European Commission, 2004, p.5). While security is moved 
to the utmost agenda, the idea of prosperity has dropped back to almost invisible in 
the ENP agenda. 126 Instead of sharing prosperity and boundaries, the ENP Strategy 
Paper implicitly describes the neighbours as problematic against EU's internal 
security - an important elements of "Others". 127 
The construction of "Other" is further strengthened by both detailed description 
incorporated in the Strategy Paper and speeches delivered by different ENP 
policy-maker. In the Wider Europe, the communication has detailed described the 
economic conditions of the neighbouring countries, producing an image of poverty in 
the neighbourhood. However, in the ENP Strategy Paper, the Commission has 
highlighted on the political problems of some trouble neighbours, for example Belarus 
and Southern Caucasian. 128 The ENP Strategy Paper stressed on the political situation 
126 The term "prosperity" has been used only one time, instead the Strategy Paper used a comparatively 
neutral tenn «well-being" to replace it. The idea of "well-being" is rather ambiguous because it can be 
used to describe being secured (as the dominate discourse in the paper) and/or being prosperous 
(clearly in the former communication). 
127 For instance, in drafting the Action Plans, the Commission considers in two broad areas, one of 
them is related to the commitment to specific actions confonning with the shared values and '"to certain 
objectives in the area of foreign and security policy", including conflict prevention, and crisis 
management, common security threat (terrorism, proliferation of W1v1D, illegal anns exports) and 
participation in EU-led external actions. 
128 Compared to the ENP Strategy Paper, the Wider Europe Communication has handpicked two 
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in Belarus: an authoritarian system which failed to meet international democratic 
standards. In addition, in describing the potential members of ENP, the Southern 
Caucasian, similar stress on political situation appears: 
"EU-Belarus relations stalled in 1996-97 as a consequence of serious setbacks in the 
development of democracy and human rights in Belarus, in particular the replacement 
of the democratically elected parliament with a national by the President in violation of 
the 1994 constitution" (European Commission, 2003b, p . 15 ~ emphasis added) 
"Currently however, an authoritarian system is in place in Belarus. Elections since 1996 
have failed meet international democratic standards and democratic structures are 
lacking" (European Commission, 2004, p.11 ~ emphasis added) 
"The European Union has a strong interest in stability and development of the Southern 
Caucasus. The European Security Strategy .. . clearly identifies the South Caucasus as 
one of the regions, in which the EU should take a ' stronger and more active 
interest ' ... The EU wishes to see reinforced, credible and sustainable commitment 
towards democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights , and progress towards 
development of a market economy" (ibid, pp.10 - 11 ~ emphasis added) 
The renewal interest of EU neighbourhood therefore was explicitly driven by the 
security agenda of EU. In fact, such concern of neighbourhood is even more explicitly 
in EU's other documents or speeches. 129 This subtle change of description of the 
nature of neighbourhood has implications in both European space thus European 
countries, Belarus and Libya, to illustrate the difference in starting point (p.lS) and the importance of 
existing contractual relationship (p.17) respectively. 
129 See Gooter Verheugen, "EU Enlargement and the Union's Neighbourhood Policy", Speech at the 
DiplomatiC Academy, Moscow, 27 October 2003 ~ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Helping Ourselves Through Helping Our Neighbours", Speech at the 
Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman ofEU Member and Candidate States , London, 31 
October 2005. 
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identities. If the Wider Europe initiati ve represents the construction of "neo-medieval 
empire", the European Neighbourhood Policy can be regarded as the construction of 
"Westphalian superstate" (I(ahl, 2007, p.62; see also Christiansen, 2005). Although 
Christiansen (2005, pp.24 - 26) argues that ENP echoes a traditional way for the 
post-Westphalian state to deal with the boundaries problems, Christiansen also 
convinced that the EU is undergoing territorialisation, which is a traditional static 
behaviours. In his paper Christiansen defines territorialisation in two ways: the 
securitizing of EU's borders and the nature of discourse (ibid, pI7) - and it is both 
reflected in ENP. 
The meaning of neighbours and neighbourhood, as Ifversen and Kolvraa (2007, 
p.I5) argues, changes easily in different circumstances : it can be a comforting buffer 
zone separating us from the threat from our enemies or a distant acquaintance when in 
company of friend . Therefore, it is not sufficient to determine the "hardness" of the 
borders betvveen self and other, without paying attention to the political discourse. By 
raising the security and stability problem, the position of neighbouring countries has 
been deployed from the friendly neighbourhood to the nearest threat to EU 's security 
and stability. Therefore, instead of being open to neighbours, EU and its citizens wi ll 
suffer the "gated community syndrome" (Zaiotti , 2007, p.I44). Under such syndrome, 
the neighbours are considered as threats to internal security and should be handled in 
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suspicion. Thus, fences will always be set up in order to separate the neighbours from 
the safety of the self. The ENP rhetoric therefore performs the function of mental 
boundaries, by producing the narrative through the policy documentation. In addition, 
the rise of security agenda further securitized the "mental fence". While the Wider 
Europe initiative, the concern on migration is to give "perspective for lawful 
migration and movement of persons" which looking for "an efficient and user-friendly 
system" to facilitate "the crossing of external borders for bona fide third-country 
nationals" (European Commission, 2003b, p.ll ; underlined added). However, the rise 
in security issue overall has also changed the narrative of the cooperation: 
"Justice and Home Affairs , and in particular regional cooperation on border 
management, migration and asylum, the fight against organized crime, trafficking of 
human beings, illegal immigration, terrorism, money laundering and drugs as well as 
police and judicial cooperation" (European Commission, 2004, p.2l ) 
Instead of giving the perspective of lawful migration, the ENP Strategy implicitly 
argues that there are no longer bona fide third-country nationals from the 
neighbouring states . Border management is now serving solely for internal securi ty 
which reinforces the definition of "hardness" of the boundaries - securitization of 
borders as the "representation of something as an existential threat to a particular 
community" and "legitimation for the pursuit of extraordinary measures" (Diez, 2006, 
p.238; see also Buzan et. aI. , 1998, pp.23 - 24). Thus, through ENP, the ED could 
Defining Europe 157 
legitimately set up "mental fence", differentiating the neighbourhood from the 
EU-self: a core European land which has to be defended from the problematic 
borderlands, called the neighbourhood. 
6.1.3 From Responsibility to Reciprocity 
In the former Wider Europe perspective and Commissioners ' speeches, the nature 
of Wider Europe initiative is a kind of responsibility of EU, to "looking after the 
neighbourhood" (Wallace, 2003). As Holm (2005, p.18) suggests, this notion of 
responsibilities is analogical to "a father 's responsibility for the education of his kids". 
Therefore, in demonstrating the political incentive, the Commission tends to use the 
idea of reward or "positive conditionality" (ibid): 
"In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective 
implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms ... the EU's 
neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the 
EU" (European Commission, 2003b, p.4; p.l 0) 
" An annual review of progress in implementing the Action Plan .. . would be a concrete 
demonstration of enhanced EU political interest and provide (neighbouring countries ' ) 
governments with the opportunity to receive credit from the EU for their political and 
economic reform efforts" (ibid, p.18) 
Although ludith Kelley (2006, p.36) argues that conditionality is a hard concept 
for the third parties , it has a positive effect on EU 's image and thus EU's identity. As 
Ifversen and K0lvraa argues, by shifting the framing of the neighbourhood policy 
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from "our interests" (as demonstrated in the suggestion of Proximity Policy) to "the 
questions of responsibility and duty to deliver on expectations", the Union can 
successfully demonstrate its normative power, without "emerging as the master 
ordering about his slaves" (Ifversen and K0lvraa, 2007, p.21). It is because at the 
heart of the conditionality, is "the idea of a deal, or a bargain" and "implies an 
assessment of the performance of one party by the other" (Cremona and Hillion, 2006, 
p.22). Thus, through the ENP rhetoric, the European identity on normative power and 
benevolent empire is effectively performed through "this special European 
responsibility towards the Neighbourhood" (Ifversen and K0lvraa, 2007, p.22). 
However, the idea of responsibility and positive conditionality are toned down in 
the ENP Strategy Paper (Kelley, 2006, p.36). For example, in the discussion of 
incentives, the linkage between progression in values and reward is in its minimal: 130 
"The implementation of the ENP itself brings with it the perspective of moving beyond 
cooperation to a significant degree of integration .. . It will set out the ways and means by 
which partner countries participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and 
programmes" (European Commission, 2004, p.8) 
Instead, the ENP Strategy Paper has introduced a new narrative on the nature of 
the incentives : "joint ownership" (European Commission, 2004, p.8). The idea of 
130 There is only one count for mention the idea of responsibility, which is in p .13 about a shared 
responsibility on security and stability in the region. The incentives, which the ENP Strategy Paper 
frequently mentioned, are not explicitly delivering "in return" of the progression 
Defining Europe 159 
joint ownership, at first glance, seems to propose the idea of egalitarianism, as the 
idea points to equality between and mutual responsibility between EU and its 
neighbours, in shaping the policy and common responses to common problems 
(Cremona and Hillion, 2006, p.20; Holm, 2005, p.18). As the ENP Strategy Paper 
demonstrates, "there can be no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined 
set of prioriti.es" thus "EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its 
partners (European Commission, 2004, p.8). However, under the heading of joint 
ownership, the Commission has hinted the idea of reciprocity instead of equal 
partnershi p: 
"The ENP is an offer made by the EU to its partners to which they have responded with 
considerable interest and engagement. Joint ownership of the process, based on the 
awareness of shared values and common interests, is essentiaL .. The ambition and the 
pace of development of the EU's relationship with each partner country will depend on 
its degree of commitment to common values, as well as its will and capacity and 
capacity to imple~ent agreed priorities" (ibid; emphasis added) 
The idea of shared values is further "elaborated" in the later session, which all 
the values "are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and non-discrimination", but "the Union 's neighbours have pledged 
adherence to fundamental human rights and freedoms , through their adherence to a 
number of multilateral treaties as well as through their bilateral agreement with the 
EU" (European Commission, 2004, p.12). Occasionally, the idea of shared values is 
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true, but only in theoretical sense. As Zaiotti (2006, pp. 150 - 151) argues, values are 
indeed shared and practiced by the member states only, while they have not been 
actually practiced by the neighbouring countries 131 - thus EU is looking for 
"commitment to certain values that will shared only when fully embraced". 
Combining this argument to the previous quote, the idea of reciprocity has become 
obvious: it is. essential for the neighbouring countries to demonstrate the awareness of 
EU values and EU interests and the ambition and the pace of development of the EU's 
relations will depend on the degree of commitment to EU's values. 132 The idea of 
reciprocity is being put more bluntly in the EU latest promotional website, as 
Ferrero-Waldner has "said": 
"The ENP offers every neighbour country the chance to choose its own path. Those who 
want to advance relations through the ENP are already seeing their commitment 
matched with new opportunities" (European Commission, 2007b; emphasis added) 
As the Strategy Paper presents, the idea of joint ownership is one of the ENP 's 
key characteristics. However, there are numbers of difficulties with this model. As the 
131 See for example, the illustration by Judith Kelley, "New Wine in Old Wineskins : Promoting 
Political Refom1s through the New European Neighbourhood Policy", Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 44: 1, pp .29 - 55 , especially pp.42 - 45; Jonannes Varwick and Kai OlafLang edited, 
European Neighbourhood Policy: Challenges for the EU-Policy Towards the Ne w Neighbours 
(Opladen & Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2007), p.221 
132 Such observation echoes the inclusion of an article in the Constitution Treaty, which has explicitly 
written: "The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to 
establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, found on the values of the Union and 
characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation." (Art. I-57) . 
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interview done by ludith I(elley revealed, the Commission has found that it is 
"problematic" to "get most partners to accept this logic (strict conditionality) within 
the concept of joint ownership" (I(elley, 2006, pp.35 - 36). Nonetheless, the ENP is 
all about "values-ambitions link" (ibid) and as revealed by the Action Plan of Ukraine 
negotiated under intergovemmentalism between the Council and Ukraine, 
conditionality is still the agenda: "the pace of progress of the relationship will 
acknowledge fully Ukraine 's efforts and concrete achievement in meeting 
commitments to common values" (European Commission, 2004, p.l). As the result, 
the inherent tension makes the ENP "essentially a unilateral policy aimed at changing 
Union 's environment" (Cremona and Hillion, 2006, p.21 ; emphasis as origin) 
Illustrated by the use of "policy" instead of wide range of choice of words, 133 Marise 
Cremona and Christophe Hillion argue that "ENP is clearly and unambiguously an EU 
policy directed at its neighbours rather than the creation of something new (a space or . 
an area) or a shared enterprise (a process or partnership)" (ibid; emphasis as origin). 
As the result, the joint ownership appears to have a different connotation in ENP, 
when compare with other policy like EMP and Common Spaces (ibid, p.22). 
133 Cremona and Billion has contrasted the idea of policy with four different words: "space" (the Four 
Common Spaces with Russia), "area" (the EEA), "process" (the Barcelona Process and the Stability 
and Association Process in West Balkans) and "partnership" (the EMP), which they argues the other 
four form contribute a certain degree of true joint ownership. 
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The conditioned joint ownership, in fact, is linked to the drop of responsibility 
and the rise of reciprocity in the ENP. By inferring the idea of joint ownership, which 
both contracting parties have the rights and responsibility towards the policy, the 
original image of positive conditionality has become the image of negative 
conditionality - and this is the second impact of the joint ownership. As Cremona and 
Hillion confirm that "it is hard to reconcile true joint ownership with the unequal 
relationship implied by conditionality" (ibid, p.22), the Council has to find the way to 
apply conditionality towards the neighbours - since it is the central concern of the 
member states' elites (Kelley, 2006, p.35). The idea of joint ownership is a plausible 
solution since it allows one of the parties to retreat from the policy. This idea is hinted 
in the subsequent communication about the Commission Proposal for Action Plans 
(COM(2004) 795): 
"In line with conclusions of the Council, the present proposals for Action Plans are : ' to 
be agreed fointly with the neighbouring countries concerned. They should be a 
minimum duration of three years and be subject to renewal by mutual consent. Such 
action plans should be based on common principles but be differentiated, as appropriate, 
taking into account the specijicities of each neighbours, its national reform processes 
and its relations with the EU'" (European Commission, 2004b, p.3; italic as origin; 
underlined added) 
Stated in the communication, the consolidation or renewal of action plans is 
subjected to the mutual agreement or consensus. By mutual consensus, it means that 
the EU can either withdraw or freeze the renewal of action plans, providing that the 
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national reform processes of its neighbouring countries do not meet EU's standard. A 
policy is always driven by the policy-maker, and in this case the EU is in the driving 
seat. The positive conditionality inscribed in the Wider Europe initiative has suddenly 
become the negative conditionality in ENP Strategy Paper: if the neighbouring 
countries cannot fulfil the requirements, they may be at risk of being rej ected from 
approximation ofEU's prosperity zone - entering the Fortress. With the effect of 
negative conditionality and the rise of reciprocity, the representation of EU is shifted 
away from the benevolent civilian power towards a softer authoritarian towards its 
neighbourhood. Instead of a genuine normative power, the ENP is just "an exceptional 
policy for an exceptional actor" (lohansson-Nogues, 2007, pp.191 - 192). 
6.1 .4 More Differentiation but Less Distinction 
The final remark on the change of representation is the idea on differentiation, 
which is also linked to the impact of joint ownership in ENP. As Delcour somehow 
suggests, the concept of differentiation subscribed in the Wider Europe initiative is 
"weaker" than that in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Delcour, 2007, p . 136 ~ see 
also footnote 34). This sense is partially correct, provided that we treat the concept of 
distinction and differentiation as the same. Reviewed the Wider Europe initiative, the 
differentiation suggested in Wider Europe initiative was based on the different starting 
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point of the relationship with EU (European Commission, 2003b, p.15). However, the 
communication has hinted that there is distinction between the Eastern European 
neighbours and the Southern Mediterranean one, on the issue of membership: 
"Accession has been ruled out, for example, for the non-European Mediterranean 
partners. But other cases remain open, such as those European countries who have 
clearly expressed their wish to join the EU" (European Commission, 2003b, p.5) 
The EU does not intend to mask the real difference in the European aspiration 
between the Southern Mediterranean and the Eastern European countries. Yet, the 
Wider Europe has also drawn distinction between the European neighbours and West 
Balkans, which have the EU's confirmation on later accession possibility. Thus the 
concentric circle model, based on the approximation of EU (Europeanness) is set up, 
with three distinct circles : the Balkans is situated next to the EU, followed up Eastern 
European neighbours and the Southern Mediterranean neighbours occupy the outer 
edge of the Wider Europe. 
However, under the ENP Strategy Paper, the idea of differentiation has changed 
and the distinction, in particular between the Eastern European neighbours and 
Southern Mediterranean neighbours, is reduced. The concept of differentiation is 
further elaborated in ENP, which includes "geographical location, the political and 
economic situation, relations with the European Union and with neighbouring 
countries, reform programmes, where applicable, needs and capacities, as well as 
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perceived interests in the context of the ENP" (European Commission, 2004, p.8). 
Also, as Cremona and Hillion (2006, p.22) observe, such differentiation is also 
justified with the reference of joint ownership, recognizing the common targets, 
starting points, circumstances and priorities. Thus, we could observe that the ENP 
Strategy Paper has taken into account of all possible difference among the neighbours, 
and prepared to work bilaterally on the consolidation of the Action Plans, which again 
differentiated further on the (possible) commitment towards EU's values and interests . 
However, the idea of distinction is attained to its minimal, which focuses on the 
geographical coverage only: 
"The ENP is addressed to the EU's existing neighbours and to those that have drawn 
closer to the EU as the result of enlargement. In Europe this applies to Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova ... In the Mediterranean region, the ENP applies to all the non-EU 
participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process) with the 
exception of Turkey, which is pursuing its relations with the EU in a pre-accession 
framework. The Commission also recommends the inclusion of Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia within the scope ofENP" (European Commission, 2004, p.7) 
By comparing the difference in presentation about the distinction, the ENP 
Strategy Paper has masked the possibility of accession to EU under the new Strategy 
Paper. Although the Strategy Paper has separated the neighbours under the context of 
"Europe", "Mediterranean region" and "South Caucasus", they are all under the 
prominent title of "European neighbours", which abovementioned, as the different 
Others. Distinction based accession is no longer a concern under the ENP, which 
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subsequently tuned down the possibility of the interpretation of ENP as the 
"temporary mechanism" under enlargement process (Delcour, 2007, p.132). In fact, 
the ENP Strategy Paper even did not mention anything on accession or even a word 
on Balkans, compared to the intermediate paper (COM(2003) 393 Final). 
The selective silent/emphasis on the distinction/differentiation creates two 
representations on ED. First of all, it creates a narrower Europe, instead of Wider 
Europe. As mentioned earlier, the ENP Strategy Paper produce a narrative on the 
neighbourhood as problematic and non-Europe (in terms of values and situation). By 
keeping absolute silence about the Balkans, the Commission can keep the Balkan 
away from the label of instability and problematic, which may not be true judging by 
negative concept of "Balkanization". Thus, the concept of European neighbours, 
which was stressed as no linkage of accession possibility, is no longer applicable to 
the Balkans but targeted only to WNIS and Southern Mediterranean countries. 134 On 
the other hand, the incl usion of Mediterranean neighbours without discussing the 
distinction between accession possibilities is therefore perceived as the downgrading 
of the membership expectations of the Eastern neighbours to the level of Morocco 
(which has applied for membership in 1987), the only country being denied that it was 
134 The idea of suggesting the Western Balkans, southern Caucasus and Turkey in the Wider Europe -
Neighbourhood Policy was firstly discussed in the European Parliament on 20 November 2003 . 
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not European (Cremona and Hillion, 2006, p.l7 ; Ifversen and K0lvraa, 2007, p.l3 ; K. 
Snuth, 2005 , pp.758 - 759). The inclusion of Southern Caucasus, as Cremona and 
Hillion (2006, p.23) suggested, has led to "a greater emphasis on the differentiation as 
to ultimate objectives - "the intensity and level of ambition" (European Commission, 
2004, p.3). The Strategy Paper however did not make clear distinction between the 
differences i,n the final level of ambition, the accession possibility, leading to the 
creation a narrower Europe: creating new dividing lines between the EU (and Balkans) 
and the Eastern neighbours . 
6.2 Policy Practice in ENP 
Followed by the Council conclusion in June (GAERC Meeting, 14 June 2004), 
the European Commission has finished seven action plans in late 2004, five more in 
early 2006.135 By rev.iewing the implemented Action Plans , the policy practice looks 
coherent with the representations above. First of all , the distinction between the 
Mediterranean countries and Eastern European countries remains minimal. Although 
the EU has differentiated the European aspiration between the WNIS and that of 
South Caucasus countries, also its position on their aspirations : 
135 The Action Plans were subsequently adopted at different time : the first seven Action Plans were 
adopted in 2005 , following by the South Caucasus countries in November 2006, Lebanon and Egypt in 
early 2007. 
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" ... the European Union acknowledges Ukraine 's European aspirations and welcomes 
Ukraine 's European choice,,136 (EUlUkraine Action Plan, 2004, p.2) 
"The European Union takes note of Georgia 's expressed European aspirations,,137 
(EU/Georgia Action Plan, 2006, p.1) 
The differentiation between the European aspirations is clearly observed by 
comparing the diplomatic phase "acknowledge" versus "takes note" appeared in 
WNIS and South Caucasus countries . However, such differentiation in aspirations 
does not transfer to the real differentiation among the Action Plans. Nearly identical 
phases appear in both Eastern and Southern neighbours, even though the European 
Union "acknowledges" the European aspiration of the countries (EU/Ukraine Action 
Plan, 2004, p.2). For example, in describing what will be the enhanced relationship 
between EU and the partner countries, the descriptors are nearly identical - "new 
partnership perspectives". 138 Therefore, in general comparison, the offer given to 
Mediterranean partners and European neighbours is similar, and making no distinction 
between the level of ambition, i.e. the European aspiration of the countries. In fact, 
there are also no significant difference between EU-Ukraine relation and EU-Russia 
136 Similar acknowledgement is also included in Moldova's Action Plan (EUlMoldova Action Plan, 
2004, p.2) 
137 Similar "note-taking" is also included in both Armenia's and Azerbaijan's Action Plans 
(EU/Armenia Action Plan, 2006, p.2; EU/ Azerbaijan Action Plan, 2006, p.l ) 
138 The dissertation has focused on the comparison of five action plans, Ukraine, Jordan, Tunisia, 
Georgia and Egypt, which two of them have shown its European aspiration 
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relation, even though one of them is in ENP while the other is out of the scope.139 It is 
more convinced to conclude that there is no further distinction under the level of 
ambition, neither among the ENP countries nor the neighbouring countries in general. 
However, differentiation has taken place in the level of actions involved and the 
importance of shared values (Bosse, 2007, pp.51 - 52). For example, a more detailed 
political reform has been included in the Eastern and Southern Caucasus neighbours : 
"Promote adherence to and ensure implementation of core UN and Council of Europe 
Convention and related optional protocols (including signature and ratification of: 
CCPR-OP2-DP, CAT - Declar.Art.21 , Dec1ar.Art.22, CAT-OP, MWC, 1951 CSR, 1967 
CSR-Prot. , and ratification of: CEDAW-OP~ CRC-OP-AC)" (EUfUkraine Action Plan, 
2004, p.7 and footnote 1) 
"Adopt a new Criminal Procedural Code (by 2007)~ Implement the recommendation of 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, notably to improve detention conc1usions ~ Ensure 
implementation of the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture" 
(EU/Georgia Action Plan, pp.4 - 5) 
"Effective implementation of core UN Conventions to which Jordan is party~ Strengthen the 
capacity and effectiveness of the National Commission for Human Rights ~ Establish a 
dialogue for co-operation on Human Rights and Democratization in the framework of the 
Association Committee ~ Enhance protection of children's rights and eliminate child labour; 
Ensure effective of existing legislation against ill treatment" (EU/Jordan Action Plan, 2004, 
p.pp.4 - 5) 
The discussion on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms are kept 
139 See Laure Delcour, "Does the European Neighbourhood Policy Make a Difference? Policy Patterns 
and Reception in Ukraine and Russia", European Political Economy Review, No.7 (Summer 2007), 
pp.1l8-155 
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short and vague with Mediterranean partners than Eastern European neighbours 
(Bosse, 2007, p.51). Instead, priority actions often include effective migration/border 
management, a viable solution towards regional cooperation, disarmament and arms 
control, and sets of trade liberations measures. Little focus has been put on the human 
rights and democratic institution, except for Ukraine. As revealed by an interview 
conducted by Bosse, "the Southern member states has quickly reemphasized their 
traditional security interests in the region" (Bosse, 2007, p.52; emphasis added). This 
intergovernmental strategy, on one hand, confirm the interest-oriented approach in 
ENP by member states, it also partial reflects the idea of Fortress Europe within the 
intergovernmental negotiation, by seeing the neighbours as the traditional threat of 
Europe security. 
The emphasis on pragmatic issues rather than political values has also confirmed 
the idea of "privileged partnership" as suggested by Hakura (2005) and Maurer and 
Haerder (2007). Combining their argument, there are five important characteristics of 
"privileged partnership": extension of economic relations by a comprehensive Free 
Trade Area; limited personal flow and migration process; strengthening of the 
partnership projects and financial support; integration into CFSP and ESDP and 
integration in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal affairs (Hakura, 
2005, p.5; Maurer and Haerder, 2007, pp. 205 - 206). Most of the above criteria, 
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indeed, can be found in all ENP Action Plans, and the emphasis is especially on free 
trade area and limited personal flow. Furthermore, as Tim Gould (2004, p.22), the 
European Council has removed the idea of "Four Freedoms" - which the usual word 
stated in EEA and EU treaties, from both the concl usion and the subsequent Action 
Plans. Instead, only "a stake in EU's Internal Market" will be provided in the "new 
partnership perspectives". 140 Judging by the above criteria, the ENP is leaning 
towards the idea of "privilege partnership", rather than "Wider Europe" or the concept 
ofEEAII. 
6.3 Play of Discursive Practice in ENP 
While the ENP looks to be consistently implemented under the identity shared by 
the member states elites, there is a gap of representation between the Commission and 
the Council, reflecting their conception of ENP also their conception of European 
identity. Such conception gaps can be found in two ways: first, the difference shown 
between the country report prepared by the Commission and the Action Plans 
negotiated intergovemmentally, and their narrative towards the neighbouring 
countries and the policy. While the Action Plans present the issues , especially political 
140 Exceptions are granted for Georgia and Egypt which the idea of Four Freedoms is incorporated in 
their Action Plans, which the word "four freedoms" even appear in Georgia's Action Plan (EU/Georgia 
Action Plan, 2006, p.2). 
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issues and values-based projects, pragmatically and diplomatically, the country 
reports are critical towards the situation. Taking the Moldova country report and the 
final action plan as the example, the Action Plan has prioritized the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity higher than human rights issue. For the Action Plans, the measures 
or promise taken by EU is very vague: "support the active involvement of civil 
society and the promotion of democratic values and respect for human rights" (ibid, 
p.12). The remaining measures are all related to hard security issues, post-settlement 
plans and border management. The gap between the supranational conception of the 
country and the intergovernmental result is even bigger when considering the 
Medi terranean partners : 
"Egypt acceded to UN Convention's Against Torture in 1986 but it has ratified the 
Optional Protocol. The Convention's provision have been transposed into national law 
in accordance with the guidelines of the UN Committee against Torture, with the only 
exception being the definition of torture which does not fully comply with the 
Convention ... Torture, is however, often cited by human rights organizations at 
international and national level as being widespread and the biggest single violation of 
human rights in Egypt" ("'European Neighbourhood Policy ' Country Report: Egypt", 
2005, pp.8 - 9; emphasis as origin) 
"Examine the possibility of accession to the optional protocols to international human rights 
conventions to which Egypt is a party" (EU/Egypt Action Plan, 2007, p.7) 
By the abovementioned comparison, the Commission has perceived the ENP as 
the framework of Action Plan to consolidate EU's political values overseas, so the 
Commission has tried very hard to identity the values which the neighbours are not 
Defining Europe 173 
shared.141 As one of the Commissioners concludes : 
"The Union has responded to these deeply-held convictions by creating the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, which aims at gradual integration with the Union, essentially 
through the adoption of parts of the Qcquis and the respect of democratic and human 
rights" (Hubner, 2006, SPEECH/06/27 ) 
After all , the idea of EU-as-political-values is a familiar notion in the Wider 
Europe initiative, but subsequently masked in the ENP Strategy Paper and the 
discussion of ENP Action Plans. 
The difference between the Commission 's and the Council 's conception on the 
policy representation can also be shown on their respective attitude towards the 
neighbours . While the previous analysis argues that the Council tries to 
present/construct the image of "difference Other" towards the neighbouring countries, 
the Commission 's position is rather vague but positive. The familiar narratives, like 
"friends ", " responsibility", "prosperity", have been reiterated by the Commission in 
different circumstances promoting the European Neighbourhood Policy, rather than 
strictly following the original narrative in ENP: 
"Our neighbours are not just citizens of ' third countries ', they are our close partners and 
friends ... OlIT first priority is thus to share the enlarged EU's peace, stability and 
141 Both Giselle Bosse and ludith Kelley conclude that the emphasis on "shared va lues" is a sign of 
Commission-centric policy formulation. See Giselle Bosse, "Value in the EU 's Neighbourhood Policy : 
Political Rhetoric or Reflection of a Coherent Policy?", European Political Economy Revie-w, No. 7 
(Summer 2007), pp.38 - 62 ~ ludith Kelley, "New Wine in Old Wineskins : Promoting Political Reforms 
through the New European Neighbourhood Policy". 
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prosperity with our neighbours" (Ferreo-Waldner, 2005) 
"The core principle of ElITOpean Neighbourhood Policy is very simple - we want to 
extend the prosperity, stability and security enjoyed by the EU's members to our 
neighbours. Why? Because our neighbours are important to us. You are our closest 
partners and friends" (Ferreo-Waldner, 2006, SPEECH/06/346) 
"Clearly, it was said at the time, the quality of our relations would largely depend on the 
political will on either side. But it was the Commission 's responsibility to come up with 
a way of improving relations with all these countries" (Barroso, 2007) 
While the European Council uses the idea of third countries to describe the 
neighbours, the idea of friends , whom shared EU 's norms, is still the dominant 
narrati ves towards the neighbours across the Commission. 
6.4 Chapter Summary and Preview of Next Chapter 
This chapter comes to the final phrase of empirical findings of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. With the member states intervention after February 2004, the 
Wider Europe was step down from the political narrati ve and replaced by European 
Neighbourhood Policy. 
By applying the discourse analysis techniques suggested by Larsen and Milliken, 
this chapter again deconstructs the policy narratives and reconstructs the change in 
European identity proposed by the member states : From Friends to Partners/ 
Neighbours, From Friendly Neighbourhood to Problematic Neighbourhood, From 
Responsibility to Reciprocity and More Differentiation but Less Distinction. Such 
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concepts, with the policy practice, support a harder boundary between EU member 
states and their neighbours . Submerged narratives, especially coming from the 
Commission, are also discussed. With the brief discussion, it can be shown that the 
member states and the Commission are indeed talking on different rhetoric and 
conceptions of European identity. 
This chapter will end the empirical findings from the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. The next chapter will be the concl uding chapter of the dissertation. The 
hypotheses will be reiterated, the empirical findings will be discussed again and the 
proj ection and the limitation of the research will be stated at the very end of the 
chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
"The European Union is enjoying an unprecedented high standard of living, and the 
longest peace in its history - but what about the states just outside its borders? Just a 
time we have ended the division of our continent, it is important that the outer perimeter 
of the EU should not become a new dividing line " 
(Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "Welcome" in ENP Official Website, 3 April 2008) 
The chapter is the concluding chapter for the whole dissertation. Started with the 
summarization of empirical findings, this chapter will first discuss the identity politics 
of European Neighbourhood Policy - what are the identity implications at each phrase? 
Followed by that, this chapter will suggest a plausible explanation, based on the 
suggested framework, for such changes. By applying the framework in the latest stage 
of the development, this chapter is tempted to project the development of ENP in the 
near future. Finally, a general discussion of the research limitation and the future 
direction of such kind of research will be included as the ending of the dissertation. 
7.1 Summarization of the Empirical Findings 
Before re-stating the empirical findings , let us revisit the hypotheses made by the 
dissertation: 
Ho: The European Neighbourhood Policy contains political narratives 
which reflect the process of negotiation in the EU's identity formation, 
through the effect of construction process vis-a-vis the ((neighbourhood" 
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in different phrases of policy formulation. 142 (The identity politics of 
ENP) 
H j : The Wider Europe is suggested by the Commission as it tries to 
produce a softened boundary (based on values or political ideas) toward 
all its neighbours; and 
H2: The European Neighbourhood Policy is suggested as the Council 
tries to purpose a social boundary which is hard and soft. The narrative 
towards the boundaries consist of hard element (like geographical) and 
soft element. 
Chapter 4 - 6 have discussed the political narratives and the boundary 
construction embedded In the European Neighbourhood Policy, Table 7.1 has 
summarized the research findings, based on each phrase of the policy: 
Policy Initiators Political Narratives Boundary fonnation 
Proximity Intergovernmental Eastern European Limited interaction to the 
Policy (Jan (Jack Straw) Neighbours (restricted) ~ Eastern European countries 
2002 - Dec New Neighbours 
2002) Initiative ~ Enlargement Geographical boundaries in 
emphasized nature 
Supranational (Romano eastern (European) Extensive interactions from 
Prodi) neighbours (defined by Morocco to Russia to Black 
PCAs)~ Wider Europe~ Sea 
Political Project of EU 
Soft boundaries in nature -
the Copenhagen Proximity 
Criteria 
Wider Europe Supranational Wider Europe ~ Prosperity~ Medieval Boundaries -
Initiative (Mar (European Stability ~ Shared/ flexible border spaces with 
2003 - Feb Commission) Common values or overlapping territories and 
142 The neighbourhood is constructed since before the ENP, there is no political discourse in EU's 
documents naming the involved countries collectively as the neighbourhood. This idea is important and 
will be discussed in later chapters. 
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2004) interests; Differentiation; diversified institutional 
Responsibility arrangements 
Proximity is differentiated 
and according to the 
commitment of European 
standards 
European Supranational but under Neighbours/ Partner; Tightened boundary control 
Neighbourhood severe scrutiny of the Security; Privileged 
Policy (May Council Partnership; Joint European neighbours -
2004 - Present) Ownership; back to distinctive 
geographical boundaries 
Table 7.1 BOlmdary formations in each phrase of ENP 
With reference to the discussion of policy texts and practices in each phrase, the 
dissertation confirmed that at each phrase, different political narratives are spelled out 
and different conception of boundaries is formed. These empirical findings confirmed 
with the secondary level of the hypotheses (HI and H2)' However, back to the 
fundamental hypothesis (Ho), the confirmation is not satisfactory if we do not discuss 
the impact of such narratives and boundary formation on identity construction at each 
policy phrase. The below section will show the theoretical linkage between the 
empirical findings and the identity constructed. 
7.1.1 European Identity in WIder Europe 
Back to Lars-Erik Cederman's framework on the relations of boundary 
construction and identity formation, the boundary constructed in the phrase of Wider 
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Europe is a post-national identity. Such post-national identity has the characteristic of 
no clear distinction between national-self, European-self and the global-self. 
Therefore, the definition between "Self' and "Others" lies on the values or 
institutions - the notion of civic nationalism. 
Discussed in Chapter 3, the Commission is driven by a desire to construct "a 
stable and enlarged Europe with a stronger voice in the world". For the idea of 
"stable", it is not only meant to a materialistic stability, but also a mental stability 
which the European political project must not be watered down; for stronger voice, it 
means that EU must build up its unique edge for its impact to the third parties. 
Judging from this perspective, the representations in Wider Europe is a deliberative 
construct by the Commission. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, one of the important representations in Wider Europe 
is the idea of "Unity in Diversity". This is a new idea of European identity, compared 
to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. While the latter one is focused on an 
absolute unity, like the phrase of "common" and "joint" in the policy, the new 
European identity is characterized as "diversity" and "differentiation": "the new EU 
approach cannot be a one-size-fit-all policy" (European Commission, 2003, p.6; 
emphasis added). As the Communication has finally put: 
Defining Europe 180 
"While the EU should aim to ensure a more coherent approach, offering the same 
opportunities across the wider neighbourhood, and asking in return the same standards 
of behaviour from each of our neighbours, differentiation between countries would 
remain the basis for the new neighbourhood policy" (ibid, p.16) 
The idea of "unity" IS re-defined: a coherent approach does not request a 
common action towards each third party, so does the coherent European Union - a 
flexible arrangement on external relations IS one of the characteristic of European 
Union (diversity). However, this diversity IS also relied on the "shared EU-values" 
which cordially defined the essence of European Union (unity). 
This partially solves the problem of "stable" Europe. Identified by both 
practitioners and academics, one problem of EU international identity is the lack of 
coherence and consistency.143 Although the Treaty of European Union (TEU) states 
that "the Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities" 
(Article C(2) of the TEU), both the treaties and the member states fail to give an 
operational definition on the idea of "consistency" (Cameron, 2007, p.35). ENP, as a 
foreign policy initiated by the Commission, has gIven a new definition thus 
143 For a practitioner view, Fraser Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy (London: 
Routledge, 2007), pp.35 - 36; For academic views, see Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations 
Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe 's International Role", Journal of Common Market Studies , Vo1.31:3 
(1993), pp.305 - 328; Reinhardt Rummel and Jbrg Wiedemann, "Identify Institutional Paradoxes of 
CFSP", in Jan Zielonka edited, Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy (Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998), pp.53 - 66; Karen Smith, "The Instruments of European Union Foreign Policy", 
in Jan Zielonka edited, Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 
1998), pp.67 - 86; Knud Erik J0rgensen, "The European Union's Performance in World Politics: How 
Should We Measure Success?", in Jan Zielonka edited, Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy (Boston: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp.87 - 102. 
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international identity for EU external relations. 144 By establishing the "new 
approach", ENP serves as the prototype of contemporary EU external relations - an 
important representation of contemporary EU "identity". 
For a strong European voice, the ENP shows its strength as a combination of 
civilian power and normative power. This combination is rather unique, compared to 
other powers present in the neighbourhood, the United States and the Russia (or 
USSR during Cold War). Rather using hostility or military strength, the ENP provides 
. a third type of power in the "power vacuum". Being a benevolent normative civilian 
power in the post 911 world, EU can demonstrate its impact in multilateralism and 
partnership, contrasting to U. S. unilateralism. 
7.1.2 European Identity in European Neighbourhood Policy 
On the contrary, the member states , even with the Pan-Europeanism ideal, treat 
EU as a platform to foster domestic legitimacy and acquire political resources. 145 
Thus, what we view ED, In their nationalistic eyes, IS the idea of efficiency and 
144 Interestingly, ENP was firstly described as "foreign policy" by the Commission on the annual report 
2005 of the EC's development policy. See European Communities, Annual Report 2005 on the 
European Community s Development Policy and the Implementation of External Assistant in 2004 
(Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005), p.3 
145 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht. Ithaca, New York: Comell University Press, Chapter 1 .~ Andrew Moravcsik, "The 
European Constitutional Settlement", The World Economy (January 2008) [accessed from 
J.1.npj!.\y.~y~y:.pr.irw.9. .. t:S!n:.~:.~.h;!.:::.:~;.n-1.Qr.~l.~:~S/J.Lb.rg.rY!.§~J.tJ.~ID.~JJ..Lp.~JL on 5 March 2008] 
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performance - "less is more" for EU and its policy. 146 The national political elites are 
concerned about the maintenance of prosperity and security, which in return affecting 
their duration of office. Thus, the European political elites requIre a smaller, 
self-contained and efficient Europe, which "can resist, with the help of security 
measures and trade barriers, globalization and Americanization" (Delanty, 2006, 
p.195) - \vhich IS the idea of Fortress Europe. This notion of European identity 
construction echoes the desire from the European citizens, which their concerns are 
the loss in social benefits and economic prosperity, particularly from the uncontrolled 
migration from the East and the South (Kratochvil, 2006, p.16). 
Such intergovernmental perception of EU has therefore transformed to a new 
type of EU identity - the Fortress Europe: "within the fortress , internal borders are 
eased, while the external ones have become more pronounced" (Delanty, 2006, 
p.194).147 Under such ideational construct, the borders are viewed as the protectionist 
barrier against "unnecessary" import from the developing world. Fortress is built in 
order to maintain the core identity of Europe, namely democracy, security and 
146 However, it does not mean that it will fail to construct a European identity or in fact, a European 
identity based on efficiency/performance may be useful for member states. For the empirical research 
on the identity building based on efficiency, see Sylvia Kritzinger, "European Identity Building form 
the Perspective of Efficiency", Comparative European Politics, Vol.3 (2005), pp .50 - 75 . 
147 However, Delanty does not agree on the nature ofENP, which he regards ENP as the exception of 
fortress. 
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prosperity. By identifying the closest neighbourhood as the problematic neighbours, 
the European elites have reconstructed EU as a community for offering pragmatic 
security solution and prosperous economic growth inside. The securitization of 
borders in ENP has re-established the new mental demarcation line between the core 
EU and the neighbouring countries, strengthening the differentiation between the Self 
and the closet Others (Kratochvil, 2006, pp.17 - 18). With the hardening of border 
control and less involvement in neighbourhood business (compared to the idea of 
responsibility), the EU's image is constructed as a pragmatic fortress vis-a.-vis the 
problematic neighbourhood. 
7.1 .3 The Institutional Bargaining Game 
To explain the outcome of the narratives , we may have to refer back the 
institutional arrangement of European Union. Although the final decision of any 
external relations conducted by EU will have to get the approval of the Council, it 
does not mean that the Council is the only single actor in the decision making process. 
Scholars like Simon Hix have argued that there is always a "bureaucratic drift" or 
"agency loss" of the policy outcome (Hix, 2005, p.29). According to Hix 's analysis 
(ibid), this phenomenon can be shown in the below figure (Fig. 3.1), which involves 
in the two-dimensional policy space, with three governments (A, B, C) and the 
Commission and their respective ideal policy preferences (P a, Pb, Pc, P corn) . Assuming 
the bargaining power of each government is similar, the resultant policy outcome 
would be the centre of the triangle (01) , and the Commission preference lying outside 
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the policy outcome. However, through "selective" implementation of the agreed 
policy, the Commission is in fact to drift the policy outcome or impact closer to its 
preferred outcome, to the point (02). For government A and B, they will prefer the 
"distorted" version of the policy as the result will be closer to their ideal preference. 
As the result, they will refuse any new legislation measures from government C to 
pull back the distortion, nor further drifting from the Commission as well. Hence, the 
Commission can manipulate the initial outcome to a certain extent, but constrained by 
the policy structure of the governments. 
Pcom '" 
Fig. 7.1 "Bureaucratic Drift" by European Commission 
In addition, linked with its competences and preference structure, the 
Commission serves as a "policy entrepreneur" which is also able to set the policy 
agenda, even the policy is formally out of the scope of competences. (Majone, 1996, 
pp. 74 - 77 ; Moravcsik, 1999) Like the member states have selectively delegated to 
the Commission, the Commission has selectively supplied information and policy 
choices to member states. The role of policy entrepreneur is especially influential 
when the Council is divided or the Council needs new policy ideas or information, 
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and there is a large variety of actors across time and space, domestic competence and 
international vision (Hix, 2005, p.68) - this happens exactly in the field of foreign 
policy. The Commission can shape the policy outcome by selectively supplying 
information to the Council, manipulating the divided lines among member states or 
bringing the Commission's idea on the Council 's table. (Moravcsik, 1999) Together 
with the selective implementation power of the Commission, the Commission can 
influence key member state governments ' preference vis-a-vis their original position. 
This eventually leads to a new policy which favours the Commission position to be 
adopted by the Council. 
Such diversification and entrepreneurship can also be observed during the 
transition from Proximity to Wider Europe. By reviewing the minutes and the political 
text, the Council has given a rather high degree of autonomy to the Commission, 
including drafting the policy communication and later the country report and the 
action plans. Not until the sudden halt in February 2004, the Commission has played 
the role of "policy entrepreneur" in the formulation of the new policy instrument. 
Therefore, the Commission is allowed to "drift" the identity presentation in the new 
policy - creating the idea of "Wider Europe" and its meaning. In addition, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, there is quite a huge discrepancy along the member states . For 
instance, the Central European (led by Germany) countries are more intended to 
embrace the WNIS while the Mediterranean European countries (led by France) are 
akin to develop a better relationship with the Mediterranean partners ~ the new member 
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states are more willing to open the gate of EU while the established states are rather 
conservative on the issue. This political context, according to Hix 's analysis, will 
allow the Commission to manipulate the dividing lines and press for a more 
favourable result. As Nathanial Cospey (2007) reminds us, the Polish non-paper has 
its impact on the policy instrument on one hand, the French concern of incl uding the 
Mediterranean partners are catered on the other hand. Such manipulation, by the 
Commission, accounts for the very first existence of the "Wider Europe". 
However, such drift is limited by the Council in 2004. Although the Commission 
may hold the administrative monopoly for most of the time, officials from the 
Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of member states are in fact more experience in 
evaluating relative policies. Neither the Commission monopolizes the information nor 
negotiation, the member states, especially the established states, have a comparable 
information network and competent officials for generating new policy ideas. Thus, 
they will eventually notice the impact of "Wider Europe", when the action plans were 
coming out in February 2004. As the result, a European Neighbourhood Policy was 
produced and the European boundaries were hardened in the ENP. Yet, some of the 
Commission's elements cannot be erased easily such that a rather identity equilibrium 
is obtained, which is much diversified from the original Proximity policy. 
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7.2 Further Implications from the Thematic Framework 
From the last section, it could be concluded that the three hypotheses suggested 
in the dissertation are confirmed by the empirical findings. The developed framework, 
may also be applied to the recent development of ENP. For instance, the Commission 
has produced two papers on the refonn of ENP (COM(2006) 726 and COM(2007) 
774). These two policy communications, accompanied by two overall assessment 
reports (SEC(2006) 1504/2 and COM(2008) 164) were produced in 2006 and 2008 
. respectively. In these two value-added communications, the Commission has put lots 
of stress on the masked representations and policies, which try to rebuild the image of 
Wider Europe: 
"The ENP is gradually established itself as a mutually beneficial partnership for refonn 
and development, helping our neighbours to come closer to the EU, bringing new 
benefits to their and our citizens and promoting regional integration beyond the borders 
of the Union" (European Commission, 2008, p.l ; emphasis added) 
"Trade and economic integration ... In order to reap additional economic and political 
benefits for all, it is important to offer all ENP partners, both in East and South, a clear 
perspective of deep trade and economic integration with the EU ... " 
"Mobility and Migration ... the ENP has not yet allowed significant progress on 
improving the movement of partner country citizens to the EU ... " 
"Regional conflicts ... The EU needs to be more active, and more present, in regional 
and multilateral conflict-resolution mechanisms and in peace-monitoring or 
peace-keeping efforts" (European Commission, 2006b, pp .3 - 4; bold as origin; 
underlined added) 
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The idea of helping neighbours, facilitating movement and effective multilateral 
appears again the policy suggestion communication. While in the overall assessment, 
special attention is always paid to the democratic or institutional reform by the 
neighbouring countries (European Commission, 2006a, pp.4 - 5; 2008, pp.3 - 6). The 
commitments towards EU's political values and the effectiveness on incentives for 
neighbours ' institutional reforms have become the main benchmark for the policy 
success or failure. Unlike the ENP Strategy Paper, security issues and border 
management are tuned down in the two succeSSIve evaluation and suggestion 
communications. Instead of narrative settlement, the representation of ENP and EU's 
neighbours is unlikely to have finalized and subjected to change, if the Commission 
can take the role of political entrepreneurship again through the policy 
communication. 
7.3 Application of the Framework in Other Areas of European Foreign 
Policy 
As a new approach for European foreign policy, the empirical findings from ENP 
have shed the light of constructing a framework for understanding European foreign 
policy in general. First of all, instead of a holistic assumption on EU's actomess, the 
dissertation argues that EU cannot be analysed without paying attention of different 
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actors and the institutional constraints. By separating the policy phrase according to 
their respective leading position and major changes, we can lead to another view of 
European foreign policy - foreign policy as the meeting of "politics of identity" and 
"identity politics" . 
"The politics of identity" includes the power struggle between the Commission 
and the member states, on the idea of identity. Rather than following the liberal 
intergovemmentalism, the thematic framework has emphasized the role of European 
. Commission in constructing European identity. By comparing the first stage and the 
last stage of the ENP, there is significant difference in the representation of EU. In 
addition, the Commission is especially important in getting into the disagreement of 
member states, formulating the equilibrium bargain position of the policy - this is 
partially shown by the Wider Europe initiative and the later stage of Proximity Policy. 
Rather than "entrepreneurship", the Commission has its real effect in shaping the 
policy orientation. 
However, the liberal intergovemmentalism is still useful when deciding the final 
outcome of representation. The alterative leading role between the Commission and 
the Council - who does not share the same normative resources - will always make 
the European identity, as shown in the empirical findings Therefore, European identity 
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cannot be a strong input variable in constraint the utility of member states - just as the 
logic of appropriateness and EU role theory assumed, but constructing identity as the 
rational choice for member states and European Commission. 
Finally, as European foreign policy involves in the definition of Self and Other, 
representation of EU's identity and EU's other will always be found in the policy and 
other of similar kind. As the performativity approach suggested that, the identity can 
only be consolidated when the normative resources are consistently performed. By 
. applying the discursive reading of foreign policy, we can always find the political 
narrati ves which reflect the leading actors ' conception of European Union. The below 

























Structural Impact of Contemporary European Political Order 
Figure 7.2 Summary of Thematic Framework 
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7.4 Future Research Possibility 
By acknowledging the limitations of the current dissertation, there can be three 
possible further research agenda arise from the thematic framework. First of all, 
testing the thematic framework by different EU foreign policy for example the 
non-selected cases suggested above or under different institutional arrangement for 
example Pillar I and Pillar III policy of EU; secondly, testing the causality by further 
investigation of member states ' and Commission's preference on European identity . 
. This can be done by more systematic interview and extensive achieve review; finally, 
testing the ENP 's effect on identity construction by further investigation of the mass 
response of European identity. This can be done by researching on the incremental 
change of perception of Europe's neighbours and the mass idea of European identity. 
As in the end, the European political project should not only involve in the elite-level 
politics, but also include the mass response on the future of Europe - this is a lesson 
taught by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the crisis stipulated by the 
Treaty of Lisbon. 
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